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ABSTRACT 
ARTICULATING AND AGGREGATING SECTARIAN INTERESTS: 
THE CASE OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY 
 
 
Ayşe Ezgi Gürcan 
Political Science, Ph.D. Thesis, 2013 
Supervisor: Sabri Sayarı 
 
Keywords: Alevi, political representation, group-based rights, transnational 
advocacy networks, interest groups 
 
This dissertation provides insight into the dynamics of the inclusion of the Alevi 
community into the political processes in Turkey. By focusing on the actors and the 
strategies of Alevi interest politics in Turkey and Germany, the dissertation discusses 
how the changing political opportunity structures and the heterogeneous and fragmented 
collective identity of the Alevis shape the articulation and aggregation of their shared 
interests. Adopting a transnational perspective, it argues that the study of the networks 
established between the domestic Alevi interest groups, and the Alevi migrant 
communities and organizations located in Europe are just as important as the 
understanding of the relationship between the domestic Alevi organizations and 
political actors in Turkey. Through process tracing this dissertation demonstrates that 
Alevis present an interesting case in the study of political inclusion of minorities. Alevis 
reject minority status, although their demands include collective right claims, and their 
narratives emphasize discrimination on the basis of their collective identity. The interest 
groups established by Alevis seek recognition and respect for the community but have 
been unable to effectively mobilize due to the heterogeneity in framing Alevi identity. 
Finally, the regional organizations, which historically played a significant role in the 
diffusion of norms of individual and collective rights, contribute to the emergence of 
new patterns of exclusion for the Alevi community in Turkey.  
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ÖZET 
MEZHEP KAYNAKLI ÇIKARLARIN EKLEMLENMESI VE TOPLAŞIMI: 
TÜRKİYE’DE ALEVILER ÖRNEĞI 
 
 
Ayşe Ezgi Gürcan 
Siyaset Bilimi, Doktora Tezi, 2013 
Danışman: Sabri Sayarı 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Alevi, siyasi temsil, group temelli haklar, ulusaşırı destek ağları, 
çıkar grupları, 
 
 
 
Bu doktora tezi, Alevi toplumunun Türkiye’deki siyasi süreçlere dahil olmasının 
dinamiklerinin kavranmasını sağlamaktadır. Türkiye ve Almanya’daki Alevi çıkar 
politikalarının aktörlerine ve stratejilerine odaklanmak suretiyle, bu tez değişen politik 
fırsat yapılarının ve Alevilerin heterojen ve parçalanmış kolektif kimliklerinin ortak 
çıkarların eklemlenmesi ve toplaşımını nasıl biçimlendirdiğini tartışmaktadır. Ulusaşırı 
bir bakış açısı benimseyerek yerel Alevi çıkar grupları ile Avrupa’daki Alevi Göçmen 
toplulukları ve örgütleri arasında kurulmuş ağların incelenmesinin, Türkiye’deki Alevi 
organizasyonları ve politik aktörlerin ilişkileri anlamak kadar önemli olduğunu savunur. 
Bu doktora tezi süreç izleme metoduyla azınlıkların siyasal katılmalarında Aleviler 
ilginç bir durum arz etmekte olduğunu göstermektedir. Her ne kadar talepleri kolektif 
hak isteklerini içermekte ve anlatıları kolektif kimlikleri bazında ayrımcılığa vurgu 
yapmakta ise de Aleviler azınlık statüsünü reddetmektedirler. Aleviler tarafından 
kurulmuş olan çıkar grupları kendi toplumları için tanınma ve saygınlık aramakta ama 
Alevilik kimliğinin çerçevelenmesindeki heterojenlikten dolayı etkin bir şekilde 
mobilize olamamaktadırlar. Son olarak, bireysel ve kolektif haklar üstüne normların 
yayılmasında etkin bir rol oynayan bölgesel kuruluşlar, Türkiye’de Aleviler için yeni tip 
dışlama modellerinin ortaya çıkmasında katkıda bulunmaktadır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Are equal citizenship rights sufficient to ensure political inclusion of all? Or 
should preservation and promotion of distinct identities be a concern in ensuring 
inclusiveness of a political system? Liberal democratic norms presuppose that each 
member of a polity has a right to an equal say in the processes influencing political 
outcomes. Yet, only a few would dispute the proposition that not all within a society has 
the same resources or opportunities to exercise such basic rights. Particularly gender 
and sexual minorities, ethnic and racial groups, urban poor and religious minorities are 
subjected to powerful contradictions.
1
 On the one hand, they are regaled with the 
principles of non-discrimination and promises of free and equal participation in the 
society as citizens; on the other hand, they are threatened by de facto (if not de jure) 
discrimination. 
In the Turkish political context, as in any other democratic system, politics of 
democratic inclusion is central to an understanding of the quality of democracy. 
Unevenness and limitations in the political incorporation, representation and influence 
of traditionally underrepresented groups such as women, ethnic groups and religious 
minorities have been a persistent question and controversy. Yet, with the rise of identity 
politics of the 1980s, a rich body of scholarly research has emerged examining the 
activities and experiences of such groups. Among those studied, the research on 
religious communities laid the ground for the analytical puzzle this dissertation attempts 
to shed light on.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the dynamics of democratic 
inclusion of minorities in general and heterodox religious communities (i.e. Alevis) in 
                                               
1 John Dryzek, “Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization,” American Political Science 
Review 90, no.3, (September, 1996), 475; Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 52-4; Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady, The 
Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
 
2 
 
Turkey in particular. It claims that the research on religious communities in Turkish 
politics literature tacitly promotes a sectarian bias.
2
 Most nomothetic
3
 works in the 
literature question organization, intermediation or aggregation of (Sunni) Islamic 
religious interests. Even though the study of heterodox Islamic communities has been 
popular in the last three decades, systematic analysis of the political behavior of the 
group, as well as the state’s strategies and attitudes towards their inclusion have been 
limited.
4
 Most analyses of Alevis are either idiographic or prescriptive analysis of their 
relationship with the state. This gap in the Turkish politics literature inspired this 
dissertation to explore the ways in which the Alevi community is included in the 
political processes in Turkey.  
Extant literature shows that political inclusion requires (i) favorable mechanisms 
enabling full access to participation, (ii) presence of instruments of representation in key 
institutions and decision-making processes, and finally (iii) capability to influence 
government decisions.
5
 Additionally, studies indicate that the nature and characteristic 
of the groups shape the level of successful inclusion. However, these studies also 
demonstrate the significant disparities (i) between non-citizens and citizen minorities 
and (ii) between women and other minority groups on the issue of political inclusion.
6
 
Unfortunately, despite the multidimensionality of the phenomenon of political 
inclusion, most of this research focuses only on one of its aspects, namely political 
representation.   
                                               
2 Ali Çarkoğlu, “Political Preferences of the Turkish Electorate: Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage” 
Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (2005): 273. 
3 Nomothetic is an approach to explanation which seeks understanding of a class of situations or events 
using a few explanatory factors (independent variables). Unlike idiographic explanations that seek to 
provide an exhaustive understanding of a particular condition or an event, nomothetic explanations seek  
generalizability See Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 
2012), 27 & 92-3.     
4 Some of the prominent works on political behavior of the Alevis include: Ali Çarkoğlu, and Binnaz 
Toprak, Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey, (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2000); Ali Çarkoğlu, and 
Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, protest and stability in an Islamic society, 
(London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007); Binnaz Toprak, et al. Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak: Din 
ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Matbaası, 2008).  
5 The large body of work on democratic inclusion includes prominent works such as James A. Morone, 
The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and Limits of American Government, (New Haven: Yale 
University, 1998); Iris Marion Young, Justice and Politics of Difference, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990); Anne Philips, The Politics of Presence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).   
6 See Joe Foweraker, and Todd Landman, Citizenship Rights and Social Movements: A Comparative and 
Statistical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Victor Asal, “Minimal Political Inclusion of 
Minorities at Risk: The Case of Americas 1870-2000” in The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion: Identity 
Politics in Twenty-First Century America, ed. David F. Ericson, (New York & Oxon: Routledge, 2011) 
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Since the understanding of democratic inclusion is highly dependent on (i) the 
features of the institutional frameworks, and (ii) the characteristics of the social actors 
excluded from the political processes, the question of democratic inclusion in this study 
is examined at two different levels: the state and the civil society. Inspired by the 
critique of liberal theories on democracy
7
, this dissertation argues that if actors’ basic 
political rights are restricted, then full incorporation of these actors into political 
processes of the state is an unlikely scenario. If the institutional design excludes or 
restricts groups’ access to political processes of the state, then polity beyond the state – 
i.e. civil society, the transnational political and public sphere – provide new 
mechanisms to communicate the preferences and demands of the group in question. It is 
also argued that these new mechanisms can pressure the existing institutional 
arrangements to transform.  
 This dissertation does not view the processes of inclusion in instrumental terms. 
It argues that incorporation of groups is neither a mere tool that can be used to secure 
individual autonomy, nor an issue that can be reduced to successful exercise of basic 
rights.
8
 It is aligned with the critique of the collectivist-individualist debate on rights of 
groups. Accordingly, the dissertation argues that the challenges to political inclusion of 
groups should not be considered merely as a problem of breach of ‘rights of individuals 
belonging to a group’, but as a problem of breach of ‘rights of a group’. It rejects the 
idea that rights of groups can ultimately be reduced to the rights of their individual 
members. Particularly if the group in question is a ‘natural’ or ‘involuntary’ one, where 
people are born into them, then the survival of the group, redressing of the inequalities 
and non-assimilation of the community would require a different set of standards.
9
  
In line with this perspective I chose the Alevis as the principle focus of my 
research because of their idiosyncratic characteristics. To begin with, the Alevis are the 
largest non-Sunni religious community in Turkey. However, there is no official census 
information about them. Since Turkey’s census data does not include religious 
                                               
7 Vernon van Dyke, “The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory,” World 
Politics 29, no.3 (1977): 343-69; Dryzek, “Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization,” 
476-78. 
8 Dryzek, “Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization,” 475-476; John S. Dryzek, 
Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 10-3.    
9 For the debate on the necessity of ‘group rights’ see Darlene M. Johnston “Native Rights as Collective 
Rights: A Question of Group Self-Preservation” in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka, 
179-201, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Nathan Glazer, “Individual Rights vs. Group 
Rights,” in Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Kymlicka, 123-138.  
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affiliation, there is no reliable statistical information about the exact numbers of the 
Alevis. Most of the figures cited in the literature are projections ranging from 5 percent 
to 25 percent of the total population in Turkey.
10
 More importantly, the Alevis are not a 
homogenous group either historically or culturally. There are Turkish, Kurdish and 
Arab Alevi communities that are geographically dispersed throughout Anatolia.
11
 
Historically, the Arab Alevis (Nusayris) were located in the southern provinces. 
However, one can also find Turkish Alevis in the rural areas of central Anatolia and 
Kurdish Alevis in the countries eastern and southeastern provinces. Even though the 
rites, practices, and languages of these groups vary, they share common religious traits 
– i.e. they do not follow the orthodox Sunni practices of Islam (such as fasting during 
the Ramadan, praying in the mosques, and making the pilgrimage to Mecca). As a 
result, they have faced public and political discrimination since the days of the Ottoman 
Empire.
 
Consequently, the relationship between the Alevis and the state has 
traditionally been marked with distrust and occasionally with violent conflicts.
12
   
The Alevis remained invisible in the public sphere in Turkey’s large urban centres 
until the 1960s. Until then they remained largely as an endogamous rural community 
throughout Anatolia. The migration to cities that began in the 1950s marked the 
beginning of transformation of the rural Alevi community. As the old structures and 
relations deteriorated, new structures and networks of relations began to emerge in the 
urban areas. Migration also reshaped the population distribution in Turkey, leading to 
the emergence of new urban centers with significant Alevi population. At the same time 
labor migration to Europe also led to the rise of the Alevi diaspora in some of the major 
German cities. Although ideological polarization and political violence of the 1970s 
                                               
10 While the Alevi activists declare the number of Alevi population to be around 20 million, the latest 
research by KONDA (a private research company) in 2007 estimate the number around 4.5 million. See 
“‘Aleviyim’ diyenlerin sayısı 4.5 milyon,” Milliyet, March 21, 2007. 
11 Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and managing territorial diversity, 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 5 
12 A number of events stimulated emergence of a narrative of victimhood since the Ottoman era: (i) 
extermination of large portions of the Alevi community during the reign of Selim I, (ii) the fetvas by the 
Şeyhülislam Ebussuud between 1537 and 1548 that paved the way for mass killings of Alevis during the 
Süleyman I period, (iii) the Hamidian campaign to unify all Muslim subjects under a single religious 
identity, (iv) the violent clashes with Kurdish Alevi tribes between 1936 and 1938 in Dersim, (v) the 
traumatic attacks of right-wing radicals in Malatya, Sivas, and Kahramanmaraş in 1978 and in Çorum in 
1980, (vi) the violent attacks by the Islamists in Sivas in 1993, (vii) the clashes between the Kurdish left-
wing Alevi activists and police forces in Gazi district in 1994, etc. See Irene Melikoff, İlber Ortaylı and 
Hakan Yavuz, eds. Tarihi ve Kültürel Boyutlarıyla Türkiye’de Aleviler, Bektaşiler, Nusayriler, (Istanbul: 
Esar Neşriyat, 1999); Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of 
Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998).  
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reshaped the needs and narratives of the Alevi community, they did not voice their 
collective right claims until the late 1980s.  
Following the historical trajectory of Alevi identity politics, my dissertation 
addresses the question of “Who speaks for the Alevis?” both at the domestic level and 
in transnational political contexts. I focus on the decade between 2002 and 2012, in 
which new domestic and transnational actors actively competed for the political 
representation of the Alevi community, and demanded the transformation of official 
policies and governmental institutions. Since the Alevis are a heterogeneous and 
geographically dispersed socio-religious group, it is also important to analyze the 
representation of Alevi interests in both domestic and transnational contexts. 
Additionally, the research presented here makes use of a broader understanding of 
representation that allows me to take into consideration the roles of governmental 
institutions, international organizations, transnational Alevi communities, political 
parties, and Alevi interest groups in Turkey.
13
 The main question of my research project 
is: under what conditions and through which channels do the Alevi interests are 
represented in Turkish politics? The mediums of the communication of the Alevi 
interests and the level of success for interest aggregation are also discussed throughout 
the text. 
The subsequent chapters raise crucial questions about dynamics of representation, 
organization and communication of group interests, and significance of domestic and 
transnational institutions and norms on groups’ influence in policy-making. They put 
particular emphasis on institutional frameworks’ role in bringing about or hindering the 
political inclusion of the Alevis in Turkey through divergent means (e.g., political 
parties, civil society organizations, courts, and so on). My analysis in this dissertation is 
based on several sources:  
    the contemporary political science literature on minority rights regimes, 
political representation, transnational networks and interest group politics,  
    semi-structured elite interviews conducted with representatives of Alevi 
interest groups, members of Republican People’s Party [CHP – Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi] organization and government officials,    
                                               
13 Here the term ‘interest group’ refers to the umbrella concept proposed by Gabriel Almond et al. It 
indicates a “form of interest articulation [that] occurs through activities of social or political groups that 
represent the interests of their constituents” emphasis added. See Gabriel A. Almond et al., eds. 
Comparative Politics Today: A World View, (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 65.   
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    field research and observation in Istanbul, Ankara and Hacı Bektaş, 
Nevşehir, 
    the publications and documents put out by the Alevi groups in Turkey 
and Germany,  
    reports concerning the Alevi issue published in Turkish and German 
newspapers and weekly political magazines (1960-2012),  
    the European Commission’s progress reports on Turkey (2002-2012) 
    European Court of Human Rights’ proceeding and decisions concerning 
the Alevi issue, 
    proceedings of the Alevi issue on the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
[TBMM – Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi],  
    reports concerning the Alevi issue published by German governmental 
organizations.  
Chapter 1 of this dissertation introduces the objectives, assumptions and rationale 
of my dissertation by highlighting the importance of political representation for Alevis. 
The chapter claims that the state-centric explanations are important but insufficient to 
explain the main research question, which is “under what conditions and through which 
channels do the Alevi interests are represented in Turkish politics?” The chapter also 
discusses to what extent the Alevi community in Turkey can be considered as a 
minority in Turkey, and provides an introduction to the role of Eruopean actors in 
transforing the Alevi-state relations in Turkey. 
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on civil society and provide an overview of articulation of 
Alevi interests in Turkey and Germany, respectively. In Chapter 2 I argue that the 
socio-economic transformations of Turkish society, along with the political and 
ideological transformations, affected the organization and strategies of the Alevi interest 
groups. This chapter also focuses on the demands put forward by the Alevi interest 
groups, and analyzes the issues areas and policy suggestions of the post-1990 Alevi 
organizations.  
In Chapter 3 I focus on the organizations founded by the Alevis in Germany, and 
examine whether these organizations provide an effective voice to the community at the 
transnational level or not. In this chapter I discuss the factors that affected the 
organization of the articulated Alevi interests. I also argue that in the absence of strong 
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elite allies at the domestic level, organized Alevi interests located in Germany became 
pressure participants.
14
 They provide new networks, as well as material and ideational 
resources for the domestic Alevi organizations in Turkey.
 15
   
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with formal representation of the Alevi interests in the 
political processes. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the Alevi interest representation in 
the legislature, and shows how these interests are represented in the TBMM. The 
chapter focuses on the cases of Union Party of Turkey [TBP – Türkiye Birlik Partisi] in 
the 1960s, and the CHP between 2002 and 2012. The chapter claims the presence of the 
Alevi in TBMM is not a sufficient condition for achieving a substantive representation 
of Alevi minority interests due to institutional constraints, the limited number of Alevi 
deputies, and the fact that majority of them are members of the opposition party. 
Therefore, having Alevi MPs does not guarantee increased interest representation. 
Instead, the mechanisms and content of the representation of the Alevis are highly 
dependent on the political opportunity structures and the organization of political 
parties. The chapter focuses on the parliamentary questions and discusses how both the 
opposition MPs and the government officials use the written and oral questions to 
justify their attitude on the Alevi issues. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between the Alevi interest groups, and the 
government. The chapter examines the nature of the inclusion and exclusion of the 
different Alevi interests in different government institutions. It focuses on the period 
between 2002 and 2012, and discusses the “Alevi Opening” [Alevi Açılımı] that began 
during the second term of the Justice and Development Party [AKP – Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi] and argues that the absence of harmonization in policy strategies of 
the Alevi interest groups weakens the likelihood of policy change and rule adoption by 
the government.  
                                               
14 Here the term ‘pressure participant’ refers to an umbrella concept that includes narrower categories of 
interest groups, policy participants and policy-centered organizations. See Grant Jordan, Darren Halpen, 
and William Maloney, “Defining Interests: Disambiguation and the Need for New Distinctions?” British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 6, no. 2, (2004): 195-212. 
15 Material resouces include tangible resources that interest groups compete for and use to attain their 
goals. Throughout the dissertation both financial resources and human resources, i.e. allies and supporters 
are considered as material resources. Additionally, ‘ideational resources’ refers to symbols and 
information that interest groups can use to influence and mobilize individuals or other organized groups. 
They also include ideological resources, i.e. principles and postulates asserting values and attitudes, 
which set forth both the characteristics of the allies and supporters of an interest group, and its strategies 
of action.    
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Chapter 6 questions the role of opportunity structures in shaping the level of 
success of the organized Alevi interest groups. The debate revolves around the legal 
changes on the issue of religious education and the success of the Alevi interest groups 
in shaping policy-outcomes in both Germany and Turkey. Within this process the role 
of transnational actors are further analyzed. In the conclusion chapter I present a 
summary of my major findings of this dissertation and present some ideas for future 
research.   
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ALEVI QUESTION IN TURKISH POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
1.1. Introduction: Why Study Alevis? 
Although their exact numbers are unknown, Alevis constitute the largest non-
Sunni religious community in Turkey. They are of particular significance not only 
because they have a legitimate claim to underrepresentation, but also because their 
political inclusion has become both a national and international concern. The 
relationship between the Alevis and the Turkish state has become a topic of great 
interest as a result of both the activities of the Alevi interest groups and the applications 
of the Alevi citizens to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The main 
question of what conditions and channels are conducive to the representation of Alevi 
interests in Turkish politics requires the clarification of a number of inter-related issues.  
This chapter provides an introduction to the debate surrounding political inclusion 
of religious groups, and argues that understanding the limits of the minority rights 
regimes of a country, as well as the scope and the instruments of the right-claims of a 
group can shed light on the dynamics of groups’ inclusion in the political process. Close 
examination of the role of the state, while necessary, is not sufficient to comprehend the 
widespread problems in the field of minority political inclusion. This chapter argues that 
even though it is the legal framework of the state that guarantees inclusion, other actors 
in the domestic and transnational spaces
16
 shape the scope and content of that inclusion. 
Consequently, it is important to not only determine how different states respond to the 
claims of Alevis, but also to identify how the claims are shaped and which of these 
claims is more likely to enter into the policy-decisions.       
                                               
16 Throughout the text, ‘transnational spaces’ refers to: “sustained ties of persons, networks and 
organizations across the borders across multiple nation-states, ranging from low to highly 
institutionalized forms.” See Thomas Faist “Towards a Political Sociology of Transnationalization: The 
State of the Art in Migration Research,” European Journal of Sociology 45, no. 3 (2004): 337. 
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1.2. Democracy and Inclusion Revisited 
The power of the norm
17
 of political inclusion lies in its capacity to legitimize 
political outcomes. Even if political actors disagree with an outcome, they have to 
accept the legitimacy of the results of the decision-making processes. For this purpose, 
democracies work to establish, protect, and improve mechanisms that enable interaction 
between individual(s), groups, and the political system. These mechanisms provide 
meaningful and continuous representation, and facilitate the expression of all sorts of 
reactions to the system through the mechanisms of the system.
18
 The more firmly the 
legitimacy of political outcomes is established through these mechanisms, the less 
social actors involve in violent and illegal political activities to make their voice heard. 
However, not all actors are welcomed into the political processes of the state, nor do 
they all chose to be incorporated fully.  
With regard to the political inclusion of groups, the state’s responsibilities are 
ambiguous. Unlike the individual rights regimes, which at least have a uniform subject, 
the variety of groups in a society has made it impossible to establish universal 
guidelines guaranteeing the political participation and representation of groups. For this 
reason, states are left to adopt whatever mechanisms they deem appropriate to promote 
the inclusion of their population’s relevant groups in formal political institutions. For 
instance, in Lebanon, participation and representation is organized along ethno-national, 
religious, or linguistic lines, i.e., confessionalism. Other countries have adopted 
mechanisms to promote participation and representation of linguistic, ethnic and 
religious groups through policies of affirmative action policies and institutional 
quotas.
19
 There is, in fact, a lively debate in the literature as to how best to guarantee a 
certain level of representation of minorities in the political processes.  
                                               
17 The concept of norm is borrowed from Finnemore and Sikkink and throughout the text refers to “a 
standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.” See Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn 
Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52 (1998): 
891. 
18 See Samuel P. Huntington, and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing 
Countries, (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 7-10 & 126-32; Max Kaase, and 
Alan Marsh. “Political Action: A Theoretical Perspective” in Political Action: Mass Participation in Five 
Western Democracies, eds. Samel H. Barnes, and Max Kaase. London: Sage Publications, 1979, 16-7, 22 
& 28-9; and Lester W. Milbrath, and M. L. Goel, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get 
Involved in Politics, (Boston: University Press of America, 1977), 18-9 & 147-8. 
19 For instance, in United States, Voting Rights Act guarantees representation of underrepresented and 
historically marginalized groups in the national legislature. Similarly, Italian and Hungarian minorities 
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Arendt Lijphart suggests that in a truly plural society different groups can be 
guaranteed a place in power-sharing institutions, and acquire veto power over the issues 
that affect their vital interests through proportional representation, as practiced in 
Germany.
20
 In such a consociational democracy, basic fairness of the political system 
can be ensured and the tyranny of the majority
21
 is prevented. Nonetheless, in this 
system recognition of non-majority groups is the decision of the governing majority. 
Consequently, not all minority groups are officially recognized. Even though 
participation and representation of underrepresented groups is valued and promoted, the 
“struggles over resources and power motivate efforts to exclude many affected people 
from decision-making processes.”22  
To shed further light on the variation among the states’ relations with their 
minority groups, Dryzek divides regimes into four categories depending on their 
strategies of inclusion and exclusion of groups. States can be either passively inclusive 
“in the sense of accepting whatever groups emerge from society”, or actively inclusive 
by taking steps to mobilize particular groups and guiding them into the state.
23
 
Categorizing a government as a ‘passively inclusive state’ implies the realization of a 
democratic pluralism in which the democracy is built and maintained through 
associational activity. In the latter case, the inclusion taking place is not so substantial 
that the rewards of participation remain symbolic. Even though the groups are allowed 
to participate in the decision-making processes, “the outcomes will be systematically 
skewed against them.”24 One such example of passive inclusion can be observed in 
Mexico between 1988 and 1994. Within years of its introduction, the Salinas 
administration’s National Solidarity Campaign [PRONASOL – El Programa Nacional 
                                                                                                                                         
are granted a seat in the parliament in Slovenia. See Annelies Verstichel, “Understanding Minority 
Participation and Representation and the Issue of Citizenship,” in Political participation of minorities:  A 
commentary on international standards and practice, eds.Marc Weller, and Katherine Nobbs, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 73.  
20 Arend Lijphart, “Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power Sharing 
Systems,” in Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Kymlicka, 277-8.  
21 Coined by John Adams (1788) and further popularized by Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) and John 
Stuart Mill (1859), the ‘tyranny of the majority’ refers to a breach of the rights of the minorities in a 
democratic system as a result of the abuse of power by the dominant party, faction, or individual in 
decision-making positions. Accordingly, the dominant majority actively oppresses the linguistic, ethnic, 
racial or religious minority groups by use of the ’majority rules’ principle.  
22 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 53.  
23 Dryzek, “Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization,” 482.  
24 Ibid., 480. 
12 
 
de Solidaridad] became an effective mechanism to assimilate oppositional forces and 
appeal to civil society actors’ demands for autonomy. As PRONASOL gained control, it 
used this power to expand Salinas’ political base and discipline the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party [PRI – Partido Revolucionario Institucional].25 
Like the strategies of inclusion, strategies of exclusion can be classified as either 
active or passive. In a passively exclusive state, even though the state resists integration 
of the disadvantaged groups in political processes, it neither officially promotes nor 
combats civil society actors. In contrast to the passively exclusive state, an actively 
exclusive state “attacks and undermines the conditions for public association in civil 
society.”26 Although the active exclusionary model is mostly associated with 
authoritarian regimes, in the West the authoritarian liberalism Britain experienced under 
Margaret Thatcher provides one of the chief examples of a state’s active exclusion of 
trade unions and attacks on the working class.  It is important to note here that 
exclusionary strategies of the state also have a dissimilar impact on different groups 
within civil society, due to the variation in the threat perceived by political actors 
towards the activities of groups. In Turkey, this selective exclusion of the state has been 
directed at religious and ethnic minorities.
27
 Islamists revivalists and Kurdish 
nationalists in particular have been subjected to different levels of suppression. 
 In the study of inclusion, it is also important to take motivations of the 
underrepresented groups into account. Like states, the groups vary in their motivations 
for and strategies of gaining political inclusion. From the ‘excluded’ actors’ point of 
view, the struggle for inclusion in the political arena involves a rational calculation: 
underrepresented groups in question seek full inclusion if the reward of entry into the 
political processes of the state surpasses the benefits of non-participation.
28
  
 
                                               
25 For a detailed analysis of the strategies of the Mexican state see Dan la Botz, Democracy in Mexico: 
Peasant Rebellion & Political Reform, (Cambridge: South End Press, 1995), 105-9 & 131.  
26 Dryzek, “Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization,” 482. 
27 See Sabri Sayarı, “Turkey’s Islamist Challenge,” The Middle East Quarterly, (September, 1996), 35-
43; Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 2000); Doğu Ergil, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 
(2000): 122-135.      
28 Dryzek, “Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization,” 484-6.  
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1.3. Inclusion as a Minority Right 
The absence of universal criteria for identification of minorities further 
complicates the issue of minority political inclusion. Since the notion of ‘minority’ 
refers to a political outsider, depending on the conceptualization of the political 
community in a country, generating a universal definition becomes difficult.
29
 In the 
documents of international and regional organizations, defining “minority” has been 
avoided whenever possible,
30
 leaving identification of the minorities to the states. For 
instance, the French government has repeatedly refused to acknowledge the existence of 
national minorities in France.
31
  Similarly, Russian immigrants in Estonia and Latvia, 
and Turkish immigrants in Germany, despite being sizable interest groups, are not 
viewed by the State as minorities. Although there have been attempts to identify and 
protect the rights of the minority groups through charters and treaties, the intention and 
extension of the concept remains ambiguous. Additionally, the concept has been 
stretched so much that the boundaries have been blurred between individual rights, 
group rights and the collective rights of minorities. To have a better understanding of 
the state-minority relations it is vital to clarify what a minority is and what kind of 
rights they lay claim to. 
1.3.1. What Constitutes a Minority? 
There are many competing definitions of the term ‘minority’ in the literature. 
Most definitions imply the singling out of a numerically inferior group on the basis of 
idiosyncratic traits, such as differences in language, religion, ethnicity and race. The 
numerical inferiority of such groups, it is argued, leads to inferiority in political, social 
and economic status. However, numerical criteria fail to explain the dominant position 
                                               
29 Jennifer Jackson Preece, Minority Rights: Between diversity and community, (Cambridge & Malden: 
Polity Press, 2005), 10. 
30 Geoff Gilbert, “The Council of Europe and Minority Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 18, no. 1 
(1996): 160-189. 
31 In 1991 the Constitutional Council evoked the Act on the “Status of the Territorial Unit of Corsica”, 
which guarantees the communities right to preserve its culture, subjet to the overall French “national 
unity.” The court found the Act unconstitutional for its recognition of another “people” within the French 
territory. In a similar vein, the Frenmch delegate refused to sign FRA, since it would be against the 
principle of “national unity.” See Azar Gat, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political 
Ethnicity and Nationalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 337-40. 
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of South African Afrikaners under apartheid, the European population of Kenya, or the 
Tutsis in the Republic of Rwanda. Even though there may be a correlation between the 
size of a group and its status in a regime, to be more numerious in the population does 
not necessarily guarantee higher status to a community in political, social and economic 
contexts. As such, groups that are in a dominant or co-dominant
32
  position in a political 
community cannot be labeled minorities. 
A further definitional element used in the identification of a minority group is 
citizenship. Whether or not a group has citizenship, while significant in understanding 
the impact of minority activities, is not sufficient to identify them. Citizenship status 
obviously makes a huge difference for minorities, since it grants leverage to pressure 
the policies and institutions of the dominant majority, and provides them with a certain 
amount of protection from abuse by the state. In the United States, the control of the 
Cuban-American vote in Florida plays a major role in both local and national politics. 
The major political parties likewise negotiate with leaders of the Irish, Italian, African-
American, Hispanic and Asian blocks for support in elections, and elected officials 
frame their domestic and foreign policy objectives in accordance with the views of these 
groups.
33
 However, adoption of citizenship as a definitional element places refugees, 
migrants, and transnational communities such as the Roma in a ‘miscellaneous’ 
category.
 34
    
In an attempt to provide a broader understanding of the concept of minority 
Dworkin and Dworkin proposed a definition characterized by four qualities: (i) 
identifiability, (ii) differential power, (iii) different and pejorative treatment, and (iv) 
group awareness.
35
 First of all, it is crucial that groups are readily identifiable in order to 
be able to delineate boundaries of inclusion in the group. Without identifiable shared 
characteristics, the establishment of group solidarity and the recognition of differential 
                                               
32 Here ‘co-dominant’ refers to the status of groups that are put on an equal footing with the majority as 
regards the running of the State institutions, despite their slightly inferior numbers. 
33 See Stephen Castles, and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the politics 
of belonging, (London: MacMillian Press, 2000), 150-1. 
34 For more information on the status of the Roma community in Europe and the impact of Ramani 
movement on domestic and transnational policies, see  Claudia Tavani, Collective Rights and the Cultural 
Identity of the Roma: A Case Study of Italy, (n.p.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012); Peter Vermeersch, 
The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe, 
(n.p.: Berghahn Books, 2007); Helen O’Nions, Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The 
Roma of Europe, (Birlington: Antony Rowe Ltd., 2007). 
35 Gray Dworkin, and Rosalind Dworkin, eds., The Minority Report: An Introduction to Racial, Ethnic, 
and Gender Relations, (New York: Cengage Learning, 1999), 15.  
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treatment become difficult. The case of Alevis provides an interesting case since there 
are few (if any) external signs to identify an Alevi. The group’s heterogeneity of 
language, ethnic origin and religious practices does not leave much room to establish 
identifiable Alevi characteristics.
36
  
Secondly, difference in power underlines all majority-minority relations. When 
the majority in power controls resources, it also controls the life chances of the 
minority, from their access to jobs, education, wealth, to health care or food supplies, 
which in turn lays the foundations of differential and pejorative treatment of the 
minority. It is this differential treatment that most directly affects the life chances and 
lifestyles of the minority group members, and thereby becomes the focus of the 
minority interest groups.
37
  
The final dimension in determining what constitutes a minority, group awareness, 
provides a particular challenge within the scope of this dissertation. Dworkin and 
Drowkin claim that if no one in a minority sees him or herself as being a minority, then 
minority status cannot exist.
38
 However, I argue that if the group members acknowledge 
that they are being subjected to discrimination and assimilation as a group due to their 
shared traits, then adoption of the minority label by the group itself is not a necessary 
condition to identify a group as a minority.  
 
1.3.2. Theoretical Approaches to Minority Rights 
Various scholars have problematized the need for special rights for minority 
groups and explored the significance of granting such rights in hindering or promoting 
conflicts.
39
 The debate between liberals and communitarians over the role of collective 
rights shape much of the literature on minority rights.
 
Increasing recognition of the need 
                                               
36 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 5. 
37 Most activists in the Alevi identity movement feel that the Turkish government treats the Alevi 
population unfairly. They claim that Alevis are looked upon as “unwanted step-children.” During the 
Fifth International Faith Leaders Meeting [5. Uluslararası İnanç Önderleri Toplantısı] (October 29, 
2010), many speakers uttered  the phrase “we are not step-children” [Biz üvey evlat değiliz], claiming that 
the Alevis were the true founding members of the Turkish Republic and culture.    
38 Dworkin, and Dworkin, Minority Report, 21. 
39 For an overview of the debate on minority rights theories see the works by Will Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
and Morigiwa Yasutomo, Ishiyama Fumihiko and Sakurai Tetsu, eds., Universal Minority Rights: A 
Transnational Approach, (Munich: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004)  
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for new norms and standards to protect the identity and lifestyles of the ethnic, 
religious, and racial groups and sexual and gender minorities has led to the questioning 
of regimes should recognize, accommodate and/or protect certain minorities within its 
population. As Douglas Sanders notes, much of these debates are “based on confused 
notions about the meaning of collective rights.”40 While the notion of ‘individual right’ 
is not contested, the conceptualization of ‘collective rights’ has been a problem.  
So the question becomes: can collectivities or groups hold rights? If so, what are 
the conditions the groups must satisfy to become a right-holding unit? Are collective 
rights and group rights similar? Are individual rights and collective rights mutually 
exhaustive? Do the rights of the groups can be reduced to the sum of the individual 
rights of their members? Do states have to guarantee special rights for the groups? If so, 
how should these rights be framed?  These questions and many more dominate the 
rights debates. Consequently, before exploring on the particular case of Alevis in 
Turkey, it is crucial to clarify the concept of collective rights to have a better 
understanding of the issue of minority inclusion. 
 
1.3.2.1. Collective rights vs. group rights  
Discussions around the scope and nature of group rights can be traced back to the 
work of Otto van Gierke,
41
 the translation of which paved the way for the emergence of 
the English pluralist tradition, which in turn lay the foundations of the debates on the 
dynamics between the individual and group specific rights.
42
 Different interpretations of 
the significance of the value of cultural membership led to the emergence of a debate 
between liberals and communitarians over the status of groups as rights-and-duty-
bearing units. The more scholars focus on the individual-group relationship, the more 
the scope and content of rights is questioned. Proponents of group or collective rights 
highlight a number of definitional elements in their discussion of the subject. While 
some frame group or collective rights in a way analogous to that of individual rights, i.e. 
                                               
40 Douglas Sanders, “Collective Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1991): 368. 
41 Through his works on the emergence and development of the German legal tradition of ‘fellowship’ 
(Genossenschaft), along with emergence of the notions of ‘corporate body’ (Körperschaft), and 
‘corporation’ (Korporation) Gierke provides insight on the uniqueness and complexity of the German 
case. See Otto von Gierke, Community in Historical Perspective, ed. Antony Black, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
42 See Jacob T Levy “From liberal constitutionalism to pluralism,” in Modern Pluralism: Anglo-American 
Debates Since 1880, ed. Mark Bevir, 21-39, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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as the sum total of the rights of the individual members of the group, others identified 
the concept as rights that are accorded to a specific group as a unit distinct from the 
individual.
43
  
According to Sanders, the former approach derives from the principle of non-
discrimination and seeks to protect members of a group from the practices and policies 
of the dominant majority, i.e. group rights. The latter view concerns the principle of 
non-assimilation and pursues preservation of the values, preferences, lifestyles, or 
culture of the group, i.e. collective rights.
44
 The right-claims of the cultural, racial, and 
sexual minorities incorporate both the collective rights and the rights of the individual 
members of their groups. Although states are expected to promote and protect the rights 
of individuals, the development of a regime for collective rights poses a challenge. 
 
1.3.2.2. The liberal vs. communitarian debate on rights 
The liberal approach to minorities, rooted in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, 
adopts an individualist perspective. Aligning themselves with Rawls’ society and justice 
conceptualizations,
45
 most liberal theorists defend the idea that the basic rights of the 
individual is sufficient to secure the rights of the individual members of a group. 
Adoption of standards, norms, and regimes targeting specific groups in a society is 
considered problematic; however, the recognition of minority rights is considered to be 
inherently in conflict with the principles of equality and freedom.
46
 Instead, minority 
groups are treated as Trojan horses that will gradually lead regimes to condone illiberal 
practices.
47
 The critics of collective-rights argue that adoption and protection of rights 
based on group status threatens the rights of the individual, since it inevitably elevates a 
specific identity over a universal one. As Kymlika notes, such an approach:  
                                               
43 For a review of the debate see Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 45-8, and Neus Torbisco Casals, 
Group Rights as Human Rights: A Liberal Approach to Multiculturalism, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 
28-37. 
44 Sanders, “Collective Rights,” 369-70. 
45 Rawls describes two principles on which to build the foundations of a well-ordered society – i.e. (i) 
principle of equal rights for all, and (ii) principle of permissible inequality – where the first have a 
‘lexical’ priority over the latter. Accordingly, Rawls claims all primary social goods should be distributed 
equally, unless an unequal distribution is to the benefit of all or to the least advantaged in society. See 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 54.    
46 Will Kymlicka, “Introduction,” in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 13.  
47 See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 35-6.  
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   often invoke[s] the image of theocratic and patriarchal cultures where 
women are oppressed and religious orthodoxy legally enforced as an 
example of what can happen when alleged rights of the collectivity are 
given precedence over the rights of the individual.
48
   
In contrast to the individualism of liberals, communitarians depict a more positive 
picture of recognition and protection of collective identities and rights.
49
  
Communitarian theorists such as Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel criticize the liberal 
view of the group as merely an aggregate of individuals. In his essay, ‘The Politics of 
Recognition’, Taylor emphasizes the dialogical character of the human beings, claiming 
that we human beings define “our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in 
struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us.’50 This dialogical 
understanding of the identity paves the way for the construction of a notion of ‘dignity’ 
relying on the universal egalitarian principles that uphold the equal worth of all human 
beings.
51
 This idea of dignity lays the foundations of the formulation of the ‘politics of 
equal dignity’ (i.e. universalism), promoting equal treatment of all via 
acknowledgement of their common identity.
52
 The danger of the politics of equal 
dignity lies in the formulation of said rights from the perspective of the dominant group. 
Taylor argues that “dominant groups tend to entrench their hegemony by inculcating an 
image of inferiority in the subjugated.”53 Alongside this dialogical understanding, a 
notion of ‘authenticity’ also emerges, emphasizing the uniqueness of the individual self. 
The recognition of this uniqueness promote of the ‘politics of difference’, which grants 
certain rights to specific groups.
54
    
Similarly, Sandel argues that in the liberal theory persons are represented as 
isolated and unbounded individuals, and points out that individuals are constituted 
through groups or communities and embedded in a particular social infrastructure.
55
 
                                               
48 Ibid., 36. 
49 See Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition.” Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann, 25-74 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), and Michael 
Walzer, On Toleration, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
50 Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 32-3.  
51 Ibid., 26-7. 
52 Ibid., 41-3. 
53 Ibid., 66. 
54 Ibid.  
55 See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982).   
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Unlike liberals, communitarians stress the significance of shared values. Consequently, 
collective rights are seen as tools for protecting the values and culture of communities 
from the destructive influence of liberal individualism.
56
  
To get around the communitarian critique and strengthen the position of 
liberalism, liberal scholars like David Miller, Yael Tamir, Jeff Spinner and Will 
Kymlicka emphasize the value of cultural membership and try to incorporate minority 
rights into the liberal framework.
57
 Among these attempts, Kymlicka proposes 
differentiating between internal restrictions and external protections in understanding 
minority rights. Internal restrictions involve the rights of a group to protect against 
internal dissent. Conversely, external protections are the rights of a group to protect it 
from external pressures.
58
 Kymlicka further suggests distinguishing “between ‘bad’ 
minority rights that involve restricting individual rights, from the ’good’ minority rights 
that can be seen as supplementing individual rights.”59 Consequently, providing means 
for the individual members of minorities to participate in social, economic and political 
spheres, i.e. affirmative action programs, protecting/providing freedom from language 
discrimination and access to state subsidies for cultural activities is expected to mitigate 
the effects of discrimination and assimilation. 
The explanatory power of both camps is limited in the formulation and 
implication of rights. Both camps drew heavy criticisms for being one-dimensional. 
While the liberals isolate individuals and the communitarians overemphasize the role of 
communities, they both fail to capture a number of mechanisms of dominance and 
exclusion. The feminists drew particularly heavy criticisms for undermining the 
complexity of community dynamics.
60
 Since individuals can be members of more than 
one community, the communitarian approach fails to thoroughly explain how collective 
elements and collective interests are constructed. Frazer observes that: 
                                               
56 Vernon van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination, (Westport: Greenwood, 1985), 195.   
57 David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Yael Tamir, Liberal 
Nationalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries of Citizenship: 
Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 
and  Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 
58  Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 37. 
59  Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 22. 
60 See Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and conflict, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
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   communitarian theorists tend to emphasize the communal construction of 
social individuals and social formations, and of values and practices. A 
problem is that these constructive processes themselves need to be analyzed 
in terms of power – power which can account for when individuals manage 
to reconstruct their circumstances, when they move from context to context, 
when they get trapped, when they rest content.
61
     
The explanatory power of both camps is also limited in understanding the problem 
of democratic inclusion of heterogeneous groups such the Alevis in Turkey. Although 
their members share common cultural and ethnic traits, the Alevis are not necessarily 
united by a strong common identity. Even though their members share interests, these 
interests are neither static nor homogenous.
62
 The literature on the Alevi identity 
movement has shown that the right-claims of the Alevi community is based on and 
shaped by the diversity of organized Alevi interests.
63
 
1.3.3. Legal Approaches to Minority  Rights 
The liberalist vs. communitarian debate on the status of groups as rights-and-duty-
bearing units also finds its way into the legal framework of the international rights 
regime.
64
 By the end of WWII, the more the emphasis shifted to the individual rights of 
groups rather than, the more the standards on minority rights were framed as basic 
human rights for all.
65
 The standards gradually transformed to secure cultural, ethnic, 
linguistic and religious identities. As a result, the institutionalization of norms and 
values regarding the rights of the minorities developed at a slower pace within the 
human rights standards. In most cases the rights of minorities were regarded as the 
extension of, or special cases within, the general standards of human rights. 
International and regional organizations dealt with the issues of minorities by using the 
language and provisions of individual rights.
66
 However, the legal frameworks laid 
                                               
61 Ibid, 1-2. 
62  Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 47-9. 
63 See chapter 2  
64 Sandel, Liberalism, 60-62; Joel E. Oestreich, “Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 21, (February, 1999): 108-132.  
65 Gaetano Pentasuglia, Minorities in International Law: an introductory study, (Strasburg: Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2002), 29-30. 
66 For examples in its application in American legal rhetoric see Glazer, “Individual Rights against Group 
Rights.”   
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down standards on the protection of minorities without identifying who or what 
constituted a minority. 
Implementation of the already limited standards poses a further challenge. Even 
though international and regional organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the 
European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE) are significant actors in the 
founding and diffusion of norms on individual and collective rights, they are mostly 
ineffective in their capability to force states to act. The signing and ratification of 
international documents on the protection of minority rights by the individual states 
depends on the costs of abandoning the existing minority rights regimes. However its 
boundaries are defined, the most significant aim of minority rights is to guarantee 
substantive justice to all members of society through genuine equality and non-
discrimination. Therefore, in the last decade the debates on the scope of state’s 
obligations regarding minority rights protections have taken into account four areas of 
concern: (1) the survival of the minority population, (2) the non-assimilation of the 
minority ‘identity’, (3) the maintenance of de jure and de facto non-discrimination, and 
(4) the promotion of effective and meaningful participation of minorities in the social, 
economic and political spheres.  
 
1.3.3.1.Emergence of minority rights standards under the United Nations 
Embedded in the liberal conceptions of the individual and the state, the list of 
standards identified in the documents of the UN constitutes the core of the international 
human rights regime of the post-WWII politics.
67
 The founding document of the UN, 
the United Nations Charter, does not contain any references to minorities and minority 
rights. Instead, the emphasis is on individual human rights and the principle of non-
discrimination. The Charter is concerned with identifying the rights of the individual, 
and protecting these rights from the state and other collectivities. Establishing non-
discrimination of individuals on racial, ethnic, religious and other grounds is considered 
sufficient for the protection of the rights of the members of minorities.
68
 
                                               
67 Deidre Fottrell, and Bill Bowring, eds., Minority and Group Rights in the New Millennium (London: 
Martinus Nijholf Publishers, 1999). 
68 The Article 1 of the Charter states that one of the aims of the UN is to be non-discriminative in nature 
“to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” 
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Like the Charter, the famous Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has 
no references to minorities and minority rights. Nonetheless, the principles of non-
discrimination and non-distinction are repeatedly emphasized throughout the document. 
Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and Article 2 of the UDHR
69
 contain similar 
provisions for the protection of minorities against discrimination. When these 
documents were drafted, it was assumed that an individual focus on the protection of the 
rights would be sufficient to protect the rights of minorities. The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) further promoted the framing of the international 
standards on rights as universal and equally shared rights of the individual.
70
 Among the 
provisions introduced by these documents, Article 27 of the ICCPR (1966) provides the 
blueprint for identifying and addressing minority issues.
71
 
In the 1990s, as the international system and social and political environment 
changed, the UN started to emphasize specific minority rights. The end of the Cold War 
and the emergence of new nation-states brought new problems on to the agenda.
72
 The 
results of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project indicates that early 1990s were marked 
with new violent communal conflicts.
 73
 Tedd Robert Gurr argues that even though the 
roots of these communal conflicts could be traced back to 1960s, they became more 
visible only after the end of the Cold War.  In his view, while “some were provoked by 
                                               
69 Article 2 of UDHR states: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made 
on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a 
person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty”. 
70 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 19-21, 149-152 &156. 
71 Article 27 of ICCPR states that: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members 
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.” [Emphasis added]. The original document is available at:   
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art27 
72 Patrick Thornberry, “International and European Standards on Minority Rights,” in Minority Rights in 
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contention for power in post-communist states; others were responses to democratic 
transitions in Africa.”74 
 The emergence of movements for language and ethnic revival in Spain and Great 
Britain led to the reassessment of effective regulations on minority issues, and in 
December 1992, the UN ratified the Declaration on the Rights of the People Belonging 
to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. With the 1992 Declaration 
minorities were granted the rights (i) to develop their own culture, (ii) to use their 
language in both public and private spheres, (iii) to participate in economic, political 
and social life without any discrimination, and (iv) to form associations.  
The new document is significant not only due to its recognition of the needs of the 
“individual as a member of a community”, but also due to its emphasis on 
securitization. The driving assertion throughout the document is that this kind of 
protection leads to both the development and maintenance of international peace, and 
the political and social stability of a given state. With the ratification of the 1992 
Declaration, both the rights of the individual (belonging to a minority) and the duties of 
the states have been clearly identified, and protection of the minority regime has been 
reinforced.
75
 The 1992 Declaration provides the minimum standards for the protection 
of minority rights and paves the way for the development of regional and national 
standards. 
1.3.3.2.European Standards on Minority Rights  
In Europe the issue of minority rights protection was put forward by the CoE, the 
EU, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Through 
the development and promotion of standardized minority rights these institutions have 
sought to secure democratization processes and regional security.
76
 However, like the 
UN, none of these institutions have established a general definition of minorities. As 
Galbreth and McEvoy note, “European organizations were limited in terms of their 
                                               
74 Ibid,134.  
75 With the document the states are held responsible for providing legal frameworks for the protection of 
minority rights (Article 2). They have to make people equal before the law without any discrimination 
(Article 4). Additionally, the states are required to provide favorable conditions for minorities to learn and 
to improve their mother languages and to have further education in this language.   
76 See David Galbreath, and Joanne McEvoy, “European organizations and minority Rights in Europe: On 
transforming the securitization dynamic,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012):267-84; Jane Wright, “The 
OSCE and the Protection of Minority Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1996): 190-205. 
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norms and policy implementation mechanisms. This limitation was due to the state-
centric nature of the relevant European organizations, as well as of international 
relations in general.”77   
No organization has attempted to define what constitutes a minority, although in 
the legal framework of these organizations, the definition proposed by Francesco 
Capotorti in 1979 continues to be a guideline. Following the principle of non-
dominance in power and status, and the criteria for numerical inferiority, minority is 
defined as: 
   A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members…possess …characteristics 
differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only 
implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, 
traditions, religion or language.
 78 
 
Similarly, there are also no explicit standards for minority rights protection in 
Europe, although through the introduction of the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM) (1995), the CoE has pioneered the framing of legally-
binding standards for the minority rights protection regime. The OESC, through the 
establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the 
introduction of a number of recommendations
79
 has attempted to enhance a European 
standard on minority protection.
80
  
Despite the ambiguity of the standards on minority rights, the treaties of the CoE 
on human rights provide legally enforceable judicial remedies to individuals belonging 
to minorities and marginalized groups whose rights had been violated. Both the 
adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) on November 4, 1950 and the establishment of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1959 enabled the CoE to scrutinize the 
laws and practices of the member states that historically have asserted different 
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78 Francesco Capotorti. Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
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conceptions of rights.
81
 The ECHR provides recourse to bring alleged rights violations 
before an international body; whereas, the ECtHR determines whether the rules and 
practices of a member state are compatible with the Convention or not.
82
 In other words, 
both the Convention and the Court provide supervisory mechanisms.
83
     
Unlike CoE and OSCE, the EU did not try to systematically institutionalize 
standardized minority rights; instead borrow the standards established by CoE and 
OSCE. While the CoE documents paved the way for the adoption of the link between 
democracy and human (and later minority) rights, the OSCE introduced a security-
based justification in the protection of minorities.
84
 In the context of EU, although the 
legal provisions highlight human rights as one of core values of the region, human 
rights were not incorporated into the Community framework for a long time,
85
 only 
beginning to be developed in the 1960s.
86
 The issue of rights of minorities did not 
emerge as a problem until the integration of the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs). Consequently, the minority rights standards of the EU were framed in relation 
to the requirements of enlargement. The famous Copenhagen criteria of “respect for and 
protection of minorities”87 is only binding in practice for the EU-candidate states. What 
is more, while political accession criteria were transferred into EU primary law with the 
                                               
81 Initially the CoE had three main instutions: the Convention, the Court and the European Commission 
on Human Rights. Due to the increasing caseload in the 1970s and the 1980s, the ECtHR was 
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Treaty of Amsterdam, the clauses covering minority protection were left out,
88
 such 
that, it remained an accession criterion, and relevant only in external EU policy, leaving 
the member states to deal with the minority issues on their own.
89
 
While with the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty further 
institutionalization of human rights standards were achieved, in none of the texts 
specific clauses for minorities were given emphasis. Nonetheless, the Article 13 of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC)
90
 introduced a provision for 
combating discrimination that expanded the listed grounds to include sex, sexual 
orientation disability, age, racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief.
91
 While this was 
a significant development in expanding the non-discrimination principle, it remained 
limited as it did not make reference to non-assimilation. Equal treatment and non-
discrimination, while is important, is not sufficient to guarantee and protect the diversity 
in a country.  
It was not until the Treaty of Lisbon legal provisions specifically related to 
minorities were included in the treaties of EU.  The Article 1.a was amended as:  
   The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are 
common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women 
and men prevail.
92
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Along with the legalization of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and establishment of 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the post-Lisbon EU 
standards on protection of rights became more systematic and institutionalized.  
However, though Article 21 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights includes a 
non-discrimination clause for ‘members of national minorities’93 and Articles 18-25 of 
TFEU deal with the non-discrimination principle, neither text deals with non-
assimilation. Indeed, in both texts the legal framework is dominated by the language 
and law of individual rights, addressing the individual rights of the members of the 
minorities rather than minorities as collectivities. The legal texts are written as if the 
problem of discrimination is one affecting individuals rather than groups. The legal 
texts are written as if the problem of discrimination is one affecting individuals rather 
than groups.  
The minority protection has yet to develop as a regional rule. Neither EU nor 
OSCE and CoE can identify the specifics of European minority rights protection 
standards. However, the more the European integration and identity became a priority 
for these organizations, the more the diffusion of these few norms on minority rights 
protection into the domestic policies and politics of the states in the region gain 
importance. To promote the protection of the minorities, the European institutions have 
been considering a variety of instruments ranging from traditional diplomacy and 
partnership agreements to providing subsidies to civil society actors to raise 
consciousness on the minority issues. 
 1.4 Issue of Inclusion of Minorities and Marginalized Groups in Turkey 
Study of the political inclusion of the groups in Turkey requires understanding of 
the minority rights and citizenship regimes of the country rooted in both legal texts and 
political culture. During the Ottoman Empire, millets were constructed as tools to 
incorporate various religious/ethnic groups into Ottoman economic, political and 
administrative structures. The communal boundaries were defined first on the basis of 
                                               
93 European Union, “Charter of the Fundamental rights of the European Union”, Official Journal of the 
European Communities (2000/C 364/01) 
28 
 
shared universal elements of faith, then on ethnic and linguistic differences.
94
 Millet 
system first divided the Ottoman population as Muslims and non-Muslims, and further 
divided the latter as Jewish, Armenian Gregorian and Greek Orthodox. Yet, the Muslim 
population was treated as a unified entity. 
This classification of the population later found its way to the interpretations of 
the legal framework of the minority treaty of the post-WW I period. Treaty of Lausanne 
1923 similar to other League of Nations treaties acted as a corrective to solve the 
difficulties of the post-war era. Through Articles 37-45 the treaty regulated the status of 
the specific minorities in Turkey, and aimed to secure equal civil and political rights 
with that of the ‘majority’ Muslim population.95 Nonetheless, while the text put 
emphasis on to protection of the rights of the non-Muslim minorities, it does not specify 
any particular group of non-Muslim.
96
 Hence, “the Baha’is, the Yezidis, and believers 
of the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Catholic United churches (the Chaldean Church and 
the Syrian Catholic Church), and the Roman Catholic Church were not included in the 
protectionist framework that emerged from the official interpretation of the Treaty.”97  
Moreover, through changes in domestic regulations (the Law on Capital Tax, [No. 
4305] issued in 1942) – ‘rights’ secured in the Articles 39 and 40 for the non-Muslim 
minorities were restricted. Additionally, some securities that were included in the 
Articles 40-2 have not been implemented until the last decade, i.e. until the last decade 
non-Muslim minorities could not establish new places of worship, could not purchase, 
acquire, or sell property.
98
 The Muslim communities on the other hand were excluded 
from the minority rights debates. Neither in the millet system nor in the legal framework 
of Lausanne, the Alevis, Kurds, Laz, Arabs, Albanians, Roma and others, obtained 
legitimate recognition as a group. What is more, any attempt of these groups to seek 
collective rights was perceived as “threats” to the integrity of the state.  
 
                                               
94 Ahmet İçduygu, and B. Ali Soner. “Turkish Minority Rights Regime: Between Difference and 
Equality,” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 3, (2006): 449-50.    
95 See Appendix 1 
96 Şule Toktaş, and Bülent Aras. “EU and Minority Rights in Turkey,” Political Science Quarterly 12, no. 
40 (Winter 2009-2010):  699-702; Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “On the Europeanization of Minority Rights 
Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey,” Mediterranean Politics 13, no.1 (2008):  31-2.  
97 Toktaş, and Aras,  “EU and Minority Rights in Turkey,” 700 
98 See İçduygu, and Soner, “Turkish Minority Rights Regime,” 453-4. 
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1.4.1 Brief Overview of the State and Alevi Relations in Turkey 
The dissolution of the late Ottoman Empire’s formal and informal institutional 
arrangements in the early Republican period was a source of both distress and relief for 
the Alevi community. The new Republic “based its legal framework on positive law, 
where all citizens are equal before the law, while establishing a modern bureaucracy to 
provide services to all citizens.”99 The transition to democracy and the introduction of 
multiparty politics in the 1950s enabled the Alevi citizens to better communicate their 
interests in the National Assembly.
100
 Since the Turkish citizenship regime put 
emphasis on the principle of equality, no formal restrictions were introduced on the 
political participation and representation of the Alevi individuals. Even though they 
could not formally establish a denominational party, Alevi notables were carried into 
the TBMM by the political parties.
101
 The Alevis were “prepared to accept that the 
Republic did not recognize them as a religious community, as long as that same 
Republic would deny all forms of religion a place in the public sphere.”102 However, 
some policies adopted by the Republican state led to pressures for assimilation and 
discrimination. 
The introduction of new reforms and laws in this period threatened Alevi 
cultural and religious institutions. In 1925, Law No. 677
103
 decreed the closure and 
prohibition of lodges, shrines and other similar sites of religious organization. As the 
new regulation also outlawed the institutions of their syncretistic religion, the Bektashi 
                                               
99 Feyzi Baban, “Community, citizenship and identity in Turkey,” in Citizenship in a Global World: 
European Questions and Turkish Experiences, eds. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, (New York, 
Taylor & Francis, 2005), 55.   
100 Since the establishment of the first National Assembly on April 23, 1920, the Alevi notabales has been 
taking part in the TBMM. The Bektashi çelebis provided support for the Mustafa Kemal and the Republic 
during the war of liberation, and Cemalettin Çelebi entered into the National Assembly. Another religious 
notable Hüseyin Doğan was elected as a CHP representetive in the 1950 elections. But he defected and 
joined the ranks of DP in 1951. In the 1954 elections, the Democrat Party [DP - Demokrat Party] listed 
Yusuf Ulusoy as its top candidate from Tokat, and made him the second “Çelebi” to enter into the 
TBMM.   
101 The only Alevi party, TBP  will be discussed in chapter 4. 
102 Erik Jan Zürcher and Harry van der Linden, The European Union, Turkey and Islam (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 127. 
103 T.C., Tekke ve Zaviyelerle Türbelerin Seddine ve Türbedarlıklar ile Bir Takım Unvanların Men ve 
İlgasına Dair Kanun (Kanun no. 677) December 13, 1925 The original document is available at:  
http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/390.html 
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branch of was not the only Alevi group affected.
104
 While Law No. 677 presented the 
most direct challenge to the Alevi community, the ratification of Law No. 442 along 
with the introduction of Directorate of Religious Affairs [DİB – Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı] as an agency paved the way for future problems of equal treatment and 
protection of minority identity.  
The Village Law
105
 (Law No. 442) of 1924, through the introduction of Section 
14 of Article 13, forced Alevi villages to build a mosque despite the fact that the 
community did not follow orthodox Sunni practices of worship and thus did not require 
such a building. Additionally, Articles 83-86 of the same law describe in detail the 
obligations of the village imams, who in Alevi communities did not fulfill a religious 
function. The basic language of the legal text reflects the assumptions of the era’s 
minority rights regime that the needs of villages should be determined through orthodox 
interpretations of Islam. Even though noncompliance with the requirements of Law No. 
442 was punishable by fines, the discourse it set challenged the non-assimilation 
principle. However, the most contested development in the early Republican period was 
the introduction of Law on the Abolition of the Ministry of Seriat, Pious Foundations 
and General Staff (Law No. 429) in 1924 and the foundation of DİB in 1924. Despite 
the Republic’s secularization claims, the establishment of the DİB institutionalized 
favoritism towards a particular sect of religion (i.e. Sunni, Hanefi Islam).
106
  
Rejection of differences as a marker of identity and preferred treatment of the 
Muslim continued throughout the 1950s. In the post-1961 period, new institutional 
arrangements promoted and expanded pluralism, clarifying and expanding the rights 
and liberties of individuals while continuing to reduce the principle of equality to 
                                               
104 Bektashis were the only branch organized around convents. In the Bektashi Order baba refers to the 
leadership position. Accordingly, the leadership structure in Bektashi tradition include dede-baba (the 
head of the order), halife (regional head), baba (head of a lodge), and derviş (monk). As the Bektashi 
Order has historical ties with the Alevi community, some Alevi organizations discuss the problems of 
Alevi dedes and Bektashi babas within the same policy frames. See Hülya Küçük, The Role of the 
Bektashis in Turkey’s National Struggle: A Historical and Critical Study, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 2, 13-14 
& 22.   
105 T.C., Köy kanunu (Kanun No. 442) March 18, 1924 The original document can be retrieved from  
http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/368.html 
106 See David Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey, (Cambridge: The Eothen Press, 1999), 64-65; 
Andrew Davison ‘Turkey, a “Secular” State? The Challenge of Description’, The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 102, no. 2-3 (2003): 334-350, and Paul Dumont “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology” in Atatürk 
and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. Jacoub M. Landau, 25-44, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1984). 
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‘uniform treatment’ in terms of language and legal rights.107 Although formal 
institutions remained blind to variation within the Muslim population, ideological 
disputes combined with major attacks on Alevi minorities in Malatya (17 April 1978), 
Sivas (3 September 1978), and Kahramanmaraş (19 December 1978) show the status of 
the non-Sunni population has been a problem at the civil society level.  
Additionally, the aftermath of the 1980 military coup and the promotion of a 
new policy of ‘Turkish–Islamic Synthesis’, revived state favoritism of Sunni Islam in 
formal institutions and civil society
108
. However, by the mid-1980s the structural limits 
brought with the 1982 Constitution had been loosened through a series of 
amendments
109
 and the non-Sunni communities gained more freedom to discuss and 
promote their identity in the public sphere. The deaths of thirty-five Alevi attending the 
annual Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Festival in a fire started by fundamental demonstrators 
on 3 July 1993 in Sivas rekindled the survival concerns of the community. Alevis’ trust 
in the state and its institutions was further shaken in 1995 by the events in Istanbul’s 
Gazi neighborhood
110
 which resulted in the death of two significant figures in the local 
Alevi community.  It was in this context that the Alevi community transformed itself 
into a movement and later institutionalized its demands in the form of voluntary 
associations and organizations at the civil society level.
 111
  
 
 
                                               
107 İçduygu, and  Soner, “Turkish Minority Rights Regime,” 456. 
108 Ali Çarkoğlu, and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili, “A Precarious Relationship: The Alevi Minority, the Turkish 
State and the EU,” South European Society and Politics 16, no. 2. (2011): 354; Koçan Gürcan, and 
Ahmet Öncü, “Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial,” Journal of Historical 
Sociology 17, no. 4, (2004): 474. 
109The most significant of those during the early 1990s  was the amendment to Articles 141, 142, and 163 
of Turkish Penal Law [ restricting any type of broadcasting of issues involve identity/culture difference] 
and to Article 13 (restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms); Article 26 (freedom of expression); 
Article 30 (protection of printing facilities); Article 33 (freedom of association); Article 34 (freedom of 
assembly) and Article 133 (radio and television broadcast) of the 1982 Constitution. 
110 On 12 March 1995 three gunmen in a taxi randomly shot at coffee houses in the Gazi neighborhood 
known to be populated by Alevis. In an attempt to protest the two killed in the attack, local Alevis 
gathered to demonstrate. The demonstrations spread as police responded with excessive use of force. At 
the end of the forth day of demonstrations, order was restored but by then 20 protestors had been shot 
dead. For more on the issue see chapter 2.  
111 Ömer Çaha “The Role of the Media in the Revival of Alevi Identity in Turkey” Social Identities 10, 
no. 3, (2004): 329; Bayram Ali Soner and Şule Toktaş, “Alevis and Alevism in the Changing Context of 
Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Parties Alevi Opening,” Turkish Studies 12, no. 3 (2011): 
419-34. 
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1.4.2 Regional Challenges to Rights Regime in Turkey 
The challenge to the rights and citizenship regimes rooted in Laussane not only 
comes from domestic actors, but also from regional intergovernmental institutions.
112
 
The more the co-operation and dialogue increase between the Turkish state and the 
European states and intergovernmental organizations, the more compliance with 
international human and minority rights norms becomes an issue. Since it is a member 
of both the OSCE and the CoE, Turkey is expected to comply with the standards framed 
by these organizations. Additionally, because Turkey is a country who wishes to be a 
member of the EU, the transfer of the liberal European norms and values on rights 
reinforced through the EU membership negotiations. 
The broadly defined Copenhagen criteria (1999) resulted in increasing demands 
for legal and attitudinal changes on political processes. Although the EU is generally 
criticized for not fully grasping the dynamics of minority issues in accession countries, 
in the Turkish case different dimensions of the minority issues have been subjected to 
conditionality.
113
 In contrast to the CEECs, the conditionality relationship between the 
EU and Turkey was established long before the recent enlargements with the signing of 
the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963. The Association Agreement would 
eventually result in Turkey’s full membership after the preparatory, transitional and 
final stages.
114
 Since the signing of the agreement, the situation of the non-Muslim 
religious communities and ethnic minorities has been perceived as a hurdle to the 
achievement of this goal by the EU. In the short time that had passed between the 
recognition of Turkey’s candidateship and the stagnation in accession talks, Turkey 
adopted far-reaching democratic reforms, including reforms regarding states relations 
with its minority groups and marginalized individuals.  
                                               
112 Giuliano Amato and Judy Batt,“Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East: Report of the First 
Meeting of the Reflection Group on the Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the 
New Border,” RSC Policy Paper, No. 98/5, (1998). 
113 On the debate on EU influence on minority issues see Aimee Kanner Arias and Mehmet Gürses, “The 
complexities of minority rights in the European Union,” The International Journal of Human Rights 16, 
no. 2, (2011):  321-36; Christos Kassimeris, and Lina Tsoumpanou, “The Impact of the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey’s EU Candidacy,” 
The International Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 2 (2008): 329-45, and Twahida Ahmed, Impact of 
European Union Law on Minority Rights,  (Oxford: Hart Publishing Limited, 2011). 
114 Meltem Müftüler‐Baç, “The never‐ending story: Turkey and the European Union”, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 34, no. 4 (1998): 240-58 
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It is important to note here that EU does not include religious rights and freedoms 
as a part of the accession conditions [acquis communautaire]. Nonetheless, the Union is 
not blind to the issue of religious diversity and the problems of the religious 
communities in the candidate states. Even though the religious freedoms and rights are 
not addressed as a separate issue in acquis communautaire, the Union’s demands for 
compliance with regional and international standards on rights encourages the candidate 
states to revise their domestic policies and institutions.  
Through its process of conditionality, candidacy process becomes a tool for 
advancing democratic governance, rule of law and collective and individual rights of the 
citizens in countries aspiring to EU membership. The negotiation framework pushes for 
(i) transformation of the candidate state’s institutions and policies, (ii) the establishment 
of participatory governance mechanisms, and (iii) timetables to complete required 
reforms. In other words, the process of synchronization of the policies and instutions via 
condiationality not only facilitates the transformation of the institutional arrangements 
of the candidate states, but also generates opportunity structures for the domestic 
interest groups to aggregate their interests.
115
  
Even though there is no internal standard on collective rights and religious 
freedoms within the EU, the Union urges the candidates to ratify legally-binding 
international documents on human rights.
116
 Once a candidate ratifies the documents, 
the Union begins to monitor the candidates’ ability to put the adopted laws into practice, 
and secure the rights of the individuals.   
When Turkey ratified the Article 25 of the ECHR, which resulted in the 
recognition of the right of individual petition to the ECtHR, two months before its 
formal application to the Union in 1987, the ECtHR applications and decisions became 
                                               
115 See Frank Schimmelfenning, Stefan Engert, and Helko Knobel, “Cost, Commitment, and Compliance: 
The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 495-518; and Frank Schimmelfenning, and Guido Schwellnus, “Political 
Conditionality and Convergence: The EU’s Impact on Democracy, Human Rights, and Minority 
Protection in Central and Eastern Europe,” paper prepared for the CEEISA Conference, Tartu Estonia, 
(June 25-27, 2006), accessed May 18, 2013, available at: 
http://www.ceeisaconf.ut.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=164447/Schimmelfennig_Schwellnus.p
df    
116 In 1998, EU pointed out the dismal rights record as the reason for excluding Turkey from the list of 
prospective members. On March 31, 1998, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker justified 
this decision by stating that: “It cannot be that a country where torture is still practiced has a place at the 
European Union table.” See Human Rights Watch, Report on Turkey: Article 10 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 1999, accessed April 23, 2013, available at 
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a part of the negotiations between Turkey and the Union. Once the ECHR ratified, the 
ECtHR began to provide a supranational system of review of the human rights practices 
in Turkey. In the area of religious freedom, the ECtHR jurisprudence has a privotal role 
in protecting the rights of the individuals belonging to religious minorities.
117
 Both the 
number and the content of the applications of the Turkish citizens, along with the 
compliance of the Turkish states to the decisions of the Court are monitored by the 
European Commission, and included in the annual progess reports. 
Starting with the Regular Report on Turkey in 1998, the EU reports on Turkey 
assess the situation of minorities, cultural rights, and religious freedoms.
118
 The 1998 
Report deals with the Alevi issues under the freedom of religion section and demands 
for improvement of the situation of the Alevi community. Even though the issues of the 
Alevis were not addressed under the section on ‘minority rights and protection of 
minorities’, the Alevi community was still considered as a (religious) minority.119  
The succeeding report on Turkey by the European Commission, rather than 
addressing Alevis and other non-Sunni groups in detail, highlighted the general 
problems on “freedom of religion.” The 1999 Regular Report on Turkey just stated that: 
“as far as freedom of religion is concerned, there still exists a difference of treatment 
between those religious minorities recognised by the Lausanne Treaty and other 
religious minorities.”120  
Following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey’s status was elevated from an 
applicant to a candidate county, the issues of Alevis were granted more coverage. The 
Even though the reform efforts of the state were recognized in the 2000 Progress 
Report, the limited scope of the initiatives were criticized. The Report noted that:  
The official approach towards the Alevis seems to remain unchanged. 
Alevi complaints notably concern compulsory religious instruction in 
schools and school books, which would not reflect the Alevi identity, as 
well as the fact that financial support is only available for the building of 
Sunni mosques and religious foundations….A positive approach seems to 
                                               
117 It is important to note here that the member states of the CoE have enjoyed autonomy in relation to 
religious matters between 1945 and 1993. Until 1993, the Court has not found violations of the article on 
religious freedoms.   
118 European Commission, 1998 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, (1998):  
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf 
119 Ibid, 19 
120 European Commission, 1999 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, (October 13, 
1999), 13,  available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/turkey_en.pdf 
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be adopted towards non-Muslim communities with regard to freedom of 
religion, but this should be developed for all religious communities, 
including non-Sunni Muslims.
121
 
  Starting with the 2002, issues of the Alevi community other than religion also 
began to be addressed. Reports start to assess a number of Alevi issues, such as the 
status of cem houses, the relationship of the community with DİB, the sectarian bias in 
religious education, the restrictions on the freedom of association, and ongoing law suits 
in both Turkish courts and ECtHR.  
In comparison to the legally binding standards of CoE and the decisions of the 
ECtHR, the normative pressure put by EU bodies is insufficient. The power of the 
Union as an exporter of norms of minority rights and/or religious rights is limited, since 
it lacks clear and sustainable norms on these two issue areas. Consequently, the changes 
in state-Alevi relations cannot be considered as a direct result of the pressure put on 
Turkey by EU. However, by addressing to the problems and demands of the Alevi 
community in the Union keeps the Alevi issues on the Turkish political agenda. By 
monitoring the compliance of the Turkish state to the articles of the documents of the 
CoE it ratified, and addressing to the de jure and de facto restrictions on rights and 
liberties, the Union promotes the transformation of the laws and practices. In other 
words, even though a causal link cannot be drawn between the accession process and 
the changes in state-Alevi relations, the contribution of the EU in transforming the laws 
and practices in Turkey should not be undermined.  
1.4.3. Alevis in Turkey: An Unwilling Minority? 
Among various minorities of Turkey, this dissertation focuses on the curious case 
of the Alevis. Since the rise of the Alevi identity movement, Alevi community has 
repeatedly refused to be labeled as a minority, despite framing their rights demands 
parallel to the dimensions of minority rights standards. Additionally, state remains 
hesitant to include Alevis into its minority rights protection regime, despite the 
pressures from the transnational actors. Instead the accession process gave birth to a 
paradoxical situation in which “the privatization of religion as a norm has turned out to 
be the most explosive political problem in Turkey and came to the forefront in Turkish 
                                               
121 European Commission, 2000 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, (November 8, 
2000), 18 & 21 available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf  
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politics from 2007 onwards.”122 Even though there have been changes in the legal 
framework, the adopted reforms gave birth to new forms of exclusionary processes.  
The content and limits of these reforms will be discussed in detail in the remainder of 
the dissertation (particularly in Chapters 5 and 6)  
Although common traits and historical misfortune led Alevis to form an 
underrepresented and victimized group identity, the status of ‘minority’ is strongly 
rejected both by the Alevi and non-Alevi statesmen, bureaucrats, intellectuals and 
activists because the notion of ‘minority’ is mostly operationalized in numerical terms, 
and remains aligned with the minority regime put forward by the Lausanne Treaty.
123
 
Instead, the emphasis is put on rough population estimates as a means of strengthening 
the position of the community.
124
 Paradoxically, in both Turkey and Europe the right-
claims of the Alevi identity movement revolve around principles of minority rights 
protection: (i) preservation of the Alevi population, (ii) non-assimilation of Alevi 
cultural ‘identity’ (iii) introduction and maintenance of the principles of de jure and de 
facto non-discrimination, and (iv) securing effective and meaningful participation of 
Alevi individuals in social, economic and political spheres.  
Additionally, the ciziten action and the lobbying of the Alevi elites and the Alevi 
interest groups at the European level inadvertently transform the community into a de 
facto minority. The more the Alevi interest groups highlight the difference between 
them and the Sunnis in their lobbying and the more cases are submitted to the ECtHR to 
pressure the Turkish state to recognize this difference, the more the Alevis are percieved 
as a non-dominant, un-recognized, underrepresented and discriminated religious 
community, i.e. a religious minority, in Turkey.  
                                               
122 Meltem Müftüler‐Baç, “The European Union and Turkey: Democracy, Multiculturalism and European 
Identity,” RECON Online Working Paper, 2011/20, 3 
123 See Appendix 1 for the original document of the Lausanne Treaty. 
124 Shankland (2003) proposes that 15 per cent of Turkey’s population is Alevi; whereas Koçan and Öncü 
(2004) give a rough estimate between 10 per cent and 30 per cent.  Üzüm (1997) by cross examining the 
census data and the performance of the Alevi party TBU in the 1970s proposes that Alevis constitute only 
10 per cent of the population. The numbers rise to 20 per cent in Güneş-Ayata (1982) and to 30 million in 
Yaman and Erdemir (2006). In the interviews and the meetings and rallies participated the status of the 
Alevis is demonstrated with the motto “Alevis are not a minority! We are….million.”      
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1.5 How to Study Alevi Inclusion in Turkish Politics? 
 How does the Alevi community interact with the political system? How do they 
achieve meaningful and continuous representation in the political sphere? How do 
Alevis react to the system through the system? Once the question of inclusion is 
formulated through questions like these, then understanding of the dynamics of 
participation and representation becomes a necessity. However, conducting individual 
level large-N studies on the Alevi community for generalizable results is difficult.
125
 
Because census data collected in Turkey is blind to religious affiliation there is no data 
on the exact size of the Alevi population in Turkey; most numbers offered in the 
literature are projections ranging from 10 per cent to 30 per cent of the country’s total 
population. Even though the highly contested results by KONDA
126
 were to be taken as 
the starting point for determining an Alevi population universe for research, the problem 
of identification continues to place setbacks for the research question at hand. Since the 
extent of the Alevi population cannot be identified, valid and reliable data on party 
affiliation or the voting preferences of the Alevi electorate cannot be provided. Despite 
a growing number of researchers conducted surveys on Alevis in the last decade, 
respondent bias and sampling continues to be a problem. In most works identifying 
what Alevi is not (i.e. non-Sunni) is much easier than what it is. 
Additionally, once the focus is shifted to formal mechanisms of representation and 
executive-legislative relations, designing a study targeting the relationship between the 
Alevi representatives and the Alevi electorate is equally challenging. For one, not all 
MPs of Alevi origin identify themselves as such publicly. As a further issue, there is a 
tendency both in the media and in the literature to label Alevis as supporters of certain 
ideologies and parties; Alevis have been identified with either Kemalism and support 
for CHP, or socialism and partisan support for left-wing parties, but given their 
heterogeneity, it is unlikely that they vote as a bloc.
127
 What is more, the absence of a 
                                               
125 See Çarkoğlu, “Political Preferences of the Turkish Electorate,” 273. 
126 According to the research by KONDA the number of people that publicly identify themselves as 
Alevis approximately is 5 million (4 million 587 thousand) See “‘Aleviyim’ diyenlerin sayısı 4.5 
milyon,” Milliyet, March 21, 2007. 
127 Ayşe Güneş-Ayata and Sencer Ayata “Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting” in Politics, Parties and 
Elections, eds. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, 146-7, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2002); David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey: The emergence of a secular Islamic tradition, (London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003), 10-1. 
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successful Alevi-oriented party combined with the legacies of Alevi-Bektashi 
contribution to nation-building in Turkey
128
 further encourages this view. However, as 
Chapter 2 discusses, the Alevi community is very fragmented; some groups have ties 
with Islamic revivalism and Kurdish nationalism. Moreover, despite the correlation 
between cities with a stronger Alevi presence and the districts in which CHP and other 
center-left (or leftist) parties win election, there is no sufficient data to establish a causal 
mechanism, making it safe to assume that the alliance between the CHP and Alevis is 
not a matter of constant partisanship.
129
 Additionally, since the 1960s there have been 
attempts to establish ‘Alevi’ parties, namely Union Party of Turkey [TBP - Türkiye 
Birlik Partisi] further indicating that there is no strong tie between the Alevis and any of 
the existing political parties. 
Following those constraints, the focus shifts from individuals to groups and 
interests, and the question of by whom and how the interests of the Alevis as an 
underrepresented social group are represented and communicated. To that end, the 
dissertation claims that Alevis’ political representation has evolved outside of 
conventional political arenas: Alevi mobilization and the creation of Alevi interest 
groups particularly in the last two decades necessitate the study of political 
representation in the domestic and transnational political contexts. This dissertation 
focuses on domestic and transnational case studies, in determining who represents them 
and in what forms of organizations articulation of Alevi interests takes place, focusing 
on the emergence of Alevi identity movement and how the interests of Alevis are 
outlined. The subsequent chapters address (i) the role and function of Alevi interest 
groups and how elites and groups articulated the interests of Alevis in the public sphere; 
(ii) the role and impact of transnational networks; (iii) the role of Alevi political parties 
and MPs on substantive political representation; (iv) the dynamics of State and Alevi 
interest group relations; and finally (v) the conditions for successful policy outcomes. 
As discussed above, most analyses of minorities revolve around the study of their 
relationship with the state, focusing on how they adopt various right-based approaches 
                                               
128 See Hamit Bozarslan, “Alevism and the Myths of Research: The Need for a New Research Agenda,”in 
Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, eds. J. White Paul, and Joost Jongerden, 3-15, 
(Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003). 
129 Both True Path Party (DP – Doğru Yol Partisi) in the 1950s and Motherland Party (ANAP – Anavatan 
Partisi) in the 1980s received electoral support of the community. See Harald Schüler, Türkiye’de Sosyal 
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and demand divergent prescriptions to ‘solve’ the problem. However, these studies fail 
to fully understand the dynamics of the relationship between dispersed and 
heterogeneous groups and the state, which is itself not a unitary actor. Different 
institutions deal with the right-claims of the groups in different ways. In the case of 
Alevis, the level of incorporation and representation of Alevi interests in incumbent and 
opposition parties and various state institutions cannot be considered as similar. The 
institutional frameworks not only determine who speaks for the Alevis, but also 
continuously shape the claims that are made.  
The dissertation proposes that political opportunity structures
130
 play a significant 
role in shaping the modes and levels of engagement of the Alevi community in their 
struggle for rights. Even if motives and resources are crucial in determining the 
capabilities and relative power of the Alevi community, it is political opportunity 
structures that generate openings for actors to interact meaningfully with the political 
system. They act as “filters” shaping the mobilization of the Alevi community and its 
choice of communication strategies, as well as its capacity to change the institutional 
arrangements. 
The debate on minority issues implies that minority groups lack access to formal 
instruments of political participation and adequate representation. Consequently, one 
would expect the group to work towards the establishment of new instruments. 
Formation of domestic and transitional Alevi institutions affirms limitations of the 
community’s political voice. These organizations act not only as institutions of Alevi 
interest articulation, but also as vehicles of communication and representation. Thus this 
dissertation also proposes that due to limitations of inadequate and legitimate 
representative Alevi institutions in the domestic arena, transnational Alevi 
representation increases to further the community’s reach.      
Additionally, the increasing proliferation of individuals, associations, and 
foundations claiming to represent the interests of the Alevi community has negatively 
affected Alevi political representation. As many researchers have already demonstrated, 
                                               
130 Here the notion of political opportunity structures are borrowed from Kitschelt (1986) and refer to 
“specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents.” See Herbert 
P. Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movement in Four 
Democracies” British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1, (1986): 57-85. 
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the group identity of the Alevi community is fragmented and contested.
131
 This 
fragmentation paves the way for increasing actors laying claims to represent the ‘true’ 
interests of Alevis, consequently leading confusion surrounding legitimate 
representation of Alevis. The research presented here relies on process tracing and 
historical analysis to assess the issue of representation and canvass the inception, 
evolution and status of Alevi identity politics in Turkey and Germany. The data used to 
support the claims made in this dissertation is collected primarily from TBMM 
proceedings, press releases, party programs, official publications of the Alevi and non-
Alevi associations, official publications of DİB and speeches of politicians and Alevi 
elites.   
Discourse analysis is used in order to identify issue areas and position the 
demands and strategies of Alevi interest groups. Through identification of how the in-
group and out-group is defined, how the basis of collective identity is explained and 
how threat perception is formulated by the Alevi elites, this dissertation demonstrates 
the dynamic relationship between the identity frames, political opportunity structures 
and right claims laid down by Alevi interest groups. Content analysis of TBMM 
proceedings is used to understand the scope of substantive representation of Alevi 
interests in the national assembly and to identify and explain to what extent 
communicated Alevi demands find their way into the individual MPs’ legislative 
activities.  
These documents are supplemented by semi-structured interviews with members 
of Alevi organizations in Turkey, DİB, and CHP132 and by evidence acquired from 
rallies, lectures, meetings, press conferences and festivals between 2009 and 2012. 
Additionally, videos and other visual materials uploaded to social media outlets are used 
as a supplement in assessment of the framing of issue areas by Alevi actors, particularly 
of those in Germany.  
                                               
131 See works of Martin Sökefeld, Struggling for recognition: The Alevi movement in Germany and in 
transnational space, (n.p.: Berghahn Books, 2008), Massicards, Alevis in Turkey and Europe; and Tord 
Olsson et al. eds. Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives, (Istanbul: Swedish Research 
Institute, 1998). 
132 Even though I try to keep my own interventions to a minimum during the interviews, in most cases I 
have little control over the environment the interviews took place. A general problem during fieldwork 
was that a number of interviews were taking place in the presence of gate keepers or witnesses; hence, 
increasing direct or indirect intervention from others. Due to respondent bias, not all interviews conducted 
made their way into the text, however the information gathered through this process are incorporated to 
the discussions. See Appendix 2 for the list of interviewees included in the dissertation.    
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Overall, the discussions in the following chapters rest on the information collected 
via process tracing. The data collected was used to identify the actors, content, and 
success of Alevi interest representation. Each chapter focuses on one dimension of 
representation and presents its own discussion on political representation literature and 
test hypotheses in an effort to clarify the causal mechanisms.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
REPRESENTING ALEVI INTERESTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
ALEVI INTEREST GROUPS AND STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS 
 
 2.1. Introduction 
 
Even though many scholars put emphasis on elections, political parties and 
executive-legislative relations in understanding the dynamics of representation, civil 
society actors increasingly play an important role in political representation in 
contemporary democracies. As the conventional patterns of political participation 
underwent significant transformations, growing number of organized groups have 
started to shape the course of modern politics. Following the decline in voting 
participation and weakening of political parties, civil society organizations continue to 
communicate the values, identities and preferences of particular groups or 
individuals.
133
 Associational activities have begun to offer supplementary (and 
sometimes alternate) instruments for representation that are interconnected with the 
classic institutions of representative democracy.  
States, either directly or indirectly, contribute to organized group proliferation. 
Either through sponsorship or sanctions, states can promote organization of groups to 
represent interests of particular social or economic groups. Policy failures and 
dissatisfaction caused by the institutional frameworks can inadvertently contribute to 
formation of groups expressing specific interests and political demands. As Michael 
Saward notes, the very design of the institutional frameworks enable “the possibility for 
non-elective representative claims that can call on criteria of democratic legitimacy 
                                               
133 See Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. Interest Group Politics, (Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1986), 9-20; Grant Jordan and William A. Maloney, Democracy and Interest Groups: 
Enhancing Participation, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2-7.  
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which in some ways echo but in important other ways are distinct from electoral 
criteria.”134 
Focusing on the actors and methods of articulation of sectarian interests in 
Turkey, this chapter addresses the question: who speaks for the Alevi community in its 
struggle for rights? The chapter argues that the right-claims of the group are related to 
the politics of group representation. It shows that various Alevi civil society actors 
facilitated the communication and representation of collective interests outside the 
formal political spheres and hence shaped the debate on Alevi rights. I argue that Alevi 
interest groups organized in the form of associations (dernekler) foundations (vakıflar) 
and federations (federasyonlar) play a vital role in framing the problem areas and 
proposing solutions. Based on the data that I have collected from various sources (i.e. 
newspaper reports, publications of Alevi intellectuals and organizations, elite interviews 
and fieldwork data collected in Istanbul, Ankara and Hacı Bektaş district of Nevşehir), I 
discuss the variations within the Alevi community and their effects on the 
representation of the Alevi interests.  
 2.2. Representing Alevi Interests in Non-electoral Domains 
With the rise of the social movements in the 1960s and the 1970s, the proponents 
of identity politics have sought to obtain greater empowerment, representation and the 
recognition of inequalities in the relations between the majorities and minorities.
135
 The 
religious, sexual, racial, linguistic or ethnic markers that have been used to discriminate 
against certain groups have provided the basis for organizing movements and 
institutions to change a group’s place in society.136 The advocates of identity 
movements have demanded greater social justice, based on the recognition of the 
differences in the public and political spheres. However, these struggles have also 
created their own paradoxes. The underrepresented and discriminated groups have 
sought both equal democratic inclusion and also the recognition of differences. In other 
                                               
134 Michael Saward, “Authorisation and authenticity: Representation and the unelected,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2009): 2-3.  
135 Phillips, Politics of Presence, 5-9 
136 See Young, Inclusion and Democracy; Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, and Young, Justice and 
the Politics of Difference.   
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words, they have demanded to be integrated into society and at the same time be able to 
enjoy full citizenship rights without necessarily being fully assimilated.  
Although in democratic systems identity politics can become a tool for the 
improvement of the quality of democracy, they may also increase the deepening of 
societal, economic and political cleavages.
137
 Identity groups can both aid and impede 
equal regard for their own members, as well as the members of the "other" groups. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the right-claims of the collectivities can be perceived as a threat 
to the common-good and well-being of the majority. The response of the state to the 
needs and demands of the identity groups can involve different levels of 
inclusion/exclusion for different types of institutional arrangements.  
It is important to note that interests are not treated here as a means to an end. 
Group interests do not exist out there in the public life; they are constructed and 
articulated into various forms. The groups do not immediately mobilize around specific 
interests to get their way.
138
 They are vital tools to understand how a group is organized, 
and what they seek. The content, actors and strategies of the Alevi interest 
representation is the main focus of this chapter.   
2.2.1.1. Political Representation Concept Revisited 
It is true that in modern politics most of the representation is carried out by 
elected officials. Hence, in most studies the notion of political representation is confined 
to the representation of the individual through the electoral processes, which has clear 
accountability mechanisms.
139
 Accordingly, the classical logic of representation 
                                               
137 Seyla Benhabib eds. Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
138 The literature on interest group theories emphasizes different dimensions of interest mobilization. In 
his Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Mancur Olson (1965) criticized 
the assumptions about the natural inclination of citizens to take joint action in their collective interests. 
He suggests that most people would not join in collective action unless the benefits of joining are greater 
than the costs of non-participation. In response to Olson’s individual-centered approach, Salisbury (1994) 
emphasize that not all groups are individual based that interest groups representing institutions have 
different incentives for mobilization. For more discussion on the mobilization of interests see Mancur 
Olson, Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965); Robert Salisbury, “Interest Structures and Policy Domains: A Focus on 
Research,” in Representing Interests and Interest Group Representation, eds. William J. Crotty, Mildred 
A. Schwartz, and John C. Green, 12-20. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994)         
139 Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes, “Elections and Representation” in 
Democracy, Accountability and Representation, eds. Adam Przeworski et.al., 29-54 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999);  Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New 
Democracies,” Journal of Democracy  9, no. 3, (July, 1998): 112-26.  
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suggests that individuals are selected and authorized through formal mechanisms (i.e. 
elections) to make decisions on the people’s behalf. Based on the characteristics of the 
political system, the representatives enjoy different degrees of discretion ranging from 
delegates to trustees. They can either act as delegates following the expressed 
preferences and demands of their constituents as James Madison claimed in The 
Federalist Papers, or they can follow their own judgment about the proper course of 
action, and become trustees as Edmund Burke depicted in his Reflections on the 
Revolution in France.
140
   
Even though the delegate vs. trustee controversy in the study of political 
representation has long been discussed at the conceptual level, the notion of 
representation still refers to a principle-agent relationship. There is still no such thing as 
self-representation. As Pitkin argues, the logic of representation requires one to make 
oneself present.
141
 Essentially, political representation occurs when political actors (i) 
stand for the interests of, (ii) authorized by, and (iii) are held accountable to the 
represented.
142
 As the relationship between the represented and the representative is 
highly dependent on the institutional frameworks within which it takes place, the notion 
of representation is a highly dynamic and multilayered concept.  
 Since Warren and Castiglione (2004) put forward, the changes in the patterns of 
politics and the way people relate to their political community are further added to the 
multidimensionality of the concept. Study of representation and aggregation of the 
interests through territorially based electoral mechanisms is no longer sufficient.
143
 
Three new dimensions – i.e. territory, identity and function – are added to the 
conceptualization of political representation as a result of: 
(i) the introduction of transnational decision-making arenas and 
powerful players with increasing control of the issues, at both the national 
and supranational levels,  
                                               
140 See Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 52 (New York: 
Cosimo Inc., 2006); Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London: Penguin Books, 
1968). 
141 Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), 8. 
142 Ibid, 11  
143 Mark Warren and Dario Castiglione, “The Transformation of Democratic Representation,” Democracy 
and Society  2, no. 1, (Fall, 2004): 5 - 20.   
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(ii) the rise of identity politics due to increasing dissatisfaction of 
groups with political egalitarianism principles, and  
(iii) the “diffusion of more informal structures and opportunities for 
democratic representation and influence.
144”      
Given the empirical evidence about the participatory democracy mechanisms, it is 
no longer possible to identify a clear conceptual dichotomy between participation and 
representation. In other words, participation and representation often intersect. Political 
representation takes place alongside direct citizen participation in new and transformed 
institutions. Institutional innovations, as in participatory city budgeting in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil
145
 or Panchayat reforms in West Bengal and Kerala, India,
146
 do not only 
facilitate empowered citizen participation, but also enable new structures for 
representation of interests.
147
 Many of participatory institutional designs target civil 
society actors or organized groups rather than individuals, and whenever individual 
participation is required in these participatory experiments, the participants also act for 
or spoke on behalf of particular groups. Additionally, the vast literature on interest 
groups and interest group politics further question monopoly of formal political 
institutions on legitimate representation of interests.
148
 Therefore, it is crucial to 
recognize the political practice aspect of political representation. 
As a subset of the previous dimension, one may think of institutional and 
associational groups of civil society as representatives. In principle, such a group can 
represent “shared interests” or “specific interests” of a collectivity. Additionally, 
interest groups in a democratic system can meet what Bartolini and Mair (2001) call the 
                                               
144 Ibid, 5 
145 The participatory budget in Brazil emerged as an experiment to transform clientelistic arrangements. It 
involves a multi-level administrative arrangement that enables residents of Porto Alegre to directly 
participate in forging city-budget and securing common goods like transportation or health care. 
146 Panchayat reforms involve democratization and empowerment of formally elected village councils 
(gram panchayats) to maintain all local public goods and implement local public projects.  
147 Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright “Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance” in 
Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, eds. Archon 
Fung and Erik Olin Wright, (New York: Verso, 2003), 10-14. 
148 See Graham K. Wilson,  Interest groups, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); David K. Ryden, 
Representation in Crisis: The Constitution, Interest Groups, and Political Parties (New York: University 
of New York Press, 1996); S.Laurel Weldon, When Protest Makes Policy: How Social Movements 
Represent Disadvantaged Groups, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2011) . 
47 
 
political integration functions, i.e. articulating and aggregating interests and integrating 
and mobilizing citizens.
149
  
However, the issues of accountability and authorization present a major challenge 
for recognizing interest groups as agents of representation. Unlike political parties, 
interest groups are not elected, and they do not always have the capability or the 
opportunity to be involved in the decision making processes directly. For that reason, 
many scholars are hesitant to use the term in explaining interest group activities.
150
 
While political parties can justify their role as representatives through their membership 
base and electoral success, such measurements are challenging for interest groups. For 
one, individual membership is not a necessary condition. Interest groups can be formed 
as "organization of organizations" and represent corporate interests, and some may have 
a few members, and exist only to influence policy (such as the Campaign for Lead Free 
Air / CLEAR in Britain).
151
  
Particularly in the case of policy-centered groups, an interest group can lay claim 
to representation without the clear consent of the represented. As Rehfeld put it: 
   Leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the International 
Red Cross purportedly represent the interests of prisoners of war even when 
those individuals have had no say in the selection of their representatives. In 
other cases, like that of environmental groups, the interests represented are 
not even human ones.
152
    
Public opinion and government recognition can be sufficient in identifying instances of 
representation. Therefore, following Rehfeld, I argue that representation can be justified 
whenever there is “an audience’s judgment that some…rather than some other stands 
for a group in order to perform a specific function."
153
 Either through informal 
selection
154
 or audience recognition, civil society organizations can become informal 
                                               
149 Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, “Challenges to Contemporary Political Parties,” in Political Parties 
and Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2001), 339, 341. 
150 Scott Mainwaring, “The Crisis of Representation in the Andes,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (July 
2006): 13-27. 
151 See Grant Jordan, Darren Halpin, and William Maloney, “Defining Interests” 
152 John Rehfeld, “Towards a General Theory of Political Representation,” Journal of Politics 68, no 1 
(February, 2006 ): 1 
153 Ibid, 2 
154 Informal selection here occurs via individual membership base. Accordingly, if the articulated interests 
are organized in institutionalized forms and require individual membership, then some form of horizontal 
accountability can be established through peers answering to peers.     
48 
 
representatives of collective interests. Informal representation seeks to influence 
political processes by communicating information, demands and interests. Based on this 
conceptualization, I argue that the Alevi associations, foundations and federations 
established more recent years, are agents of representation. By “giving voice” to their 
"constituents", these groups try to aggregate support for economic, social or political 
claims of the collectivities that they represent.  
2.2.1.2. “Frames”: Tools of “giving voice” 
Frames, rooted in Goffman’s frame analytical perspective, are schemas of 
interpretation that enable individuals to come together by (i) diagnosing social ills, (ii) 
prognosing movement possibilities and outcomes, and (iii) motivating for collective 
social action.
155
 As a result, frames can change perceptions of existing structures of 
power and inequality in order “to further undermine the legitimacy of the 
[political/social/cultural] system or its perceived mutability.”156 Through frames 
movements/groups can give ‘claims’ a specific content. They provide a core 
understanding of a problematic condition or situation, identify the actors at stake, and 
then call for specific action.
157
 As Lowery and Brasher stated; “once an issue is defined 
as a policy problem, how it is framed may influence the support or opposition faced by 
a proposed solution.” 158   
Yet, interest groups cannot frame and reframe issues to their liking. Framing 
efforts of groups can be curbed down by the opportunity structures and lack of (or 
limitation of) public interest above the issue at hand. However, if an interest group can 
“take the lead in identifying and discussing a problem, it can shape the public 
perceptions” and legislative responses.159 Frames can be used to assign domestic issues 
                                               
155 David A. Snow, “Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields”, in The Blackwell Companion 
to Social Movements, eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Haspeter Kriesi, 380-412. (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social 
Movements: An Overview and Assessment” in Annual Review of Sociology 26, (2000): 614-5.   
156 Doug McAdam,, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. Comparative perspectives on social 
movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings, Cambridge studies in 
comparative politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8. 
157 Sidney G. Tarrow The New Transnational Activism, (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 32-34. 
158David Lowery, and Holly Brasher, Organized Interests and American Government, (Boston: McGraw 
Hill Companies, Inc., 2004). 
159 Ibid, 111. 
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a new international or transnational relevance or meaning.
160
 Either by linking domestic 
issues to broader global frames, or by diffusing domestic frames across borders, actors 
move from domestic to international spheres. However, there are particular challenges 
of framing at the international level. Although global framing can “dignify and 
generalize claims that might otherwise remain narrow and parochial”, it is hard to 
achieve because “activists must work within the power structures and political cultures 
of their own countries.”161  
In the specific context of the Alevi movement and its representative organizations, 
the frame of social and political claims is constructed along a number of dimensions. 
The socio-economic transformations, changes in the formal and informal institutional 
frameworks, introduction and diffusion of ideological movements, and emergence of 
new transnational networks have not only led to the transformation of the Alevi 
community, but they have also shaped the way in which the issue areas are determined 
and policy suggestions are made. The Alevi interest groups use a number of means to 
frame and communicate the issues. Among these, a popular method is conducting 
research on policy issues and then presenting them to the media, both to highlight the 
problems and the organization's position.
162
 
2.2.1.3. Political Opportunity Structures  
The concept of political opportunity structures refers to the institutional context 
which determines the degree of openness of a political system to challenges addressed 
by movements, organizations, groups or individuals.
163
 Simply put, opportunity 
                                               
160 While this chapter, for the most part, deals with the issue of formation of the Alevi frames through the 
interaction of the domestic networks, chapter 3 presents the formation and use of the Alevi identity 
frames in the German transnational context. 
161 Tarrow, New Transnational Activism ,75 
162 See İnsan Hakları Araştırma Derneği, Din ve Vicdan Özgürlüğü Hakkı  İzleme Raporu, (2009), 
accessed April 23, 2013, available at http://www.ihad.org.tr/dvo-raporlari.php; Stratejik Düşünce 
Enstitüsü Alevi Raporu (2010), accessed April 23, 2013, available at 
http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/haberler/859/sde-alevi-raporunu-basina-tanitti.aspx; Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür 
Derneği, Alevi Olmak: Alevilerin Dilinden Ayrımcılık Hikâyeleri, (Ankara: Pir Sultan Kültür Derneği, 
2005); Alevi Kültür Dernekleri, Türkiye’de Alevi Olmak, (Ankara, 2010) 
163 Political opportunity structures are defined differently in the literature, emphasizing different aspects 
of institutional contexts. For an overall discussion see Herbert P. Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity 
Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movement in Four Democracies” British Journal of 
Political Science, 16 (1986), 57-85; Donald McAdam. ‘Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future 
Directions’ In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, eds. Donald McAdam et al.,  23-40, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem 
Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni, New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
(St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 26-8 & 34-5. 
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structures are determined by the regime of a given country. They can be expanded or 
constrained depending on (i) the level of inclusiveness of the institutionalized political 
system (i.e. level of access to institutions), (ii) the availability of influential allies, (iii) 
the stability and structure of alignments, and finally (iv) the state’s capacity and 
propensity for repression (i.e. legal constraints).
164
  
Political opportunity structures are not static, and do not lead to similar outcomes 
over time. What seems to be an opportunity structure that shapes claim-making process 
and organization and mobilization of an actor at one point may discourage it at another 
time. The opportunity structures in Turkey vary as the social, economic and political 
conditions change. They are of significance in shaping the way in which Alevi interest 
groups are formed, and how they act within a given period of time. 
2.3. The Transformation of the Alevi Community: A Brief Historical Overview 
The rise of the Alevi collective action has been discussed with reference to 
various theoretical frames. The literature on the Alevis employed numerous conceptual 
models both analytically and functionally to help uncover the transformation of the 
Alevi community as well as the scope and content of Alevi collective action.
165
 Yet, it is 
clear that no single dimension is sufficient to explain the transformation of the 
community and the rise of the Alevi collective action. An overview of the period 
between 1950 and 1980 indicates that the Alevi movement was marked with conflicts 
between urban and rural, between traditional first generation migrants and the 
politicized and more urbanized second generation, between leftists and nationalists, and 
finally between the Alevis and the Islamists. However, the threat of political Islam, the 
attacks on the Alevis in Sivas and Istanbul, along with the transformative power of the 
transnational Alevi migrant communities, laid the ground for a new movement in the 
late 1980s.
166
 Although as early as the 1960s Alevis began to ‘go public’167 to adjust 
                                               
164 Donald McAdam,  ‘Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions’  
165 A great wealth of perspectives dominates the literature on the Alevi identity movement. The 
transformation of the community and rise of collective action is explained with reference to: 
modernization (Shankland, 1993 & 2003; Subaşı, 2005; Erdemir, 2004); center-periphery relations (Ateş, 
2006; Bozkurt, 1998, Dressler, 2005); urbanization (Bozkurt, 1998; Çamuroğlu, 1998 & 2004; Erman, 
and Göker, 2000); transnational social movements (Massicard, 2003, 2007 & 2013; Şahin, 2005; 
Sökefeld, 2003, 2004 & 2008); and media affect (Vorhoff, 1998; Yavuz, 1999; Çaha, 2004).  
166 Şehriban Şahin, “The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion”, Current Sociology Vol. 53, no. 3 (May, 
2005): 465-85 
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themselves to the urban sphere, the Alevi movement of the post-1980 period 
increasingly became more transnational and rights-oriented.  
2.3.1. Early Transformations: Effects of Migration and Social Change  
Along with the social and political changes of the 1950s, the spatial 
marginalization of the Alevi community gradually came to an end. The spread of 
communication networks, introduction of compulsory schooling, increasing levels of 
industrialization, migration and urbanization that began in the 1950s had a tremendous 
impact on the Alevi community in Turkey, which was historically organized as a rural 
community.
168 
The continuous population loss in the Alevi villages in Anatolia and the 
subsequent urbanization of the Alevi population led to the inevitable transformation of 
the religious institutions and practices and networks of relations of the community.
169
 
The immediate effect of the religious, ideological, economic, educational, and political 
conditions in the urban context was the re-construction of Alevism. Migration and 
urbanization forced the Alevis to interact with their urban Sunni "others", and push the 
community either to transform or to eliminate its institutions.  
Musahiplik
170
, the functional solidarity system of rural life, was unable to survive 
in the difficult economic conditions of the urban areas. The Alevi migrants, who 
                                                                                                                                         
167 José Casanova argues that one of the reasons that a religion enters into the public sphere 
is first to “protect the traditional life-world from administrative or judicial  state penetration.”  and  
then to open up “issues of norm and will formation to the public” See José Casanova, Public 
Religions in the Modern World, (London & Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 58  
168 Although there is no nationwide data available to pinpoint the direction of the migration patterns, 
projections and regional researches on the issue indicate that Alevis villages are more likely to have 
higher outmigration rates than their Sunni neighbors. In the four major cities known to have Alevi 
majorities (Sivas, Tokat, Çorum and Kahramanmaraş) the Alevi populated districts experienced more 
population loss than other mixed or Sunni dominated ones. A similar trend can also be observed in the 
outmigration rates for Tunceli, which is another Alevi dominated province populated mostly by Kurdish 
(Zaza) Alevis. By 1985 the outmigration rate of the city reached 43 per cent. See Şehriban Şahin, 
“Transformation from Secret Oral to Public Written Culture in National and Transnational Social Spaces” 
Unpublished PhD dissertation. (New School, Department of Sociology, 2001). 
169 Extant literature on the Alevis confirm that the migration of the Alevis most commonly occurs as 
chain migration, through which, first the close-relatives of the pioneering migrant, then the village and in 
some cases the whole province engage in large scale migration. See David Shankland, Islam and Society 
in Turkey, (Cambridge, The Eothen Press, 1999), 168; Shankland, “Alevi and Sunni in Rural Turkey”, 1-
19; Şehriban Şahin, “Transformation from Secret Oral to Public Written Culture in National and 
Transnational Social Spaces” Unpublished PhD dissertation. (New School, Department of Sociology, 
2001), 97-100; Philip L. Martin, The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, 1991); Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "The Turkish Alevis." Innovation 5, no. 
3(1992): 109-114. 
170 Musahiplik refers to a fictive kinship uniting two men’s families with a bond thicker than blood 
throughout their lives. Accordingly, musahips are responsible for each others’ actions and misconducts. If 
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competed with each other in the urban workforce, could no longer support their 
musahip economically. The responsibilities and the duties of the Alevi dedes
171
 were 
redefined as the bond between the dedes and talips (followers) were weakened. In the 
cities, the dedes had to compete with their talips in the labour force and ceased to be the 
only authority figures for the community.
 
When they migrated, their followers faced the 
challenge of keeping the religious knowledge and practices alive. The Alevis in towns 
and cities tried to perpetuate religious practices by organizing cems. Nonetheless, due to 
the lack of Alevi worship places in large towns and cities, and increasing social 
pressures, religious practice declined.  
An additional effect of migration and rapid urbanization was the level of social 
differentiation. Accordingly, many of the unskilled and uneducated first-generation 
Alevi migrants were employed in the factories and low prestige jobs of the booming 
public sector. It was the second-generation that enjoyed the benefits of education as a 
tool for upward social mobility.  Yet, in both cases, many had to hide their religious 
identities to escape discrimination in the workplace and in their neighborhoods. Thus, 
labor union activism and left-wing political parties provided new grounds for 
organization of the urban (Alevi) interests.
172
 The leftist movements and organizations 
provided an alternative source of visibility for the working-class Alevis and the second-
generation Alevi migrants who were mostly students. The first generation migrants 
were more concerned with economic issues and survival in the cities. Consequently, 
faith-based and culture-based associational activities emerged only after a level of urban 
integration occurred. 
As a result of the growing dissatisfaction with the political elites, and emergence 
of favorable opportunity structures, the visibility of the Alevi community increased with 
the rise of a lively associational life.
 
Starting from the early 1960s, a number of 
solidarity (hemşeri) associations were founded in gecekondu neighborhoods. These 
                                                                                                                                         
one of them needs aid the other is required to help him, i.e. to feed his family, to pay his debts, etc. 
However, the Alevi migrants, who are competing with each other in the urban workforce, could no longer 
support their musahip economically. See Cemal Şener, Alevilik Nedir, (İstanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan 
Dergahı Yayınları, 2001), 66-67; Fuat Bozkurt, “State Community Relations in the Restructuring of 
Alevism” in Alevi Identity , Olsson et al , 87. 
171 The ideal functions of dedes in the traditional rural Alevi community can be summarized as being 
social and religious leaders in the community. They are expected to set an example for the congregation 
by their behavior and morality. Additionally, due to their sacred powers and charisma, they have greater 
authority and power in the community than any other type of leadership structure.   
172 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 25. 
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village and hometown networks helped the new immigrants in finding jobs and 
accommodations, and providing basic needs.
173
 Yet, it was not until the mid-1960s that 
the first Alevi journals, Cem and Ehli Beyt, were published emphasizing Alevism,   and 
Alevi problems, local radio stations established by Alevis started broadcasting, and 
Alevi gatherings and festivals began to flourish.
174
 However, the Alevi elites were 
always careful not to adopt a discourse of difference in their speeches and publications. 
The Alevi community was always represented as a founding member of the modern 
state and the guardian of Kemalist principles.   
2.3.2. First Alevi Identity Movement and the Road to Increased Alevi Associational 
Activity 
While the 1960 military coup marked the first breakdown of Turkish democracy 
the relatively liberal 1961 Constitution paved the way to the emergence of dynamic and 
free press, as well as an increase in the number of political parties, and socio-economic 
and political associations. The changes in the institutional structures expanded both the 
conventional forms of political participation and protest behavior along.
175
 In the post-
1960 period, student revolts, trade union movements, clashes between ideological 
groups, and sectarian conflicts in society quickly became part of the Turkish political 
life.
176
   
Between 1961 and 1963 a number of motions, commission reports and bills were 
concerning the religious sectarian issues submitted to the parliament. Additionally, the 
legislative meeting on the budget of the DİB turned into lengthy debates on Turkey’s 
religious identity.
177
 While no substantial changes took place, the debates on the 
organization of the DİB in TBMM and the media in the early 1960s underlined the need 
for representation of Alevi interests both in the National Assembly and the public 
sphere. In 1963 a directive from General Cemal Gürsel, the President of the Republic, 
                                               
173 Kemal H. Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 165; Fuat Bozkurt, Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinde Alevilik (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 
2000), 81. 
174 Lütfi Kaleli, Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri, (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2000), 18. 
175 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and İlter Turan, “Measuring Political Participation: A Cross-Cultural Application,” 
Comparative Political Studies 14, no.1, (1981) 123-35; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005,   93-7. 
176 Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 103-5. 
177 Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1 session 22, (December 15, 1961), 313-4; volume 2 session 50, 
(February 19, 1962), 610-38, and volume  11, session 37 (January 30, 1963) 392.  
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requesting Alevi dignitaries to give their opinion on the planned establishment of a 
mezhep bureau (bureau of sects) within DİB, triggered another public debate.  
The right-wing media was particularly critical of the proposal No. 1/392 that was 
submitted to the National Assembly by CHP concerning the establishment of a bureau 
of sects. Two conservative newspapers, Yeni İstanbul178and Adalet179, claimed that 
Alevis has no religious basis. Their editors and writers argued that the boundaries of the 
sectarian relations were limited to Sunni vs. Shiite dichotomy, in which the syncretistic 
characteristic and oral tradition of the Alevi faith forced the Alevis to forfeit 
representation within DİB.  
As the Alevi communal and religious identity was increasingly attacked by the 
right-wing media, and the political parties, the emerging radical student movements and 
the Alevi elites provided a counter-critique.
180
 Among these, the declaration signed by 
the four students from Ankara University (Mustafa Timisi, Engin Dikmen, Seyfi Oktay 
and Ali İlhan) in 1963 marked the beginning of a movement, which organized itself to 
eventually become a political party.
181
 This declaration was significant since it was the 
first (Alevi) document that used the term “Alevi” publicly. The declaration emphasized 
the necessity of the Article 10 of the new proposed bill on DİB for equal representation 
and condemned the negative labeling of the Alevis in the media.  
Awareness about the Alevis further increased with the beginning of the process of 
rapprochement between the Alevi and the Bektashi communities. The founding of Hacı 
Bektaş Tourism and Information Association [HBTTD - Hacı Bektaşi Veli Turizm ve 
Tanıtma Derneği] by Cemalettin Ulusoy, the cem ceremony that took place in Ankara in 
December of 1963, and the seminar series that began later in 1964 were all influential 
developments that increased the visibility of the Alevis in the public sphere.
182
 The 
commemorative ceremonies of Hacı Bektaş Veli that began in 1964 followed the 
                                               
178 In the op-eds by M. Raif Ogan on March 23, 25 and 27, 1963, he claimed that there was no need for 
introduction of a new office to deal with sectarian relations since there were no sects in Turkey. 
Consequently, inclusion of Alevism into the DİB would lead to the justification of superstition rather than 
preventing them. 
179 Op-ed by Ali Ak and Abdülrezzak Öz, Adalet, March 23, 1963 
180 “Açık Oturum: Alevilik, Sünnilik,” Yarın, May 9, 1963; “Alevi gençler bildiri yayınladı,” Milliyet, 
May 1, 1963 
181 The formation of the TBP will be the subject matter of Chapter 4. 
182 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 26-7.  
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example of the Mevlevi ceremonies in Konya
183
 and promoted itself as a tourist 
attraction.
184
 In this early period the ceremonies were mostly organized as cultural 
events and they did not involve a political dimension.  
HBTTD and other associations founded by the Alevis were crucial in maintaining 
the heritage of Alevism. The significance of associations (and later foundations) lied in 
their capacity to fund and promote religious activity. Once an association was 
established and officially approved, its members could raise money for a particular 
cause by collecting donations from door to door (or from their members). While most of 
the associations established by the Sunnis aimed at building mosques
185
, the Alevis used 
associations to finance funeral costs to transport the body of the deceased to his/her 
village, to organize lessons for people interested learning how to play the saz (lute) and 
practice together, later to establish and fund the places for holding cem ceremonies. In 
other words, these associations were immensely important to those who wished to 
practice Alevism as a living religion.       
The final factor that further stimulated the institutionalization of Alevi activism 
was the frustration of the Alevi elites with their political representatives regarding the 
beginning of violent conflicts between the Sunnis and the Alevis. The clashes began in 
early June 1966 in the Ortanca Village in Muğla and they rapidly escalated into an 
Alevi-Sunni conflict dominating the headlines in the press and the debates in TBMM. 
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and the incumbent Justice Party [AP - Adalet 
Partisi,] government labeled the attack as an individual event (münferit vak’a) and 
blamed the press for creating instability in the aftermath of the 1966 senate elections.
186
 
Although the newly-elected CHP senators called for the establishment of a commission 
to investigate the events, this proposal was declined. Instead CHP sent its Muğla deputy 
Turan Şahin to Ortanca to investigate this event.187 Although a number of Alevi 
                                               
183 Mevlevis since 1953 are allowed an annual whirl in public as a tourist attraction.  
184 John D. Norton, “Bektashis in Turkey” in Islam in the Modern World eds. Denis MacEoin, and Ahmed 
al-Shahi (London&Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), 80 
185 Yücekök showed that the increasing use of associations to promote religious actives after Democratic 
Party [DP – Demokrat Parti] came to power.  Among the associations with religious purposes the largest 
was that of associations formed with a view to building or maintaining a mosque. By 1968, 10730 of the 
37806 associations in Turkey had a religious agenda, and 8419 of those were aimed at building mosques. 
See Ahmet N. Yücekök, Türkiye’de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı (1946-1968) (Ankara: 
Siyasal Bilgiler, 1971).      
186  “Demirel: bütün Vatantaşlar eşittir,” Milliyet, June 16, 1966, 7  
187  Ahmet Demirel, Nihat Erim Günlükler: 1925-1979, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), 829-30.  
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intellectuals urged the Alevi deputies in the opposition parties to submit a vote of 
confidence against the government, their effort did not succeed.
 188
     
The immediate result of their failure and also existence of favorable opportunity 
structures led to the establishment of an Alevi-based political party for the first time in 
the history of the Turkish Republic. On June 18, 1966 Cemal Özbey declared that an 
Alevi party would be established to protect the interests of the Alevi community.
189 
Even though Özbey had plans to form an Alevi-based party for some time, the Ortanca 
events and the absence of the legisture to discuss this issue gave further support for the 
formation of an Alevi party.
190
  On October 17, 1966 Union Party of Turkey [TBP – 
Türkiye Birlik Partisi] was officially established by a number intellectuals and 
professionals, who had no or very little previous experience in politics.
191
  
 The foundation of TBP, the publication of Alevi journals such as Cem and Ehl-i 
Beyt, the emerging associations, the rapprochement between the Bektashis and the 
Alevis, along with the emerging labor activism, all contributed to both the creation of 
the collective identity and the institutionalization of the Alevi interests. Yet, political 
polarization and increasing political violence in the late 1970s led to the re-
conceptualization of the Alevi identity and transformation the Alevi activism in the 
public sphere.  
2.3.3. Polarization of Associational Activity in the 1970s 
The flourishing levels and modes of participation in the 1960s and the 1970s 
created its own challenges for governance and stability in Turkey. Economic downturn 
in the country coupled with the effects of rapid urbanization and migration further 
promoted fragmentation of the society along ideological, sectarian and ethnic lines. By 
                                               
188 Even though Hüseyin Balan from Nation Party (MP) submitted a motion of interpellation against 
Süleyman Demirel and Faruk Sükan (the Minister of Internal Affairs), he was forced to retrieve the 
motion two days later due to the request of his party’s leader Osman Bölükbaşı.  
189  “Mezhepçiliğe karşı olan yeni bir parti kurulacağı açıklandı,“ Milliyet June 18, 1966, 1-7 
190 Kelime Ata, Alevilerin ilk Siyasal Denemesi: Türkiye Birlik Partisi (1966-1980), (Ankara: Kelime 
Yayınevi, 2007),   50-62. 
191 The founding members of the TBP were: Hasan Tahsin Berkman (retired general), Cemal Özbey 
(lawyer), Feyzullah Ulusoy (lawyer), Salim Delikanlı (retired officer), Tahsin Tosun Sevinç (trade union 
representative), Mustafa Geygel (contractor/land owner), Mehmet Güner (economist), Mehmet Ali Egeli 
(Economist), İbrahim Zerze (worker), Hüseyin Dedekargınoğlu (print owner), Hüseyin Günal 
(contractor), Mustafa Topal (doctor), Hüseyin Eren (Retired officer), Eli Kemal Eroğlu (worker), Hüseyin 
Erkanlı (lawyer), and Faruk Ergünsoy (lawyer). See Ata, Alevilerin ilk Siyasal Denemesi 
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the late 1970s, the political system in Turkey was characterized by a paralyzed National 
Assembly, and a major crisis stemming from spreading violence and instability.
192
   
This period was also characterized by convergence between the Alevi community 
and the left. Among the newly emerging Alevi working class, the Kurdish-Zaza Alevis 
and the educated second-generation rural migrants, leftist views were considered as 
progressive ideals. These actors provided a new pool of support and membership for 
labor unions, especially left-wing Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of 
Turkey [DİSK - Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederayonu] and illegal radical left 
organizations [such as TIKKO, DHKP-C, DEVSOL, and TKP]. As the Alevi actors 
participated in and shaped left-wing movements, the movements began to be identified 
with its Alevi actors.
193
 For the most part, the Alevis were welcomed by these radical 
movements as they provided a new social base for recruitment and mobilization.
194
  
The Alevi actors, particularly the youth, reconstructed the historical figures and 
rebellions according to Marxism, and re-assessed the Alevi teachings as a revolutionary 
doctrine. Within this process, religious and mystic concepts were reformulated to match 
socialists' understanding of rights and justice, and the historic figures of the Alevi faith 
and culture were transformed into the symbols of revolutionary resistance.
195
  
Additionally, Kurdish Alevis – who had been disproportionally excluded from 
political processes – began to articulate their interests through legal and illegal 
organizations. Although the TBP was formed as a sect-based party, it did not attract 
many followers from Turkey’s Kurdish Alevi population. Instead, a significant portion 
of the Kurdish Alevis became a pool of support for radical political parties and their 
armed factions.
196
  
Since ideological confrontations turned into social conflict and violence, 
particularly in the provinces with mixed ethnic and sectarian populations, such as 
                                               
192 Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Dynamics,  120-4  
193 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 29. 
194 Sabri Sayarı, “Violence and terrorism in Turkey 1976-1980: a retrospective analysis” Terrorism and 
political violence 22, no. 2 (2010): 198-215; Sabri Sayarı, and Bruce Hoffman, “Urbanization and 
insurgency: The Turkish case 1976-1980,” Small Wars & Insurgencies  5, no. 2 (1994): 162-79.    
195 Among those, the figure of Pir Sultan Abdal transformed into revolutionary hero and his struggle with 
the (Sunni) Ottoman Governor Hızır Paşa presented as the model of resistance for justice. Illustrations of 
Pir Sultan Abdal, raising his lute (saz) in defiance, incorporated into the emblems of various left-wing 
Alevi organizations.  
196 Michiel Leezenbero, “Kurdish Alevis and the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s” in Turkey’s 
Alevi Enigma, White, and Jorgerden, 198-199.  
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Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, Çorum, Malatya, Tokat and Erzincan, social cleavages were 
deepened and intensified. The more the Alevi-Sunni confrontations increased, the more 
the Alevis became major suspects and targets of political violence.
197
 The rumors 
implicating the Alevi population as the culprit of (i) alleged mosque burning in Sivas, 
(ii) assassination of the mayor in Malatya, or (iii) bombing of a theater in 
Kahramanmaraş, led to the death and injury of thousands of inhabitants and the 
destruction of various shops and businesses in these cities.
198
 The bloody and dramatic 
nature of the events was influential in reshaping the collective memory of the Alevi 
identity movement and the emergence of narratives of violent discrimination and 
victimization. The immediate impact of these events was distancing of Alevis from the 
processes and institutions of the Turkish politics. The police, local authorities and legal 
authorities were no longer seen by the Alevis as the neutral parties in these ongoing 
sectarian conflicts.    
2.3.4. The Breakdown of the Regime and the Emergence of a New Alevi Identity 
Movement  
 
The 1980 military coup was another landmark in the transformation of the Alevi 
community and the articulation of Alevi interests. The increased identification of the 
group with left-wing groups and movements that started in the late 1960s marginalized 
the community in the aftermath of the coup d’etat.199 The new institutional design that 
was introduced in the 1982 Constitution displayed distrust towards civil society 
associations and political parties of all ideological convictions. The mistrust of the Alevi 
associations led to the closing down of many Alevi organizations, and the imprisonment 
of large numbers of Alevi activists. The institutional transformations introduced by the 
new military regime shattered the networks and ties that were established by the Alevi 
community during the past decades.  
The 1982 Constitution revoked many rights that were secured by the 1961 
Constitution. Restrictions on the formation of associations and political parties forced 
groups and communities to establish alternative networks to represent their interests. 
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The elites of the previous Alevi identity movement was replaced with the new Alevi 
elites.
 
These born-again second generation Alevi elites took up the role of ‘identity 
entrepreneurs’200 and claimed authority on their knowledge of Alevism. These new 
elites who were not limited to the dedes (who traditionally are considered as the sole 
authority on esoteric knowledge, beliefs, rituals and practices)
201
 sought answers to the 
questions as to who an Alevi is and what constitutes Alevism. By publishing opinion 
pieces, books or periodicals, giving speeches in various panels and conferences, or 
appearing in the media, these new Alevi elites shape the scope and content of the new 
frame of the Alevi collective action. 
Regarding these developments, Vorhoff emphasizes the significance of the press, 
and the new publishing houses.
202
 As the restrictions on public broadcasting and the 
press gradually were lifted, this newly-emerging form of activism began to use the 
media and public representation channels to raise public awareness about Alevism and 
Alevi claims. Countless new books on Alevism were published, new publishing houses 
were founded, and series on the Alevis began to appear in almost all major newspapers 
in the 1990s.  Even though the publications by the Alevis and the non-Alevis on 
Alevism and Alevi religious figures had been in circulation long before the 1980s,
 203
 
the works of the post-1980 period were vital in formalization of Alevism as a ‘public 
religion’. These new publications not only tried to systematically analyze and 
standardize Alevism, but they also sought to standardize the Alevi communal interests. 
These works both provided guidelines about the Alevi beliefs and worship, and 
presented solutions to the problems that the Alevi community faced.
204
 
                                               
200 An identity entrepreneur is an individual, typically a charismatic voice, who finds it desirable to create 
or reinforce group identities. Either by highlighting the injustices the group in question faces or creating 
myths about the significance of the group, the identity entrepreneur tries to create or reinforce collective 
identities. See Barbara Ballis Lal, “Ethnic Identity Entrepreneurs: Their Role in Transracial and 
Intercountry Adoptions,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 6 (1997): 385-413 
201 Even though most authors of Alevism and Alevi movement are not from the dede/baba lineages as 
Şahin (2005) claims, there are some figures like Bedri Noyan (dedebaba) or Mehmet Yaman (dede) who 
have also written on Alevi/Bektashi faith and practices and issues of the community.  
202 Karin Vorhoff, “Academic and journalistic publications on the Alevi and Bektashi of Turkey” in Alevi 
Identity, eds. Olsson, et.al. 23-51. 
203 Such as Haydar Alkor, Mevlevilik ve Bektaşilik, (Konya: Yeni Kitap Basımevi, 1946); Hasan Bahri Er, 
Tarih Boyunca Alevilik (İstanbul: Varol Matbaası, 1954), and Cemal Özbey, Alevilik Üzerine Tartışmalar 
(Ankara: Emek Basım Evi, 1963).    
204 Cumhuriyet newspaper became a medium of the Alevi elites to educate the public on Alevi issues 
between 1990 and 1999. Additionally, a number of publications emerged during the 1990s, which 
diagnose and then propose solutions to the problems of the Alevis. See Rıza Zelyurt, Aleviler Ne 
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In addition to the standardization of the Alevi practices, the Alevi movement of 
the 1980s and the 1990s also involved the institutionalization of the Alevi ritual 
practices, through construction of the cem houses. In this way, Alevism was 
transformed into a ‘congressional’ religion. Unlike a mosque, the Alevi a cem house is 
not an architecturally distinct sacred building. However, in the urban context, as more 
and more Alevis migrated to the cities, the notion of the cem houses was re-defined in 
accordance to the changing needs of the community. In the 1960s and the 1970s, cem 
houses were established in the large cities, and they were “near the shrine of an Alevi 
saint”, “in reopened old Bektashi convents”, or in “nondescript buildings in urban 
neighborhoods with a heavy Alevi population”.205 It was not until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s that these cem houses acquired institutional characteristics where members 
of the ‘Alevi congregation’ from different backgrounds came together.206 The ‘new’ 
cem houses, in addition to being a sacred place for worship, were a space for funeral 
ceremonies, a communal kitchen to feed the poor, and a cultural centre where the Alevi 
community could learn its cultural heritage.
 
 
Along with these changes, the urban Alevi community required aid to educate and 
financially support its religious leaders (dedes), to fund its places of worship, and to 
educate the younger generations in the Alevi faith. The more the cem houses were 
institutionalized, the more their functions became an area for contestation with the state 
sponsored institutions. As the legitimacy of the Alevi faith and its institutions were not 
been recognized, the courtrooms became the place for challenging the role of state 
institutions and policies since 1998.
207
 
In addition to the changes in the formal and informal institutions, transformation 
of the elites and the increased importance of the media, domestic third parties (who 
cannot be necessarily labeled as pro-Alevis) also need to be taken into account in 
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Accessed December 21, 2012, available at:  
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206 Günkut Akın “Cem Evi Mimarisi Üzerine Notlar”, Cem Kültür Evi Mimari Proje Yarışması, (İstanbul: 
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207 Markus Dressler “Making Religion Through Secularist Legal Discourse: The Case of Turkish 
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understanding the dynamics of the Alevi identity politics. Depending on their own 
framework of interpretation on Alevis, these groups and movements seek alliances or 
further discrimination. The assessment of the stance of these actors is vital to have a 
better understanding of the formation / transformation of issue areas of Alevi politics, 
and strategies of Alevi organizations and associations in making demands. Among 
those, the role of Islamists revivalist Kulturkampf
208
 and Kurdish nationalists will be 
assessed in the subsequent sections.
209
   
 2.4. Links with Other Movements in the post-1980 Period 
 In the early 1990s, the Alevi identity movement was marked with a series of 
significant events that included the hotel burning in Sivas (1993), the protests sparked 
by the derogatory comments of Güner Ümit, the host of the popular TV show Turnike 
(January, 1995)
210
, and the Gazi riots in Istanbul (March, 1995). The rising levels of 
discrimination along with the prevailing threat of political violence increased the 
feelings of victimization among the Alevis. Even though the actors of the Islamist 
revivalist camp denied expressing anti-Alevi sentiments threat perception of the Alevi 
community became intensified following the Sivas events of 1993.  
2.4.1. Links with the Islamic revivalists 
The Sivas events of 1993, “The Sivas massacre” as it is called, marked the 
breaking point in the Alevi identity movement as it led to an increase in consciousness 
among the Alevis. Burning down of Madımak Hotel by a mob of Islamic revivalist on 
the second day of the Pir Sultan Abdal festivities on July 2, 1993 led to the death of 37 
                                               
208 Here the term is employed in line with Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (2005). Accordingly, it refers to a clash 
between two different images on how a good society is organized. The first camp put emphasis on the 
significance of science and progress as the key values of politics and society labeled as the secular 
kulturkampf. Praise of traditional lifestyles and gratitude [şüküretmek] to one’s place in society marked 
the latter camp, which is labeled as the revivalist kulturkampf throughout the work. 
209 The transnational dimensions of these movements will not be discussed here. As the transnational 
dynamics is the subject matter of the next chapter, the chapter at hand will only focus on the domestic 
actors, strategies and effects of the movements.  
210 On January 10, 1995 Ümit made a joke implying incestuous relationships [mum söndü] among Alevis 
on a live show. Immediately after the unfortunate joke many Alevis all over Istanbul gathered around the 
building of the TV station to protest Ümit. Following the large protests and criticisms, Ümit had to resign 
from the program. Even though the event has no direct links to either Islamic revivalism or Kurdish 
nationalism, it is significant for showing the deepening desire of the Alevi masses for recognition and 
respect.  
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people. The footage of the brutal event was aired numerous times on TV stations, and 
the images of the helpless victims and the violent mob on TV and in the press 
traumatized the Alevi public. The failure of the police forces to repress the protestors 
and the length of the judicial process transformed the event into a symbol of Alevi 
repression.  
The actions of the mayor, Temel Karamollaoğlu211 during the events, and the 
representation of the detainees by Şevket Kazan212 in court, strengthen the distrust of 
the Alevi community towards the Islamist revivalist camp. This distrust was deepened 
by a series of a derogatory expression made by the Welfare Party [RP – Refah Partisi] 
political elite. In 1997, the labeling of popular protest campaign “One Minute of 
Darkness for Eternal Light” [Sürekli Aydınlık Için Bir Dakika Karanlık]213 as a candle 
extinguishing (mumsöndü) game by Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan in a speech given 
in his visit to RP local branch in Gölcük, 214 responded with a public outcry and later a 
suit filed by the Alevi association Semah Culture Foundation [Semah Kültür Vakfı].215  
While the actors of the revivalist camp and their actions are perceived as a threat 
by most of the Alevi actors, the revivalists deny anti-Alevi sentiments. Indeed, the mid-
1990s was marked with increasing encounters between the Alevi notables and the 
Islamists. The political elites sought to reach out to Alevi community with the hope of 
normalizing the relations and mobilizing the Alevi constituents. Alevis were seen as a 
potential pool of voters, and prior to both the 1994 local elections and 1995 general 
elections, RP reached out to Alevi notables for support.
216
 RP’s successor Virtue Party 
[FP - Fazilet Partisi] continued this trend. To this end, Recai Kutan, the chair of FP, 
attended meetings organized by Ehl-i Beyt Foundation and Association of Democratic 
                                               
211
 Who was a member of the Islamists RP and prosecuted for preventing rapid response of the fire 
department and for encouraging the mob, but was not charged during the trial period. 
212 Who later became the Minister of Justice under the Refah-Yol (RP and DYP [Doğru Yol Partisi, True 
Path Party]) coalition government during 1996-97). 
213 In order to protest the scandalous state-Mafia relations uncovered by a car crash in Susurluk, 
participants of the protest flickered the lights at 9p.m. every night. 
214 The debate can be traced through a review of major newspapers between February 11 and 24 of 1997. 
See “Kazan: Okyanusta mücadele ediyoruz,” Milliyet, February 11, 1997; “Sönen her mum hükümeti 
tüketiyor,” Milliyet, February 13, 1997; “Aleviler Kazan’ı mahkemeye veriyor,” Milliyet, February 14, 
1997; “Mumsöndü TBMM’de,” Milliyet, February 21, 1997  
215 A detailed account of the case can be found in Kaleli (2000). 
216 “RP’nin gözü bile Alevilerde,” Milliyet, September 6, 1991; “Alevi dedesi İzzettin Doğan Refah 
Partisi’yle neden görüştüğünü Cumhuryet’e anlattı: Darbeye Karşı RP ile işbirliği” Cumhuriyet, February 
26, 1994. 
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Industrialists and Businessmen [DEMSİAD - Demokrat Sanayici ve İşadamları 
Derneği].217 Additionally, in the 1999 elections, Alevi candidates were selected for 
Tunceli province, and Fermani Altun
218
 was placed second in the electoral list for 
Mersin.  
However, these attempts did not trigger significant electoral gain either for RP or 
FP. Their successor AKP incorporated Alevi elites into its ranks, and introduced 
projects for normalization of relationship between the Alevis and the state. Although the 
relationships and the policy proposals were short-lived and limited, the nomination and 
the election of Alevi MPs and the rapprochement project coined as “Alevi Açılımı” 
(Alevi Opening) in the second term of AKP demonstrated a significant change in 
attitudes and behavior. The more the Alevi issues became a concern at the European 
level due to the lobbying activities of the Alevi interest groups and the applications to 
the ECtHR, the more the state was pressured to recognize and meet the demands of the 
Alevi community. In 2007 the AKP government began to argue that there was an Alevi 
issue which needs resolution. Both the AKP notables and the other government 
officials, i.e. Director of Religious Affairs, started to highlight the importance of 
inclusion of the Alevis.
219
  
Yet, the links between the revivalist camp and the Alevi identity movement are 
not limited to the relations between revivalist parties and the Alevi associations and 
foundations. Revivalist business associations and press also reached out to Alevi 
notables to establish networks. Among those, the evolving relationship between the 
devout Sunni bourgeois and some of the Alevi notables is of significance. Although 
most of the Alevi associations and foundations are divided along political lines and are 
more rigid in their activities and attitudes, there is a significant individual fluidity. It is 
individual networks that provide new spaces to connect different parties of conflicting 
camps. Such relationships can be detected over an analysis of participation of Alevi 
notables in activities sponsored by The Association of Independent Industrialists and 
                                               
217 “Kutan meydan okudu,” Milliyet, December 14, 1998; “Ehl-i Beyt Birleştirdi,” Zaman, March 14, 
1999. 
218 Fermani Altun is the chair of Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı (World Ahlul Bayt Foundation) and founder of 
DEMSİAD. Since its creation, the World Ehl-i Beyt Foundation has promoted itself as a representative 
Alevi institution among circles of Islamic revivalism in Turkey. For this purpose it is also criticized by 
other Alevi organizations as assimilationist, and labeled as “Sunnified”.   
219 Chapters 4 & 5 will provide more details on the linkages between the Alevi community and the 
political parties. 
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Businessmen
220
 [MÜSİAD -Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamlari Derneği]. MÜSİAD221 not 
only provides networks of solidarity among its members, but also pave the way for the 
establishment of new networks between the (Sunni) devout bourgeois and the Alevi 
elites and entrepreneurs through its social and cultural activities.
222
 
 Additionally, the right-wing newspapers [Zaman, Yeni Şafak, and Vakit] also 
shaped the debates on the Alevi identity. Two associations, Ehl-i Beyt, and Center for 
Republican Education and Culture Foundation [CEM - Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür 
Merkezi] enjoy significant levels of coverage right-wing media. The Alevi identity the 
publication of these newspapers was framed in accordance to the dominant Islamist 
view.
223
 The Alevi associations and/or community are considered to be victims of 
manipulation [of the left] to promote cem houses to keep Alevis out of mosques.
224
   
2.4.2. Links with Kurdish nationalism 
Ethnic dimension is another important issue in understanding the dynamics of the 
Alevi politics of post-1980 period. Alevis, who are not limited to Turkish-speaking 
communities and they do not always align themselves with Kurdish nationalists. 
Historically, a certain level of animosity emerged between the Sunni Kurds and the 
Alevis due to Ottoman Empire’s use of Sunni Kurds to suppress Alevi rebellions in the 
eastern regions.
225
 van Bruinessen points out that the Kurdish Alevis living in far 
eastern provinces (Bingöl, Muş, Varto) “surrounded by Sunni Zaza and Kurmanci 
                                               
220 MÜSİAD is a businessman association founded by a group of young businessmen in 1990. It was 
founded to represent Anatolian based small and medium enterprises which did not qualify for 
membership to Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association [TÜSIAD – Türk Sanayiciler ve 
İşadamları Derneği] which accepted only the largest companies in its ranks a new responsive network to 
connect with the revivalist camp. For a detailed comparison of the two business associations, see Ayşe 
Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business 
Associations,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 30, no. 4 (1998): 521-39. 
221 MÜSİAD is associated with Islam because “1) it is affiliated with religious sects and communities, 2) 
Islam appears a significant point of reference in its activities, and 3) it has close ties with political Islam 
mainly represented in Turkey since 1980s by the Welfare Party, then the Virtue Party and finally the 
Justice and Development Party” See Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu, “Globalization, alternative 
modernities and the political economy of Turkey,” Review of International Political Economy 12, no. 1 
(February 2005): 112. 
222 Such as the visits between the MÜSİAD and Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı (World Ahlul Beyt Foundation) 
Fermani Altun’s participation in international fairs, award ceremonies and Ramadan and Muharram 
festivities organized by MÜSİAD.   
223 “Erbakan: Alevi-Sünni Kardeştir” Zaman, June 01, 1995. 
224 Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Hz. Ali cem house açmadı” Zaman, September 14, 1994; 
225 Bozarslan, “Alevism and the Myths of Research: The Need for a New Research Agenda,” 
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speakers with whom they had a long history of conflict, were less inclined to see 
themselves as Kurds.
226” 
Additionally, the PKK which was founded in 1978 to publisize Kurdish 
nationalist demands through violence and terrorism had a narrow focus that was based 
only on the Kurmanci-speaking Sunni Kurds. It faced serious difficulties in the Zaza-
Alevi dominated regions such as Tunceli/Dersim. Particularly, the radical left-wing 
organization Liberation Army of Turkish Workers and Peasants [TIKKO - Türkiye İşçi 
Köylüleri Kurtuluş Ordusu] / Communist Party of Turkey Marxist-Leninist [TKP-ML - 
Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist-Leninist] and Revolutionary People’s Liberation 
Party-Front [DHKP-C - Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi] and their sister 
factions compete with the PKK for resources and support.  
Although since the late 1960s the people from Dersim province were more prone 
to the left-wing movements, Kurdish nationalism also gained a significant level of 
followers. Sait Kırmızıtoprak (a.k.a. Dr. Şıvan) Led the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
[KDP - Partiya Demokrat Kurdistan] and began the preparations for a prolonged 
guerrilla struggle in 1969. In the 1970s Freedom Path movement [Özgürlük Yolu] of 
Kemal Burkay also recruited people from Dersim among its founding cadre.
227
    
Even though the Alevis were present in the Kurdish nationalist movement, there 
was no widespread support. The lack of emphasis given to religion inevitably led to 
rejection of Alevi belief and rituals and its “traditional enmity towards Sunnis”. 
Consequently movements elevating religion to that of respectable tradition [TIKKO and 
later DHKPC] gained more support among Kurds who identify themselves as Alevis.
228
 
 By the late 1980s PKK accepted the need to integrate religion and promoted a 
rapprochement with Sunni Islam.
229
 Yet, it was 1990s that led the PKK elites to 
establish ties in order to make-up for the Sunni emphasis. This change in attitude was 
linked to the change in strategy of organization. Starting in 1992, PKK sought to expand 
its activities in the Alevi dominated provinces of Tunceli, Malatya, Elazığ, Sivas and 
                                               
226 Bruinessen, Martin van,“ ‘Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!’:The Debate on the Ethnic Identity of 
Kurdish Alevis”, in Syncratistic Religious Communities in the Near East, eds. Kriztina Kehl-Bodrogi, B. 
Kellner-Heinkele, and A Otter Beaujean, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 13 
227  Ibid. 
228  Ibid, 15-6; Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 72-3. 
229 David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, 
(Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 142-3. 
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Adıyaman.230 The Sivas Events and the later Gazi riots provided a new opportunity for 
the organization to seek links with the alienated Alevi groups.   
Three days after the Sivas Events, another tragic event took place inthe Sunni 
village of Başbağlar, in Erzincan. The village was raided by PKK and all 28 males in 
the village were killed. Later the village was burned and one child and four women also 
died in the fire. The organization declared that it was for the revenge of the “Sivas 
Massacre”. However, despite the PKK‘s propaganda and attempts to use the Sivas 
Events to attract Alevis, many Alevis refused to support the PKK. 
In the case of the Gazi neighborhood in Istanbul there was a tension between the 
residents and the police due to the death of a 35 year old man in police custody in 
January, 1995.
231
 On March 12, one person died and numerous others were injured 
following the drive-by shooting at three coffeehouses, and a pastry shop. Although the 
coffeehouses were a few hundred meters away, the police were late on the scene.
232
 As 
a result, protesters gathered in front of a nearby police station, and the crowd began to 
throw stones and petrol bombs at the police. The police responded by shooting at the 
crowd. The riots spread to the neighborhood and the rioters destroyed the shops and the 
workshops.
233
  
What started as a local event soon spread to other Alevi populated neighborhoods 
in Istanbul. The Gazi Riots of 1995 were especially important for the manifestation of 
discontent and grievances in the Alevi neighborhoods of Istanbul.
234
 Taking advantage 
of these grievances the militant left-wing organizations such as TIKKO, DHKP-C, and 
radical Kurdish nationalist PKK managed to establish their presence in these 
neighborhoods. 
                                               
230  Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe,; Romano, Kurdish Nationalist Movement 
231 Aliza Marcus ““Should I shoot you?”: An eyewitness account of an Alevi uprising in Gazi,” Middle 
East Report, 1996: 24-6.  
232 Ibid.  
233 Bruinessen, “Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!” 
234 Gazi is a neighborhood in Sultanbeyli, Istanbul (at the time of the events it was part of 
Gaziosmanpaşa), in which the residents are predominantly Alevi and Kurdish speakers. 
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 2.5. Representing Alevi Interests at the Civil Society Level: 
 Actors, Issues and Strategies of the post-1990 period 
As the preceding analysis suggests the changes in the political institutional 
structures, ideological movements, social and economic transformations, along with the 
increasing activism of the other identity movements in Turkey shaped the form and 
scope of Alevi associational life. By late 1990s new actors has been introduced to Alevi 
identity politics. Since the identity frames and policy claims of these new actors vary, 
literature on the identity politics fails to provide a substantive tool to depict the in-group 
differentiation. The standard differentiation of Alevi identity along the lines of religious 
vs. cultural, and the classification of Alevi actors along the dimensions of ethnicity or 
ideology are insufficient to explain the heterogeneity of Alevi associational life. These 
constructs have limited use in understanding the instruments and strategies of the 
individual and collective, civil and uncivil; domestic and transnational actors.   
2.5.1. Alevi Organizations of the 1990s 
 
Following the tragic and deadly events in Sivas and Istanbul, a new type of 
associational activity began. While the village networks and solidarity associations 
along with cultural associations have continued to be a part of Alevi associational life, a 
number of local and nation-wide associations/foundations, promoting different Alevi 
identity frames emerged in the Turkish public sphere. These numerous organizations 
transformed and branched out at the national and supranational levels depending on (i) 
the amount of resources, and (ii) the level of restrictions that were imposed on them by 
the political authorities.  
Following the violent events of Sivas (1993) and Gazi (1995), a new type 
association building emerged. While the village networks and solidarity associations 
along with cultural associations continued to be a part of Alevi associational life, with 
1990s a number of local and nation-wide associations/foundations, promoting different 
Alevi identity frames emerged in the Turkish public sphere. These numerous 
organizations transformed and branched out to the national and supranational levels 
depending on (i) the amount of resources, and (ii) the level of restrictions social and 
political structures imposed.  
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As the resources of the founding elites increased and more Alevi organizations 
were established, a greater policy scope was adopted. During this time, there were four 
major types of Alevi identity organizations, each formulating and promoting a distinct 
identity discourse. Despite their broad influence, however, these were not the only 
actors in Alevi identity politics in the 1990s, and their dominion over public debates 
quickly diminished with the introduction of new actors in the form of associations or 
foundations. Nevertheless, the axes of religion, culture, and ideology around which they 
were organized continue to shape the structure of mobilization in later periods (See 
Table 2.1).        
 
Table 2.1 The Major Alevi organizations in the 1990s
235
 
 CEM Ehl-i Beyt 
HBVAKV 
& 
AKD 
PSAKD 
Major axis 
of 
organization 
Religion Religion Culture Ideology 
Identity 
frame 
Emphasis on 
religious 
heterodoxy 
(syncretism); 
 
Traditions 
encapsulated 
in the 
principle of 
edep
236
 
 
 
Emphasis on 
religious 
orthodoxy 
(Shiism); 
 
Quran and 
Ehl-i Beyt 
(the Holy 
family) as the 
foundation of 
faith 
 
Emphasis on 
the way of 
life; 
 
Anatolian and 
Turkish 
traditions; 
 
folklore 
 
 
Emphasis on 
philosophy; 
 
Resistance to 
social, 
economic, 
and political 
orthodoxy 
Leadership 
profile 
Religious 
dignitaries 
Businessmen/ 
Entrepreneurs 
Businessmen/ 
Entrepreneurs 
Left-wing 
activists 
Resource 
Religious 
authority 
External 
support 
Grassroots 
mobilization 
Grassroots 
mobilization 
 
The Hacı Bektaşi Veli Culture and Information Association [HBVAKD - Hacı 
Bektaş Veli Kültür ve Tanıtma Derneği], founded in 1991, had 86 local branches by 
2008, and changed its name to Alevi Culture Association [AKD - Alevi Kültür 
                                               
235 Table is based on the analysis of the publications and press releases of the five Alevi organizations in 
the 1990s. 
236 The notion of edep (morality) is encapsulated in the saying “Eline, diline, beline sahip ol!”, which is 
most frequently translated as “Do not take what is not yours, do not lie and do not commit adultery”  
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Derneği]. Aligning itself with Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Culture Foundation [Hacı 
Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı, HBVAKV], HBVAKD defines Alevism as a way of 
life, and has a particularly strong presence in the Alevi-dominated provinces and sub-
provinces of the central Anatolia and Aegean regions. The organization was founded by 
businessmen with limited capital, and its activities were confined to the organization of 
cultural events.
237
  
Another significant organization of the 1990s is the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture 
Association [PSAKD - Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği, hereafter], which was 
established in 1988 in Ankara as a solidarity association for immigrants from the village 
of Banaz, Sivas.
238
 It gradually transformed into a major national player in the aftermath 
of the Sivas events in 1993 and expanded its membership base to between 20,000 and 
30,000 by the mid-1990s. PSAKD increased its visibility through organizing street 
demonstrations, and consciousness rising efforts in the form of seminars and talks. 
Following the establishment of Alevi Bektashi Federation [ABF - Alevi Bektaşi 
Federasyonu] in 2002, PSAKD began to align itself with ABF in the processes of claim 
making, as well as in other consciousness raising activities.
239
 
The Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, based in Istanbul, was founded by Fermani Altun in 
1994. Unlike the other Alevi organizations, this foundation put more emphasis on 
Quran as the basis of Alevi faith, specifically sectarian (Shiite) interpretations. Because 
Ehl-i Beyt Foundation maintained strong ties with right-wing nationalists and religious 
press, it does not enjoy much respect and recognition from Alevis outside of its own 
supporters.
240
 Despite alienating other local/Turkish Alevis, the Ehl-i Beyt Foundation 
was primarily occupied with the organization of international conferences. Following 
the 1997 conference, it was transformed into the World Ahlul Bayt Foundation [Dünya 
Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı], a conglomerate of 127 Alevi-Bektashi organizations.  
 The CEM
241
 Foundation, established in 1995 by a lawyer belonging to a leading 
dede lineage named İzzettin Doğan, is widely known to be a Kemalist, traditionalist and 
republican Alevi group. This foundation, which consists of 20 national branches, a 
                                               
237 See Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 47-8.  
238 Banaz is the birthplace of the legendary figure Pir Sultan Abdal. 
239 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 48. 
240 Ibid. 
241 The double meaning of the foundation’s acronym allowed it to get around the ban on references to 
Alevi identity in the name of the organization, particularly in the early 1990s. CEM could be interpreted 
as the Center for Republican Education and Culture, or as a reference to the Alevi religious ritual.  
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number of sister associations, private television and radio stations and publication 
series, is one of the most well known Alevi organization. It is run by members of 
leading dede lineages, although these leaders are either intellectuals and/or businessmen 
themselves and do not necessarily practice dedelik as a profession. Under this 
leadership, the Foundation emphasized the research, promotion and protection of the 
Sufi tradition and culture. CEM foundation and Izzettin Doğan were both instrumental 
in the establishment of the Alevi Foundations Federation [AVF – Alevi Vakıflar 
Federasyonu] in 2005.
242
  
In addition to CEM’s scholarly efforts, it founded the Directorate of Religious 
Services of Alevi Islam [AİDHB - Alevi İslam Din Hizmetleri Başkanlığı]. AİDHB 
establishes its goals as follows: 
   To carry out the duties related to belief, form of worship, historical 
development, philosophy, social and ethical principles, as well as 
communication and culture of Alevi Islam; to guarantee, through training in 
religion, belief, and practice the enlightenment of society and, according to 
[the Directorate's] aims, its application and supervision in the places of 
worship. The faith of Alevi Islam represents the Alevi-Bektaşi-Mevlevi-
Nusayri as well as other belief groups based on this interpretation of 
Islam.
243
  
To this end, AİDHB organizes seminars and talks, provides practical information on 
Alevi faith and practices, such as when to break fast for Hızır and Muharrem, and 
“vocational training” courses for the dedes and babas.244 The dedes working in AİDHB 
are responsible for leading the Thursday night cem ceremonies. In short, AİDB mimics 
the functions of Directorate of Religious Affairs [DİB] for Alevi congregation and 
clergy.    
 The four organizations introduced above are the largest/most significant 
players/actors in the complex associational organization of the Alevis. The three axes 
represented by these four organizations, i.e. religion, culture and ideology, are of 
particular significance due to their influence in shaping the discourses and policy 
                                               
242 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 49. 
243 Interview with the Director of the AIDHB in May, 2005. 
244 Baba refers to the leadership position in the Bektashi Order. Accordingly, the leadership structure in 
Bektashi tradition include dede baba (the head of the order), halife (regional head), baba (head of a 
lodge), and derviş (monk). As Bektashi Order has historical ties with the Alevi community, some Alevi 
organizations discuss the problems of Alevi dedes and Bektashi babas within the same policy frames. See 
Hülya Küçük, The Role of the Bektashis in Turkey’s National Struggle: A Historical and Critical Study, 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002), 2, 13-4 & 22.   
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demands of Alevism since the 1990s. However, not all actors of Alevi identity politics 
are associations. The associations and foundations with similar ideological and 
denominational demands co-operated and established Alevi federations, which compete 
among each other for legitimate respresentative status. By the mid-2000s, a number of 
umbrella organizations had been established both at the domestic and transnational 
levels. Each of these umbrealla organizations has been competing with the other Alevi 
organizations for official recognition and resources from both the state and the 
European intergovernmental organizations. Additionally, in the last two decades citizen 
action at the level of ECtHR became a powerful instrument to pressure the Turkish state 
for institutional and behavioral change.  
 2.6. Who says What? The Claims and Strategies of Alevi Organizations 
2.6.1. Actors of Alevi Identity Politics in the 2000s   
Parallel to the increase in new actors and opportunity structures introduced in the 
late 1990s, the actors and spheres representing Alevi interest likewise increased as talks 
with the EU began. These actors, made up of individuals, domestic Alevi civil society 
organizations, radical Alevi actors, and transnational Alevi organizations, began to 
determine the content and scope of Alevi interest communication.
245
 As Kurban points 
out:  
   The EU accession processes has been instrumental not only in 
strengthening the impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the protection of 
human rights in Turkey, but also in encouraging marginalized individuals 
and minorities other than the Kurds to litigate in Strasburg.
246
  
 
The new opportunity structures emerging through Turkey’s increased diplomatic efforts 
to join the EU were powerful tools for individuals to (i) communicate violations of their 
                                               
245 It is important to note here that the emphasis on Alevi actors does not stem from a desire to undermine 
the significance of MPs, political parties, media and other non-Alevi actors and institutions in 
transforming Alevi-state relations. Even though their role in the communication and aggregation of Alevi 
interests is significant, the source of the communicated interests is the activities of Alevi actors of civil 
society. 
246 Dilek Kurban “Protecting Marginalized Individuals and Minorities in the ECtHR: Litigation and 
Jurisprudence in Turkey,” in The European Court of Human Rights and the Rights of the Margianlized 
Individuals and Minorities in National Context , eds. Dia Anagnostou and Evangelia Psychogiopoulou 
(Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010),  169. 
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rights in Turkey to European institutions, and (ii) seek leverage in transforming 
domestic practices through cases brought to the ECtHR. In principle, the legally binding 
character of the European Convention of Human Rights and emphasis on compliance 
with ECtHR court rulings in Turkey’s EU accession process were expected increase 
pressure on the Turkish state, encouraging it to change policies that directly impacted 
the Alevi population/community. Among the cases communicated, those of Hasan and 
Eylem Zengin v. Turkey and Sinan Işık v. Turkey are of significance for setting the 
precedent regarding issues of compulsory religion and morals  courses and disclosure of 
religion on identity cards, respectively. Even though the Turkish state still does not 
comply with the rulings, non-compliance shapes the course of public and international 
debates on Alevi rights claims. 
A second significant group of actors representing Alevi interests is the Alevi 
foundations and other umbrella organizations established in the late 1990s. 
Accordingly, unlike their predecessors established in the 1960s, these organizations are 
more politically oriented and oversee interest group activities. ABF, successor to the 
Culture Associations of the Union of Alevi Bektasi Organizations [ABKB - Alevi-
Bektaşi Kuruluşları Birliği Kültür Derneği], was established following the passage of 
amendments to legal constraints on the formation of federations. When first established, 
ABF was composed of PSAKD, AKD and a number of local organizations, although 
once more firmly established, the significance of this organization came to lie in its 
relations with transnational Alevi organizations and in the cultural/ideological discourse 
shaping its right-claims. Opposing discourses on the Alevi identity and right-claims are 
represented by the AVF and Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Foundation. The variation in these 
organizations’ demands, behavior, and attitudes paves the way for the emergence of an 
unheavenly chorus of Alevi representatives in civil society. Unlike in the Kurdish 
nationalist and Islamist movements articulated Alevi interests were not organized 
around a focal point.
247
 Quite the opposite, the arena of Alevi identity politics was (and 
still is) filled with contesting actors, demands, and strategies.  
In addition to civil actors, radical actors (i.e. violent, illegal groups) have also 
played a significant role in shaping the debates and strategies of Alevi rights claim 
making. The radical left (such as DHKPC) and Kurdish nationalist (i.e. PKK) 
organizations have, on occasion, been associated with Alevi issues. Even though these 
                                               
247 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe 
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groups lack audience recognition – i.e. are not considered representatives of Alevi 
interests– they can act as policy participants and supplement policy debates on Alevi 
issues. Even though these are not organizations of articulated Alevi-specific interests, 
the fact that their membership and leadership profiles often include some Alevi 
individuals helps to shape the content of the debate.           
The birth of the Alevi social movement in Turkey coincided with the emergence 
of a strong transnational Alevi migration in Europe.
248
 While the Turkish Alevi interest 
groups were forced to deal with the issues and problems emerging from the institutional 
and cultural constraints in Turkey, their transnational counterparts incorporated the 
issues of integration to the debates on Alevi rights claims. The significance of these 
transnational actors increased once Turkey gained formal EU candidacy status at the 
Helsinki summit of 1999. Particularly in the years between 1999 and 2005 these groups 
were vital in both strengthening the newly emerging Alevi civil society organizations 
and familiarizing these organizations with the cultural norms and socio-political 
institutions of Europe.  
The Turkish accession process and the ongoing ECtHR cases provided an 
opportunity for the Alevi activitsts to market themselves as experts on issues related to 
the Alevi faith and community, to legitimize their activities and keep the spotlight on 
Alevi-State relations in Turkey. In other words, the EU and other European institutions 
provided an alternative arena for domestic Alevi organizations to communicate their 
issues and demands, and in which their identities could be recognized. The Alevi issues 
are brought to the attention of the ECtHR by the Alevi citizens and the members of the 
Alevi interest groups. The Alevi activists act as either counsel or adviser to the 
applicants during the trials.
249
 Additionally, the major Alevi federations try to mobilize 
the Alevi associations and foundations to submit class action lawsuits to the ECtHR to 
further pressure the Turkish state to recognize and respect the Alevi community. 
The alliances formed between the domestic and transnational Alevi organizations 
became pivotal in communicating Alevi demands and problems in Turkey to EU 
parliamentarians and officials. The domestic and European Alevi associations and 
foundations have been lobbying since the 2000s to pressure the Turkish state to 
                                               
248 Vorhoff, “Academic and  journalistic publications on the Alevi and Bektashi of Turkey”   
249 During the Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey trial Turgut Öker, Kazım Genç, the chair of PSAKD at 
the time and a member of ABF, was the counsel, and the chair of the Federation of Alevi Unions of 
Germany [AABF - Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu] acted as an advisor.     
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recognize and respect the Alevi community without addressing the Alevis as a 
minority.
250
 Particularly, the co-operation between the ABF and the Confederation of 
the Alevi Unions of Europe [AABK – Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu] has 
been vital in increasing the information flow to the European Commission rapporteurs 
and the EU parliamentarians.
251
 However, the lobbying activity is not continous and not 
done by professional lobbyists. The Alevi activists and groups tend to do their own 
lobbying and increase their activities before the finalization of the EU progress reports. 
2.6.2. Issue Areas of Alevi Claims 
The series of articles on Alevism in Turkey published between May 6 and May 
12, 1990 in Cumhuriyet marked the beginning of a number of public declarations of the 
Alevi community. Of those, the Alevi Declaration of May 15, 1990
252
 provided the 
blueprint for basic right claims of Alevi identity politics (Figure 2.1).
 
The document, 
rooted in 1989 declaration of Hamburg, was a product of both transnational and national 
concerns regarding the problems of the Alevi community in Turkey. Despite the 
heterogeneity among the Alevi activists and the Alevi interest groups, the declaration 
diagnosed the common Alevi problems, provided prognoses of the issue areas, and 
proposed general solutions to existing problems.  
The declaration catalyzed co-operation and dialogue between and within the 
domestic and transnational Alevi communities. Even though the 1989 Hamburg 
declaration was a product of an informal local initiative, the universality of the demands 
turned it into a manifesto. After it was revised a number of times, the final version was 
published in 1990 in Turkey. Following the publication a number of discussion 
programs, articles, radio shows, web sites, and chat rooms started to appear on Turkish 
media. Starting with 1990, Alevism ceased to be a private religion. Unlike the 1960s 
identity movement, the 1990s Alevi movement was more interested in familiarization of 
the non-Alevis with the needs and characteristics of the Alevi community. Starting with 
                                               
250 In 2004 the ABF submitted a pettion to the European Parliament including 150 450 signatures. 150 
000 of which was from European Alevis. See “Alevilerden AB çıkarması,” Hürriyet, December 15, 2004.   
251 See “Alevilik İslamiyet’in içinde değil,” Radikal October 10, 2005; Turan Eser, “Avrupa Birliği 
İlerleme Raporları-Kopenhang Siyasi Kriterileri Açısından Alevilerin Türkiye’de Karşılaştıkları Hak 
İhlalleri,” ABF and AABK report, April 16, 2007, available at: http://www.alevi-
fuaf.com/yazi/1/12/avrupa-birligi-ilerleme-raporlari-kopenhang-siyasi-kriterleri-acisindan-alevilerin-
turkiye-de-karsilastiklari-hak-ihlalleri/ 
252 “Alevilik Bildirgesi” Cumhuriyet, May 15, 1990, 15 
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(1) Oppression of Alevis should be acknowledged [by the state and public];  
(2) Alevis should be able to state their identity freely;  
(3) Sunni families should give up their prejudice towards Alevis and Alevilik;  
(4) Intellectuals should support the existence of Alevilik on the Human Rights 
basis;  
(5) Turkish press (newspapers) should also include Alevi culture in its 
publications;  
(6) TRT should take Alevis into consideration in its broadcasts;  
(7) State should quit constructing mosques in Alevi villages;  
(8) Alevism should also be taught in schools. However, one should be aware 
of the fact that compulsory religion courses and existence of an institution like 
DİB are problematic practices in a secular country;  
(9) Governments should abandon their negative attitude towards Alevis 
(10) It should be remembered that Alevis are one of the guarantors of the 
“Secular State”. 
(11) Dedelik as an institution that should be reestablished as a modern 
institution 
(12) Culture programs should be prepared for the Alevis inhabited in foreign 
countries 
(13) It should be noted that there is no relation between Alevis and Shiites in 
Iran     
the mid-1990s, the Alevi interest groups began to demand substantial changes in the 
instutional framework.  
 
Figure 2.1 Main articles of the 1990 Alevi declaration 
 
The new Alevi interest groups tried to mobilize the urban Alevi community, and 
raise the consciousness of both the Alevi and non-Alevi population. The privatization of 
the media ended the monopoly of the Turkish Radio and Television Institution [TRT – 
Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu] on broadcasting. Following the establishment of 
the first private television station in 1990, a number of private television channels and 
radio stations emerged. The developments in the information technologies and the 
increase in the number of communication mediums enabled the Alevi interest groups to 
brough new issues into the public agenda. Through publications, seminars, and cem 
ceremonies held in stadiums the Alevi associations and foundations not only continued 
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to seek preservation of the essence of the Alevi culture, and religion in the urban 
settings, but also transformed Alevism into a public religion.
253
     
In the last decade a number of studies have been published depicting the level and 
scope of discrimination of Alevis in Turkish society. While the method and design of 
these studies varies they all demostrate that the Alevi population is subject to 
discrimination tied to the general problem of the absence of recognition and respect for 
the Alevi community and Alevi faith. Individual narratives also indicate that Alevi 
citizens are subjected to discrimination both in institutions and in public life.
254
 While 
the issues areas identified in the manuscript are still relevant, new issues were added in 
time due to changes in threat perception and preferences of the Alevi community.  
It is important to note here that, except Articles 8 and 11, the articles of the 1990 
declaration continue to be addressed by the contemporary Alevi interest groups. The 
Alevi organizations in the last two decades highlight the need for respect for and 
recognition of the Alevi community. Through media and lobbying they try to pressure 
the state and the public to end de facto discrimination of the Alevis. When the narratives 
of Alevi citizens are read in conjunction with the problems addressed by the Alevi 
notables, the following problems become apparent:   
The status and organization of DİB: Even though DİB has been a subject of 
contestation between the Islamist revivalist and secular camps since the beginning of 
the multi-party period, its status since the 1990s has been crucial to the debate on Alevi 
assimilation. As Berkes notes the establishment of the DİB “did not yet separate state 
from religion and it did not let religion have its own autonomous existence.”255 The 
Alevi activists argue that the disproportional distribution of resources, and the absence 
of Alevis and Alevism in the activities of DİB, reinforces the discrimination and 
assimilation of the Alevi community.
256
 Even though all Alevi actors agree on the need 
                                               
253 Şahin, “The Rise of Alevism as a Public Religion,” 475-6. 
254 There are only a few individual level statistical analyses on the issue of recognition and respect for 
community.  And the issue of sampling bias prevents finding generalizable conclusions. Therefore, 
qualitative works are more valuable in understanding the causal complexity. Binnaz Toprak, Türkiye’de 
Farklı Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler, (İstanbul: Metis, 2009)  
255 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 
479. 
256 Both the elite interviews and content analysis of press releases indicate that Alevi elites saw the 
organization and activities of DİB as breach of non-discrimination and non-assimilation principles. 
Accordingly, although citizens paid taxes to receive religious services and DİB was required to provide 
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for change, varying policy solutions have been put forward: the Dünya Ehl-i Beyt 
foundation calls for a more autonomous structure for DİB so that it will be free of state 
imposed interpretations of religion; the CEM foundation and AVF foundation call for 
integration of Alevism into DİB as the second best option.257 
Status of Alevi dedes: One aspect of the discussion on the status and organization 
of DİB is some Alevi associations’ and groups’ call for the incorporation of Alevi 
religious institutions into the structure of DİB. However, the question of whether or not 
Alevi dedes should be incorporated into its organizational structure becomes an issue of 
concern only when Alevi identity is framed along the syncretistic religion axis. Groups 
that depict Alevism as a "way of life" or a part of orthodox interpretations of Islam lay 
no claims regarding the status of dedes.  
Status of cem houses: While the role of the dedes is not an issue for all fractions 
of the Alevi identity movement, the legal framework limiting recognition of cem houses 
as a place of worship dominates both public debate and court cases. In addition to the 
conceptual constraints promoted by DİB, the legal framework set by the 1985 Zoning 
Law (Law No. 3194),
258
 Article 2 of the Village Law of 1924, and the 1981 Law on 
Local Revenues (Law No. 2462, Article 36), challenge the legitimacy of designating 
cem houses as places of worship. From a legal perspective, cem houses could only be 
established as “culture centers”, which means that they can neither enjoy the same 
privileges as mosques, nor receive financial support from DİB. The limited financial 
support available to cem houses under these restrictions either comes from Ministry of 
Culture or from municipalities. Consequently, the construction of most cem houses is 
funded by the Alevi ‘congregation’. As with most problems addressed by the 
associations and the elites, this one hinges on the behavioral and attitudinal constrains 
set by the State.
259
  
Religious education: State-sponsored religious education, consisting of 
compulsory religious and ethics courses for children in public schools is another 
contested issue for Alevis. While the aim of compulsory religious and moral education 
                                                                                                                                         
such religious services, the content and scope of the DİB activities ignore the needs of the Alevi 
community.   
257 See T.C. Devlet Bakanlığı, 1. Alevi Çalıştayı, Ankara, January 3-4, 2009. 
258 In 2003 the law was amended and the term mosque was replaced with place of worship.  
259 Such as refusals to allocate land for construction of cem houses, attempts to demolish established cem 
houses, and more recent lawsuit calling for the closure of Çankaya Cem House Building Association 
[Çankaya Cemevi Yaptırma Derneği]. 
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courses under the Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution was to protect the next generation 
from the ills of Islamic revivalism, the outcome was the creation of a new mechanism to 
exclude non-Sunni interpretations of religion.
260
 While all Alevi organizations are 
critical of the practice, no consensus emerges on a specific solution.
261 
ABF and its 
sister organizations (such as PSADK and HSAKD
262
) call for termination of the 
compulsory courses of religion and ethics, AVF and its sister organizations
263
 have 
offered policies focusing on neutralizing the content. Compliance with the ECtHR’s 
ruling on Hasan Eylem Zengin v. Turkey is considered as the first step to resolving the 
issue.
264
 As a subset of the issue, the new education policy, known popularly as the 
4+4+4 System is being criticized with increasing vehemence. Reports prepared by Alevi 
associations and foundations demonstrate that the three new elective courses on religion 
deepen de facto discrimination of Alevi students.
265
     
Disclosure of religion on identity cards: Following the amendments to Population 
Services Law (Law No. 5490) on April 25, 2006, disclosure of religion in national 
identity cards sparked a debate among the Alevis that frame Alevism as a religion. The 
compliance with the ruling on the Sinan Işık v. Turkey266 case dominated those debates 
and claims laid by Alevi interest groups on the issue. It is important to note here that not 
                                               
260 Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 130-1. 
261  The fieldwork conducted in Istanbul, Ankara and Nevşehir between August 2012 and January 2013 
showed that while some groups within the Alevi movement, PSAKD and ABF identify the issue as a 
breach of human rights and call for termination of compulsory courses on religion, others such as the 
CEM foundation adopt a more moderate position and argue that regardless of whether courses on religion 
continue to be compulsory, Alevism should be included in the curriculum.  
262 The whole list of membership can be found in ABF website. See 
http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=222&Itemid=258, 
last accessed on April 15, 2013.   
263 The whole list of membership can be found in AVF website. See http://www.avf.org.tr/uye_listesi.asp, 
last accessed on April 15, 2013. 
264 Chapter 6 will provide more detailed analysis on the issue.  
265 The latest report prepared by ABF member HSAKD (Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği, Hubyar 
Sultan Alevi Culture Association) indicates that Alevi children were forced to select courses on religion 
in the 2012-2013 education year. Accordingly, in some regions parents were threatened and told that their 
children would be expunged from school records if they did not comply. (Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür 
Derneği 2012 Hak İhlalleri İzleme Raporu, HSAKD press release, 30.01.2013) Sections of the document 
can be found in Evrensel newspaper dated January 31, 2013, where one of the authors is the chair of 
HSAKD. See  http://www.evrensel.net/news.php?id=47689, last accessed April 2,  2013.    
266  The case originated from an application (no. 21924/05) against Turkey filed on 3 June 2005. 
Accordingly the applicant Sinan Işık alleged that the denial of his request to have the word “Islam” on his 
identity card replaced by “Alevi” violated Article 9 of the Convention. He also claimed the denial by state 
authorities was a violation of Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention. On 15 January 2008 the case was 
declared admissible and on 2 February 2010 the Court declared by six votes to one, that there had been a 
violation of Article 9.  See ECtHR, Sinan Işık v Turkey (no. 21924/05) February 2, 2010, available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97087#{"itemid":["001-97087"]} 
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all Alevi interest groups and activists consider the issue of disclosure of Alevism as a 
religion on identity cards as a priority even after the announcement of the ECtHR 
ruling.        
2.6.3 The Challenge of Positioning Actors: Need for a New Framework 
 
Starting with the late 1990s, both domestic and transnational actors sought to 
unify the Alevi movement. A number of umbrella organizations were formed during 
this period, each of which lay claim to legitimate representation of the Alevi community 
and Alevi interests. While these newly formed federations and foundations are in 
principle larger and more resourceful than their members, they have not always been 
successful in mobilizing their constituents to achieve policy objectives. They have only 
been able to achieve partial unification in the processes of political claim making; the 
more fragmented the Alevi movement, the more diversified the interests and policy 
strategies of the actors. Particularly, the Alevi activists and interest groups who have a 
sectarian understanding of Alevism refuse recognition of Alevism as a separate religion.  
The diversity of strategies is apparent both within and between federations. 
Despite the shared desire to force the Turkish government and its institutions to 
recognize cem houses as places for worship, to date no widespread collaboration 
between or within the federations has been mobilized to achieve this goal. At the 
domestic level, while Alevi elites acknowledge the power of collaboration and highlight 
the significant role of regional institutions like ECtHR as opportunity structures to 
communicate Alevi claims and force policy changes, the federations fail to mobilize. 
According to Doğan Bermek, the chair of AVF, efforts to pressure government with 
class-action suits in ECtHR failed due to the heads of cem houses’ failure to act 
collectively.  
Following the amendment to Electricity Market Law (Law No. 5784) in 2008, 
which enabled places of worship to ask for subsidies for their electricity bills, AVF has 
been trying to mobilize the heads of cem houses to submit a class-action case to 
intensify the pressure exerted on the government. Because procedural requirements of 
the ECtHR necessitate exhaustion of all domestic options
267
, cem houses' officials must 
                                               
267 Council of Europe European Court of Human Rights, “Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria”, 
2011, available at:  http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B5358231-79EF-4767-975F-
524E0DCF2FBA/0/ENG_Guide_pratique.pdf 
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petition DİB and submit the answer to AVF before a court case can be filed. 
Unfortunately, a full two years after the introduction of the amendment, “Only one 
[petition] came…all they got to do was to write a petition [to Diyanet]… and gave the 
answer to us…but only one came.” 268 An application was finally submitted in 2010, 
with CEM foundation being the only party in prosecution.  
Alevi institutions’ failure to mobilize for collective action or to agree on similar 
strategies is not only a concern for the individual organizations themselves, but also a 
major issue between federations. For instance, both the lack of representation for the 
Alevi faith in DİB and the content of the courses on religion and ethnics are 
acknowledged to be a problem by Alevi organizations, and yet they do not agree on the 
problems’ causes, the relevant constituencies, or the particulars of the policy solutions.   
During the 2012 commemorative festivities in Hacı Bektaş, all heads of the Alevi 
associations heralded a unified stance, the organization of a major rally on September 
30 in Ankara in front of TBMM sponsored by the ABF, ADFE and AVF to condemn 
the State’s attitudes and policies in dealing with Alevi issues. The rally was postponed 
as a result of the disagreements among the organizers, and when a new date was set for 
October, the rhetoric of the public meeting has been changed from “claims on freedom 
of belief” to “claims on equal citizenship.” The title of the new rally was “We want 
Equal Citizenship for a Laic Democratic Turkey!”  
The rally organizers sought support from various political parties, municipalities, 
MPs, labor unions, civil society groups and organizations, intellectuals and artists. 
Selahattin Özel, the director of ABF, in calling for support, explained the objective of 
the rally: 
   In this rally we will raise our voice for recognition of cem houses as places 
of worship, abolition of practices of mosque building, elimination of 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, abolition of compulsory courses on 
religion, ending of 4+4+4 policies and introduction of laic and scientific 
education system, maintenance of peace in Turkey, prevention of a possible 
war with Syria.    
                                               
268 Doğan Bermek’s speech at the roundtable talks in Hacı Bektaş Veli Commemorative Festival on 
15.08.2012 
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The rally, which ultimately took place on October 7, 2012, was criticized by other 
organizations and in some cases was even boycotted.
269
 The day before the rally, during 
a meeting with her branch leaders, CEM Foundation listed the reasons for not joining 
the October 7 rally, and later that night cancelled the buses from her Istanbul branches 
which had been organized to bring supporters to Ankara. Hıdır Akbayır of CEM 
foundation explained the basis of this decision as concern over the increasing 
politicization of the rhetoric of the rally and the increasing emphasis on human rights 
rather than rights on religion. Akbayır further explained: 
   We try to solve the issues through legal and peaceful means. We are 
careful not to carry anything religious to the political arena. If you 
watched…from the televisions, the slogans [were]: end the war, end paid 
education, [paid] health care, unemployment, inflation, 10 percent 
threshold….they also said something on cem houses…We do not 
acknowledge this. We should not mix politic discourses with belief…people 
has many rights…what I say is belief rights. And the name of the belief is 
Alevism, and the basic problem is exclusion and breach of formal, 
constitutional rights. 
  
This suggests that although actors agree on the Alevi issue topics, and macro-level 
claims such as recognition and respect, non-discrimination, non-assimilation, they 
cannot seem to agree upon the content of and strategies for dealing with specific issues. 
It is clear that of the remarkable diversity among Alevi organizations makes mapping 
and evaluating the actors and strategies very difficult, but even without such evaluation, 
it is clear that the variation cannot be thoroughly explained through/by the use of 
religion, culture and politics as basic axes of differentiation.  
The standard categorization of Alevi organization based on the two dimensions of 
culture vs. religion and left vs. right ideologies is not enough to capture the complexity 
of relations and policy demands and strategies. The claims laid by Alevis vary in 
conjunction with (1) the manner of the interaction of the group with the other formal 
and informal groups especially in the struggle for resources, status or social position, 
and (2) the way in which the identity of the group is framed.  For this purpose, the 
empirical reality of the Alevi demand-making processes calls for an alternate model of 
assessment. Like Massicard’s adoption of Charles Tilly’s (1978) tripartite classification 
                                               
269 HBVAKV, although critical of the participants and the content of the rally program, declared on its 
website that it will still participate. See “ABF’nin 7 Ekim 2012 tarihinde düzenleyeceği “LAİK 
DEMOKRATİK TÜRKİYE İÇİN EŞİTYURTTAŞLIK MİTİNGİ” ile ilgili düşüncelerimiz” (September 
25, 2012) available at: http://www.hacibektasvakfi.web.tr/icerik/abf-nin-7-ekim-2012-tarihinde-
duzenleyecegi-laik-demokratik-turkiye-icin-esit-yurttaslik      
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of forms of collective action as proactive, competitive or reactive,
270
 this chapter seeks 
to classify and map the Alevi interest groups based on the type of claims they make and 
their policy strategies.   
While Massicard used Tilly’s framework to classify the demands generated by 
Alevi identity movement, the framework presented here takes both the issue area and 
framed identity into account. Based on this added complexity, contrary to Massicard’s 
claims for harmonization of strategies for reactive (defensive) and competitive 
demands,
271
 I argue that all strategies vary depending on the image of Alevi identity the 
interest groups formulate.   
Accordingly, when groups maneuver for greater control over a certain position, 
advantage, or resource also claimed by other actors, they lay competitive claims. In the 
context of Alevi demands, competitive claims include call for demands similar to those 
of the Sunnis, and revolve around the principles of non-discrimination and equality. 
More specifically these include: 
(ci) recognition of cem houses as places of worship (as opposed to 
recognition of mosques);  
(cii) funding for Alevi places of worship (equal distribution of state 
funds) 
(ciii) free practice of Alevi rituals [cem rituals] (as opposed to prayers 
[namaz]);  
(civ) fair media coverage of issues related to Alevis (as oppose to 
Sunni dominant coverage);  
(cv) fair coverage of Alevism in text-books. 
(cvi) [if problem is framed in the axis of religion] equal distribution of 
DİB funds;  
(cvii)  [if problem is framed in the axis of religion] inclusion of 
Alevism in DİB (as opposed to dominant position of Sunni 
interpretation of Islam);  
                                               
270 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hil Publishing Company, 1978), 
144-7. 
271 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe 52 
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(cviii) [if problem is framed in the axis of religion] inclusion of dedes in 
DİB (as opposed to dominant position of imams).272  
The second category of reactive claims refers to demands formulated once one 
group is challenged by another. When making a reactive claim, the group is demanding 
to keep hold of resources, status or social position that it already has because some other 
group is threatening to claim those resources, that status or social position. In this sense, 
reactive claims are defensive claims and they seek policy changes, but not necessarily 
changes in the institutional design. In the case of Alevi demands, reactive claims 
revolve around the principles of non-assimilation and (physical) survival of the group. 
In particular, such claims will include: 
(ri) termination of compulsory courses on religion whose design 
reflects Sunni, Hanefi interpretation of Islam; 
(rii) abolition of DİB as an institution; 
(riii) implementation of sanctions for derogatory remarks against 
Alevis; 
(riv) implementation of sanctions for violence against Alevis.273 
Finally, when a group rises to assert claims that have not previously been made, 
proactive claims are formulated. The group or groups in question formulate demands 
for resources, status or social position to obtain rights and privileges for the first time, 
rather than because of competition with the other groups or in defense of resources, 
status or social position. Since the Alevi community in Turkey already has formal rights 
of equal citizenship, the proactive claims revolves around recognition and respect for 
Alevi community. Additionally, since proactive claims would in principle require the 
transformation of the institutional relationship to actualize the demands, they seek either 
reform in institutions or regime changes.  
The above classification of claims provides a valuable tool to position interest 
groups on Alevi issues of the post-2000s. The policy strategies of the Alevi interest 
groups rely primarily on the framing of the problem in question. Whether a group 
demands incorporation within existing institutions or seeks institutional change is 
                                               
272 The list is prepared based on the combination of the analysis of the demands addressed by the major 
Alevi organizations during the fieldwork, the policy suggessions of the Alevi activists published in the 
media, and the demands addressed during the Alevi workshops.  
273 Ibid. 
84 
 
dependent on what type of claim the interest group addresses. In other words, whether a 
group seeks reform (such as ABF’s calls for termination of compulsory courses), 
integration (such as CEM foundations calls for integration of dedes into DİB structure), 
or revolt (such as the calls of Revolutionary Alevi Committee [Devrimci Alevi 
Komitesi] for system change) is a reflection of the relationship between demands and 
strategies. This framework will be used in the discussions regarding State-Alevi interest 
group relations on the issue of religious education in Chapter 6.  
 
2.7. Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter illustrates the complex trajectory of the organization of the 
articulated Alevi interests. Until the 1950s the Alevis remained an endogamous rural 
community. The rural-urban migration of the 1950s and the 1960s paved the way for the 
emergence of an urban Alevi community. Additionally, the transformation of the 
opportunity structures with the 1961 Constitution enabled and encouraged the 
emergence of a more lively Alevi associational life in Turkey. The more the urban 
Alevis challenged by the social, economic and political factors, the more they establish 
associations and organizations to fulfill the emerging needs and demands.  
While the first organizations established by the migrant Alevis were solidarity 
associations [hemşeri], the later organizations were more concerned with the identity 
demands of the community, i.e. the demands for recognition and respect for the Alevi 
community. However, in the 1960s the emphasis of the Alevi associations was on the 
protection of the Alevi culture, and religion, rather than familiarization of the non-
Alevis with the institutions and the practices of Alevism. Consequently, the Alevi 
identity movement of the 1960s was mostly an inward-looking movement seeking to 
preserve the in-group identity of the urban Alevis.  
Increasing ideological polarization in the 1970s not only paved the way for the 
emergence of new forms of Alevi organizations, but also did increase the Alevi 
membership of the trade unions, the left-wing political parties, and student 
organizations. In this period, neither the Alevi associations nor the Alevi political party 
[TBP] highlight the ‘difference’ of the Alevi community from their Sunni counterparts. 
Even though the highly polarized and the politicized environment enabled integration of 
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the second-generation rural migrants into the cities, the politicized Alevi actors did not 
seek Alevi-based demands.  
The educational backgrounds, class feeling, economic and occupational 
characteristics of the Alevi immigrants played a vital role in shaping the form of the 
articulation and aggregation of the demands and preferences of the Alevi community in 
the 1970s. Although their denominational characterists were important, they mostly act 
as a supplement.
274
 The most significant factor that laid the ground for the emergence of 
a new Alevi identity movement based on the Alevi denominational characteristics was 
the increasing hostility and violence against the Alevi community in the late 1970s. The 
events of Sivas, Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, and Çorum not only created new narratives 
of victimhood, and wore the trust of Alevis to the state officials out, but also did 
generate demands concerning solely the Alevi community.
275
      
In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, the characteristics of the Alevi activists 
had changed since a significant number of activists were either arrested or had to seek 
asylum in the European countries. Additionally, the constraints introduced by the 1982 
Constitution discouraged the Alevi associational activity. As a result of the changing 
economic and political environment, new Alevi actors were introduced. The more 
amendments were introduced to the institutional framework, the more the Alevi 
associational life increased. Additionally, the emerging Kurdish nationalism and the rise 
of Islamic revivalism influenced the demands framed by the newly emerging Alevi 
actors.   
The emergence of new opportunity structures and the increase in material and 
ideational resources in the 1990s led to the emergence of a many-headed complex 
network of Alevi interest groups. This network has seen socio-economic 
transformations, ideological movements and transformation of political opportunity 
structures that have affected the emergence and transformation of Alevi identity 
politics. Within this process Alevis use their identity as the impetus to create diverse 
organizations to communicate their community’s needs, demands and preferences. 
However, these diverse networks of associations and foundations do not always emerge 
                                               
274 Chapter 4 will discuss how the TBP did not sought and provide a substantial Alevi interest 
representation although recognized as an Alevi Party.  
275 Such as, the demands for the arrest and trial of the culprits, and/or the demands to hold a day of service 
to commemorate the victims of the events.  
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as a result of grassroots movements: Alevi elites and entrepreneurs, such as Fermani 
Altun or İzzettin Doğan, play a significant part in organization of these associations and 
foundations. These elites also have a crucial role in shaping the networks established 
between the community and other groups. The universe of Alevi interest groups is a 
multi-organizational field occupied by polarized camps, with no institution in place to 
settle intra-organizational conflicts and harmonize policy demands.  
Even though all Alevi actors in the last two decades emphasize ‘recognition and 
respect’ as the ultimate goal, and highlight the need for a unified stand, they fail to build 
the necessary alliances. The domestic opportunity structures, along with the political 
stances and the denominational characteristics of the Alevi interest groups shape how 
the Alevi right-claims are framed. The policy demands of the Alevi groups, i.e. 
integration, institutional reform, or regime change, are determined by the nature of these 
claims. However, as the Chapter 3 will discuss in detail, the diagnosis of the Alevi 
problems and the strategies of the Alevi interest groups are also influenced by the 
activities of the transnational Alevi interest groups.  
Rights policies of most states either have emerged or have transformed as a 
response to the pressure from networks of organizations and interest groups. In the case 
of Alevi-state relations the Alevi transnational networks generate such pressure. 
Additionally, through their activities targeting intergovernmental organizations, the 
domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups seek to set the public agenda, and 
mobilize support for change. Like Keck and Sikkink note: “networks often have their 
greatest impact by working through governments and other powerful actors.”276 Having 
introduced the domestic actors in Alevi representation, the focus shifts to transnational 
actors in the subsequent chapter. Although Chapter 2 demonstrates how the Alevi elites 
and interest groups helped framing the issue areas, it was the transnational Alevi 
community that provided the ideational and material resources.
277
 
 
                                               
276 Margaret Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 102. 
277 The purchase of the headquarters of the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Associations in Ankara became 
possible only with the financial support provided by the Alevi association from Wunppertal, Germany. 
See chapter 3 for further discussion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ORGANIZING AND COMMUNICATING ALEVI INTERESTS IN EUROPE: 
THE CASE OF GERMANY 
  
 3.1. Introduction 
The theoretical and historical aspects of Alevi identity politics in Turkey have 
been discussed in the previous chapter. Before moving on to the analysis of formal 
representation of the Alevi interests, this chapter seeks to analyze the inception, 
evolution and status of transnational actors of Alevi interest group politics. For this 
purpose, I focus on the Alevi identity movement in Europe with special reference to the 
case of Germany. The aim of this chapter is to explain different political opportunity 
structures shape actors and the content of Alevi right-claims. Rooted in the 
transnational advocacy network model, the chapter aims to unpack the dynamics of the 
relationship between the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups.  
The case of Germany is selected primarily because it has the oldest, largest and 
politically the most active Alevi Diaspora.
278
 Germany-based Alevi interest groups 
became significant actors in shaping the debates on and the tactics of the Alevi right-
claims not only in Turkey, but also in other parts of Europe. Since the 1990s, these 
groups have also been providing material and ideational
279
 support for the Alevi 
                                               
278 Throughout the text, the concept of diaspora is employed parallel to the definition put forward by Van 
Hear, Pieke and Vertovec (2004). It refers to “populations of migrant origin who are scattered among two 
or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of 
people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries.” 
See Nicholas Van Hear, Frank Pieke and Steven Vertovec, The contribution of UK-based diasporas to 
development and poverty reduction, Report by COMPAS (April, 2004), 3. Complete text of the report is 
available at http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/papers/DfID%20diaspora%20report.pdf, last 
accessed May 20, 2013.    
279 By ideational support, I mostly refer to the contribution of Alevi elites and Alevi interest groups in 
Germany in identification and framing of issue areas in Alevi right-claims in Turkey.   
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community in Turkey.  Even though their as representatives has been subject to 
controversy in Turkey, it is acknowledged and welcomed by the decision-makers in 
Germany. The organizations established by Alevi immigrants
280
 in Germany played a 
vital role in the integration of the Alevi community into German social, political and 
economic structures and processes. These groups helped the Alevi immigrants to adapt 
to their host country by both cushioning the impact of a culture shock and by mediating 
between the German institutions and the Alevi immigrant community. Particularly, they 
played a crucial role in the process whereby the Alevis gained Körperschaften des 
Öffentlichen Rechts [KÖR]281 status.  
The focus of this chapter is on activities of the German Alevi interest groups. By 
integrating theoretical concepts of political representation with the approaches of 
transnationalism, this chapter seeks to provide a deeper insight on the representation and 
communication of Alevi interests. Following the main assumptions of my dissertation, 
the chapter seeks to adress the following questions: How do political opportunity 
structures impact on the formation of the Alevi interest groups in Germany? What kind 
of relationships do the German Alevi interest groups have with their counterparts in 
Turkey?   
3.2. Between Home and Host: Organizing and Communicating Migrants’ Interests 
The literature on migration and transnational networks has shown that the 
relationship between migrant sending and receiving countries is not static and linear.
282
 
International migration paves the way for the establishment of intense and relatively 
                                               
280 For the purpose of this research, the term “immigrant” is employed to identify all foreign born persons 
regardless of their citizenship status.  
281 Can be roughly translated as “corporations under public law”; KÖR status in Germany refers to the 
recognition of religious organizations/community bodies as public corporations.KÖR status grants 
autonomy from the state. Once officially recognized, religious corporations are entitled to offer 
instructions in the schools, receiving funding (i.e. public tithe), have a say in (public) cultural affairs etc. 
See Walter Krebs, “Verwaltungsorganisation” in Handbuch des Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Volume 5, eds. Josef Isensee and Public Kirchhof, 457-520 (Berlin, C.F. Müller, 2007); and 
Bappenheim Stefano Testa, Die Haftpflicht und die Religiösen Institute in Deutschland, (Berlin: LIT 
VERLAG, 2006), 31-2 & 34. 
282 Ludger Pries, “(Grenzüberschreitende) Migrantenorganisationen als Gegenstand der 
sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung: Klassische Problemstellungen und neuere Forschungsbefunde” in 
Jenseits von “Identität oder Integration”: Grenzen überspannende Migranteorganisationen, eds. Ludger 
Pries and Zeynep Sezgin, 15-60, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), and Stephan Castles and Mark J. Miller, 
The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (Guildford Press, 
2009), 7-8. 
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continuous networks between the countries of origin and destination.
283
 The more 
migration becomes a phenomenon transforming the social, economic and political 
structures of home and host countries, the more migrants seek mechanisms to 
communicate their needs and preferences within and across borders. The complex 
interplay between the policies and the politics of migration highlights the role of 
transnational communities and transnational spaces
284
 in the materialization of both the 
immigrant identities and their political demands.  
Due to the social, economic and political transformations in the countries of 
origin and of destination, immigrants establish and maintain various formal and 
informal, organized and unorganized networks of relations (i.e. immigrant interest 
groups). These immigrant interest groups act as important instruments in the processes 
of integration and as a means of influencing the decision-making structures in the host 
countries. Consequently, understanding the dynamics of the networks and the form in 
which migrants articulate and communicate their interests is crucial.  
 Since many immigrants are excluded from the processes of participation and 
representation, these immigrant interest groups act as bridges between the immigrant 
community and the host country’s institutions and decision-makers.285 Within this 
context, articulation of the immigrant interests in the form of migrant associations and 
organizations becomes a mechanism for effective representation of the immigrant 
interests in their host country.
 
In other words, they add a bottom-up dimension to the 
issue of inclusion of the immigrants (i.e. integration) - which, in principle, is considered 
as a state-centric process.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the kinds of immigrant associations that emerge at the 
different stages of migration. As Layton-Henry notes, “Associations initially established 
to preserve culture, religion, language and ethnic identity of migrant groups, are 
inevitably, over time, drawn into closer contact with the institutions and authorities of 
                                               
283 Thomas Faist “Towards a Political Sociology of Transnationalization: The State of the Art in 
Migration Research,” European Journal of Sociology Volume 45, issue 3 (2004):331-66. 
284 Throughout the text, “transnational spaces” refers to “sustained ties of persons, networks and 
organizations across the borders across multiple nation-states, ranging from low to highly 
institutionalized forms.” See Ibid, 337. 
285 Dirk Halm and Zeynep Sezgin, “Introduction: interplay between migrant organizations and their 
environment - conceptual and theoretical framework” in Migration and Organized Civil Society: 
Rethinking National Policy eds. Dirk Halm and Zeynep Sezgin, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 2. 
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the country of settlement.”286 During the early stages of migration immigrants’ interests 
are mostly organized in the form of informal networks and solidarity associations that 
focusing on the needs and preferences of the community in the homeland. Immigrant 
interest groups, such as kinship groups, village-based or hometown (hemşeri) 
associations, are established upon arrival as a means to obtain social contacts, jobs, 
housing, etc. The more the migrant organizations focus shifts to their host country and 
the more their awareness of their rights (or lack of them) increase, the more stable the 
networks which aim to improve the quality of life and housing   are established. 
  
Figure 3.1 Typology of immigrant organizations by orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Layton-Henry, “Immigrant Associations”, 102. 
                                               
286 Zig Layton-Henry “Immigrant Associations” in The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western 
Europe, ed. Zig Layton-Henry, (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 102. 
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During the later periods, as the socio-economic integration of the immigrants 
increases, immigrant organizations start to act as mediators between the institutions of 
the host country and the immigrant community. It is important to note here that the 
stages of orientation are not necessarily linear in all countries due to differences in the 
migration processes (see Figure 3.1). Due to the different types of immigrant interest 
groups can co-exist simultaneously in the later stages. In relation to the nexus between 
the country of origin and country of destination, (i) timing of the migration flows, and 
(ii) immigration policies of the receiving country become important factors in shaping 
the organization of the migrant interest groups.  
In addition to their role in the integration of immigrants to host countries, these 
interest groups play a significant role at home as well. Immigrant interest groups 
influence the country of origin by (i) providing material and ideational resources, and  
(ii) generating pressure in hindering/encouraging societal cleavages and conflicts. 
Migrants and their organizations can be “sources of important material resources 
through remittances they send back to the homeland state, in the form of diaspora-led 
investment or by offering the homeland state expanding markets for its exports, cultural 
output and even a temporary labour pool.”287 Political actors in the country of origin can 
encourage the establishment of ties with immigrant communities either to increase the 
flow of remittances or to better communicate (or legitimize) homeland state’s policies 
in the international arena.
288
 Yet, the relationship between the homeland country and the 
immigrant communities is not linear. As Østergaard-Nielsen states within this complex 
interaction;  
   Emigrants want their country of origin to support their struggle for equal 
rights and against discrimination on the labour market. More established 
migrant and diaspora groups demand more transparency and good 
governance in order to feel that their remittances and foreign direct 
investment is spent in the best possible way. And if migrants are expected to 
be good representatives and do some lobbying for their country of origin 
abroad, then they would often like some influence on the policies that they 
are expected to represent.
289
 
                                               
287 Myra A. Waterbury, “Bridging the divide: towards a comparative framework for understanding kin 
state and migrant-sending state diaspora politics” in Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts and 
Methods, eds. Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 138. 
288 Ibid, 138-40. 
289 Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, “International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and 
Transnational Relations,” in International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and 
Transnational Relations, ed. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 4-5. 
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However, homeland political actors might resist or hinder the formation of extensive 
ties, if they believe that the populations abroad can jeopardize domestic and/or foreign 
policy goals.
290
 
To influence policies and shape institutional relations, organizations established 
by the immigrants in their host countries can work together across borders and form 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs).
291
 TANs that are established between home 
and host countries provide mechanisms and resources (i) to shape political and societal 
incorporation of the immigrant communities in the host country, and (ii) to challenge 
the policies and institutional frameworks in their homeland.
 292
 It is equally important to 
note that not all TANs are byproducts of migration; TANs can emerge in a number of 
ways. Networks can either be engineered by like-minded activists and organizations or 
emerge from existing contacts that unite and intensify around a specific issue (such as 
the encouragement of the ethical treatment of animals worldwide, or non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons). Yet, once formed, TANs are generally effective tools in the 
diffusion of international and regional norms.   
In the case of the minorities, TANs are also significant in ethnic or religious 
boundary-making and maintenance. Through the exchange of (i) knowledge on the 
present status of the minority group, (ii) information on events and policies challenging 
the status of the minority, and (iii) symbols of cultural, ethnic and/or religious identity, 
TANs can shape the boundaries between minority group in question and its ‘other’ 
(Figure 3.2). Information exchange enables networks to call attention to the issues (or 
create the issues) that would otherwise not be heard.
293
 Through emphasizing norms of 
                                               
290 Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy and Security in 
Eurasia,” International Security 24, no. 3(Winter 1999/2000): 108-38.  
291 TANs refer to “networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or 
values in motivating their formation” See Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 1. A detailed 
account of the impact of TANs on the transformation of the religious education policies will be the 
subject of Chapters 6. 
292 A proliferating literature in international relations theory now explores the emergence and impact of 
TANs. See Keck, and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Robert Rorschneider, and Russell J. Dalton, “A 
Global Network? Transnational Cooperation among Environmental Groups,” Journal of Politics 64, no. 2 
(2002): 510-33; Charli R. Carpenter, “Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and 
Non-emergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 1, (2007): 
99-120; Thomas Risse, and Kahryn Sikkink,  “The socialization of international human rights norms into 
domestic practices: introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, eds. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kahryn Sikkink, 1-38, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002)     
293 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders,18 
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individual rights and/or collective rights, TANs can try to aggregate support for 
domestic movements demanding institutional and policy changes at home. In other 
words, the interaction between the minority interest groups in the country of origin and 
in the country of destination influence the framing of in-group and out-group identities, 
and the way in which issue areas are diagnosed and prognosed.  
 
Figure 3.2 Relationship between immigrant and domestic minority interest groups 
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Figure 3.3 Boomerang pattern  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 13 
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294 Ibid., 117. 
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pattern, where domestic groups that are excluded from the political processes find allies 
to put pressure on the target state (Figure 3.3). 
It is clear that states have few incentives to comply with the objectives of TAN 
campaigns. Unless the mechanisms to put pressure on a target state/actor exist, and 
target actor is vulnerable to incentives or sanctions, a TAN campaign cannot succeed. 
What is more, the issue areas are uneven since not all issues have mass appeal and 
generate the effective organization of transnational networks. TAN campaigns can fail, 
if there is no consensus on framing of the issue. In addition to the characteristics of the 
target actor, the availability of political entrepreneurs (i.e. members of advocacy 
networks) is vital both in the formation and effectiveness of TANs. As Keck and 
Sikkink states, “just as oppression and injustice do not themselves produce movements 
or revolutions, claims around issues amenable to international action do not produce 
transnational networks.”295 One needs entrepreneurs (i) to provide information that 
would not otherwise be available, (ii) to frame issues, which in turn would be used by 
networks to create awareness, and (iii) to seek material or moral leverage to pressure 
more powerful actors to comply with campaign objectives.
296
   
In principle within a boomerang pattern, when the domestic opposition (which 
Keck and Sikkink label as “NGOs”) is denied access to state institutions and decision-
making processes, they can bypass the state and search allies to pressure their state in 
the international arena. While the domestic NGOs provide the information on the issue 
areas, the transnational NGOs put pressure either on the state in which they are located, 
or on an intergovernmental organization, so that they can put pressure on the target 
state. Although networks cannot directly change policies and transform institutions, 
they have the capability to persuade and bring pressure on target states. Networks can 
seek influence by (i) generating reliable information on an issue quickly and 
communicating it to an influential audience, (ii) calling upon symbols, actions and 
narratives to raise consciousness of the audience, (iii) finding more powerful actors to 
challenge the target states, and lastly by (iv) holding powerful actors to their previously 
stated policies accountable.
297
  
                                               
295 Ibid., 14. 
296 Ibid., 18 & 22-3. 
297 Ibid., 16 
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However, this model does not provide much insight on the dynamics of the 
relationship between the domestic and international organizations. While the motives of 
the domestic actors to establish contacts with international actors are shown clearly in 
the model, the motives of the international actors to promote domestic opposition’s 
claims remain vague. Moreover, on issues involving the violation of individual and 
collective rights, the lack of access to the processes of the state does not require lack of 
access to the intergovernmental organizations. Domestic actors can simultaneously both 
provide information to intergovernmental organizations and also contribute to the 
generation of external pressure to the target state. In the study of the relationship 
between the domestic and international minority interest groups, motives can become 
less of an issue. Despite this, the model still fails to fully explain framing of issues and 
claims. As a final point, even though this model historically has been used effectively in 
the fields of human rights, women’s rights and environmental rights, its capacity to 
explain the diffusion of ambiguous norms (such as collective/minority rights norms) 
poses a problem.  
Once the focus shifts to the complex relationship between the immigrant interest 
groups, domestic interest groups, and states, and intergovernmental organizations, some 
clarification is required to capture the dynamics of influence. As Brysk noted, change 
can occur when social actors can codify new norms and alter state policies and 
institutions.
298
 While domestic actors and structures provide a starting point for 
understanding the inception, evolution and status of networks, they are not sufficient to 
explain the activities and effectiveness of TANs. The organization of articulated 
immigrant minority interests is highly dependent on the structures and policies of the 
host country. Similarly, the level and scope of the impact of TANs as much influenced 
by the opportunity structures of the host country as those of home.  
 3.3. Policies of Migration in Germany and the Rise of the Alevi Diaspora 
Other than universal individual rights, states are not expected to be held 
accountable for not granting political, social or cultural rights to their non-citizen 
populations. There are no universal standards that regulate the way in which states 
                                               
298 Alison Brysk, "From Above and Below: Social Movements, The International System and Human 
Rights in Argentina," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 3 (October, 1993): 259- 85. 
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should deal with immigrants. Consequently, not all immigrants are treated equally and 
included in the political, economic and social processes of the countries they settle in.   
Germany presents a particular case where the state tried to limit the rigid 
discrimination of economic, ethnic and political immigrants through a complex set of 
legal provisions. The questions “Who constitutes the foreigners/outsiders” and “what 
kinds of rights they have” are determined by a complex web of legal framework, 
operating with various status, permit and residence categories. Within this system 
neither are all immigrants automatically labeled as foreigners, nor are all foreigners 
considered as immigrants. The status and rights of each group (i.e. labor migrants, 
asylum seekers [Asylbewerber]
299
, war refugees [Bürgerkriegsflüchtlinge], immigrants 
of family reunifications [Familiennachzug] and repatriated ethnic Germans 
[Aussidler]
300
) vary significantly.
301
  
Additionally, an exclusionary citizenship regime based on jus sanguinis, 
combined with the long-term effects of the guest-worker program, has created a system 
where the entry of large number of immigrants was permitted. However, this has been 
done without introduction of adequate measures to incorporate the non-German 
immigrant population into the society and to represent their interests within the political 
processes. While the repatriated ethnic German immigrants
302
 could exercise full 
citizenship rights upon arrival, the non-German immigrants have been actively excluded 
from the political processes of the German states [Länder]. From the introduction of the 
guest-worker [Gastarbeiter] system in the mid-1950s to the adoption of the Immigration 
                                               
299 As the Article 16a of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, hereafter GG) guarantees the right of asylum of 
persons persecuted on political grounds, Germany has accepted a large number of asylum seekers over 
the years. See Lydia Morris, Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrant’s Rights (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2002), 29-30 & 41-45. 
300 The German state tried to control (and reduce) the inflow of Aussidler through the war settlement Act 
(Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz, hereafter KFBG). With the introduction of KFBG in 1993 people with 
an ethnic German background from other countries are only allowed access to Germany, only if they can 
prove that their ethnicity is the foundation of discrimination in their country of origin. Starting in 1993, 
these groups began to be referred as Spätaussiedler.  
301 Simon Green, The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and immigration policy in contemporary 
Germany, (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 1.  
302 The Articles 16 and 116 of GG, enables the ‘return’ of ethnic Germans (Aussidler). Due to 
constitutional requirements, between 1945 and 1961 millions of ‘ethnic’ Germans migrated to Federal 
Republic of Germany. The number of entries reached 2.4 million between 1990 and 2003. Yet, the 
number of Aussidler immigration declined over the years, decreasing to its lowest rate in 2011 with 2,148 
immigrants. For more information on the rates of Aussidler inflow see BMI, Bundesamtes für Migration 
und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung, Migrationsbericht 2004, (2004), 34 & BMI, 
Migrationsbericht 2011, (2011), 7. 
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Act [Zuwanderungsgesetz]
 
in 2005, the policies regarding immigrants and foreigners 
ignored the long-term effects and consequences of migration.  
Although the issues related to ethnic German immigrants shape a significant 
portion of the politics and policies of migration in Germany, it is the history of labor 
migration that has the most effect on the transformation of the principle dimensions and 
legal basis of the policies on immigration, residence and citizenship rights of foreigners 
[Ausländer].303 The migration and integration of the Turkish immigrants, which 
constitutes the largest non-German immigrant population, in general and the Alevis in 
particular, are of significance to trace the emergence, transformation and impact of the 
domestic policies and rights regimes in Germany. What is more, understanding the 
consequences of the uneven distribution of the Alevis among the Turkish immigrant 
population is important to explain the content of the Alevi rights networks.     
 3.3.1 From Gastarbeiter to Ausländer: Migration Debates and Issues between 1955 
and 1973 
 
The largest portion of the (legal) immigrants entered Germany through labor 
migration and subsequent family reunifications. In the post-WWII period, despite the 
large number of ethnic German migration, the needs of the agricultural and industrial 
sectors compelled the government to establish what is now known as the guest-worker 
[Gastarbeiter] system. All parties involved (workers, foreign governments, German 
political parties and bureaucrats) were aware that economic interests were the driving 
force behind this program.
304
 In principle, through the introduction of short-term, 
temporary foreign labor force, the Germany was expected to (i) replace the manpower 
lost during WWII, (ii) hasten economic progress, and (iii) strengthen economic 
growth.
305
 Other than the introduction of the Federal Agency for Labor [BA - 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit], the immigration acts and the institutions of the pre-WWII 
                                               
303 Green, Politics of Exclusion, 1. 
304 In addition to achieving domestic economic goals, the Gastarbeiter program was used to meet foreign 
policy ends. German Labor Ministry considered the program as a supplement to economic collaboration. 
between anti-communist allies. See Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling and Anton Kaes, eds. Germany in 
Transit: Nation and Migration 1955-2005, (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 2007), 9-
10.     
305 Wesley D. Chapin, Germany for Germans?: The Political Effects of International Migration, 
(Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 9-10. 
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period
306
 continued to dominate the way in which the Federal Republic of Germany 
[Bundesrepublik Deutschland] dealt with immigrants.  Like its European counterparts, 
BA was to act as a medium between the interested and qualified potential workers and 
employee-seeking firms. Work and residence permits of the country were turned into 
clauses of job contracts between the employers and (individual) workers, as well as 
between (individual) workers and the Federal Republic of Germany. Between 1955 and 
1973, around 14 million workers signed contracts and entered Federal Republic of 
Germany
307
 through bilateral agreements.
308
 
The guest-worker program, modeled after the ‘return’ migrant experience in 
Europe in the 19
th
 and the early 20
th
 centuries,
309
 did not involve any institutions or 
mechanisms to incorporate foreigners into the German society and to aid them in coping 
with alienation problems. Contrary to other policy areas, the policies of the Gastarbeiter 
system were not society-centered and cooperative.
310
 Neither the coalition under 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s Christian Democrats [CDU – Christlich Demokratische 
Union Deutschlands / CSU –  Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern ], nor the opposition 
under Social Democratic Party [SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands]311 
considered the possibility that the guest-workers could become long-term residents or 
permanent immigrants.
312
 While migrants were initially recruited as seasonal workers, 
the needs of the metalwork and engineering industries compelled the government to 
abolish this practice in the 1960s.   
                                               
306 Namely, the 1938 Foreigner Police Ordinance [Ausländerpolizeiverordnung] and the 1933 Ordinance 
on Foreign Workers[Verordnung über ausländishe Arbeitnehmer] 
307 Norbert Cyrus, Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Germany, country report prepared for the 
European research project POLITIS, (Oldenburg 2005), 50-51, accessed March 2, 2013, available at 
http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Germany.pdf.  
308 Germany signed agreements with Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal 
(1964), Tunisia (1965), Morocco (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). 
309 Accordingly, in the 1870s 25 per cent and in the 1890s 45 per cent of the Europeans migrated to US 
estimated to return to their homelands. Similarly, a significant number of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese 
workers in South America returned to Europe throughout the 19th century. Between 1907 and 1914, return 
migration was a common phenomenon that 2 per cent of the Germans, 33 per cent of the Poles and 
Portuguese, around 48 per cent of English and North Italians, as well as 42% of South Italians returned to 
their countries of origin. See Leslie Moch, Moving Europeans Migration in Western Europe since 1650, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 155-6. 
310 James F. Hollifield, Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe, 
(Harward University Press, 1992), 60-1. 
311 SPD was critical of the plan due to unemployment rates. They claimed that recruitment of foreign 
workers would hinder the position of the German laborers. See “Hundertttausend italienische Arbeiter 
kommen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 21, 1955. 
312 Hollifield, Immigrants, Markets, and States 60. 
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Even though by 1960 immigrants became an integral part of the  labor force, the 
absence of clear and substantive legislation regarding housing and workplace rights of 
the immigrants led to increasing deliberations and conflicts between the federal 
ministries.
313
 The growing desire of the immigrants for family unifications and resulting 
accommodation and visa issues started to challenge the legal framework and attitudes 
on migration. Particularly, the pleas of the Italian guest-workers, who were the first 
group to be recruited, found support from the Catholic Church. As a group analists note 
“At the Katholikentag of 1962, its president, cabinet minister Paul Lübke, stated that 
Catholics had to protect the ‘guestworkers’ from ‘moral and spiritual’ degeneration.”314 
While the Catholic Church and Christian Democrats put emphasis on the moral issues, 
the German employers perceived family unifications as a means to reduce the effects of 
alienation. In their view, the less distraction the workers had, the more motivated they 
would be, and hence, the more productive they would become. 
 Despite the pressures from the migrant-sending countries for improvements in the 
conditions of the guest-workers, little action was taken to meet their demands. Even 
though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared that this issue would deteriorate 
Germany’s image in the international arena, the possibility of a new and permanent path 
for migration evoked more fear among the political elites. The shortage of housing in 
the early 1960s promoted even more fear. There were worries that by allowing more 
foreigners to enter Germany, tensions and conflicts would emerge between the local and 
immigrant populations.
315
 Consequently, “German authorities did little to facilitate 
family reunion and still often refused permission, and housing programmes for the 
immigrant families remained negligible.”316   
The first change came with the introduction of the 1965 Ausländergesetz 
(Foreigner Law). With this new law, the immigrants granted residence as long as they 
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314 Ibid., 24. 
315 Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn, “Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal 
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Univeristy Press, 2001).  
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had valid visas and did not hinder the ‘needs’ of the Federal Republic.317 Yet, variance 
in the interpretation of the ‘needs’ by the local foreigner bureaus (Ausländeramt) fueled 
the general confusion about the status and rights of the labor migrants. The new law, 
contrary to expectations, had a destabilizing effect on the migrants and their families 
since it neither clarified the status of the immigrants nor guaranteed equal housing and 
labor rights for them. 
3.3.2 Beginning of the Turkish Immigration to Germany and the Early Immigrant 
Organizations 
 
Even though migration to Western Europe was considered as a means for 
financial improvement since the late 1950s, it was not until 1961 that emigration from 
Turkey underwent a significant structural change. Starting with the bilateral agreement 
between the Turkish and German governments (No. 505-83 SZV/3-92-42) on October 
30, 1961, state-sponsored labor migration to the Federal Republic of Germany became 
an important trend in the 1960s.
318
 At the end of 1961, 6,700 Turkish workers were 
recruited. Due to the increasing need for foreign labor in the Federal Republic the 
number of Turkish workers continued to grow with the exception of 1966-1967 
recession. Their percentage within foreign population doubled in 1962, and reached 7.4 
per cent by 1964.
319
 By the time of the 1973 moratorium, the Turks had become the 
largest non-German (and non-citizen) community in Germany.   
Between 1961 and 1973, the Turks were mostly recruited as unskilled or semi-
skilled workers to work mostly in metalwork and engineering industries. In accordance 
to the requirements of the guest-worker program they were not allowed to bring their 
families with them, and were housed in dormitory type settlements. Even though with 
bilateral agreements social security rights were granted and Turkish workers were 
expected to receive similar wages and social benefits as their German colleagues, the 
absence of mechanisms of control led to the exploitation of the Turkish migrants. 
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Particularly, the firms and landowners could take advantage the situation of the housing 
market and force the guest workers to live in inadequate and unsanitary conditions. In 
principle the labor unions and associations were expected to be the mediums for the 
communication of the needs and preferences of the immigrant workers. However, 
“Worker’s Welfare Association [Arbeiterwohlfahrt], which had set up a special office 
for the consultation of Turkish guest workers –Turkish Advisory Center [Türk Danış] –  
in 1962, was unable to remedy this lack.”320 Since labor migration to Germany was 
expected to be a temporary arrangement the German governments was not particularly 
interested in improving the conditions of the Turkish workers. It was not until the 1970s 
that Turkish authorities began to pressure the German government for places of worship 
for Turkish immigrants, and schools for their children.
321
 However, even after Turkish 
authorities were involved, Turkey’s emphases was confined to keeping the Turkish 
immigrants in the Federal Republic of Germany ‘Turkish at heart’ rather than 
encouraging their successful integration.  
In the absence of mechanisms and institutions to communicate their needs and 
preferences, Turkish workers in Germany began to organize early in the 1960s. Parallel 
to the labor union activities in Turkey, the Turkish workers in Germany sought to 
improve their situation through the establishment of unions/representative bodies and 
sometimes wildcat strikes.
322
 Despite its problems, Turkish Advisory Center was 
instrumental in strengthening the cooperation between Turkish workers and the 
establishment of associations.
323
 However, neither the German labor unions and 
workers, nor the employers acknowledged the claims made by the labor associations 
established by Turkish workers as legitimate. Since the guest-workers in Germany did 
not have labor rights or any specific social rights other than those specified in the 
bilateral agreements, the most conventional modes of civic participation was considered 
illegal and illegitimate by the German authorities.    
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The first Turkish association that was established by Turkish guest workers was in 
Cologne. The establishment of the Turkish Workers Association of Cologne and its 
surroundings [Köln ve Çevresi Türk İşçileri Derneği] was followed by a number of 
workers’ associations in the cities which had high levels of Turkish immigrants.324 
Echoing Layton-Henry’s typology, in addition to the worker associations, in the 1960s 
Turkish immigrants (guest-workers and other groups) in Germany established a number 
of organizations that retained their links to Turkey.
325
 Among those groups, Federation 
of Turkish Students in Germany [ATÖF - Almanya Türk Öğrenci Federasyonu] was 
founded in 1962 and it was subsidized by the Turkish government until 1968. 
Additionally, by the late 1960s, political parties and left-wing and right-wing 
associations in Turkey began to establish networks and organizations in Germany and in 
other parts of Europe. Like the interest groups in Turkey, the immigrant interest groups 
increasingly politicized and polarized in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.  
The Alevi organizations in Germany and elsewhere in Europe were established in 
the late 1970s.
326
 In the German cities, the Alevi migrants continued to hide their 
identity upon arrival, as they did in the urban contexts in Turkey. Hence, they were 
practically invisible in the public sphere.  Similar to the experience of the Kurdish 
migrant workers from Turkey, the Alevis also tended to join the preexisting Turkish 
associations. Additionally, there were no religious markers to indicate their presence in 
the German cities. As Massicard notes: “Whereas the Sunnis set up mosques as soon as 
they realized they would be in Germany for a prolonged period of time…there was no 
organized [Alevi] religious life.”327  
3.3.3 Rotation vs. Integration: Debates and Policies between 1973 and 1982  
The ambiguity regarding the status and the rights of the immigrants was further 
complicated when the global economic crisis and recession paved the way for a new 
economic context, where guest-workers were no longer needed. In this period, the 
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composition of the labor migrants began to change, with the introduction of a 
moratorium on guest-worker recruitment. While most guest-workers from Southern 
Europe returned to their countries following the moratorium, the total population of the 
Turkish immigrants as well as other non-European immigrants continued to grow due to 
the changes in policies of the host country (i.e. family reunions).  By 1974, 78 per cent 
of the Turkish labor force outside of Turkey was located in Federal Republic of 
Germany and Turks constituted the largest non-European immigrant population.
328
 
Additionally, the non-European guest-workers, unlike their European 
counterparts, could not freely rotate in and out of Germany. Since they were subjected 
to additional requirements and conditions in their contracts, most non-European workers 
chose to remain in Federeal Republic of Germany fearing long term travels to their 
country would jeopardize their work and hence residence permits. In the absence of 
legitimate representation in the existing trade unions and workers’ councils, guest-
workers gradually mobilize for strike action and organize their own associations.
329
  
The emergence of wildcat strikes in 1973 not only made it clear that new 
institutional and policy regulations are needed to fulfill the housing and education needs 
of the workers  and their families, but also they alarmed the Federation of German 
Trade Unions [DGB - Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund ] due to the potential threat of 
establishment of immigrant labor unions. Both the state and civil society actors in 
Germany as well as in other European countries receiving labor migrants realized that 
change was necessary, as workers were not as easily disposable as they thought it was 
the case. The willingness of the immigrants to mobilize and organize strikes turned 
DGB into an (unwilling) advocate of immigrant labor rights in this period. As 
Katzenstein suggests, DGB put pressure on SPD-led government to provide “stronger 
protection of free speech and free association, reforms in the rules governing residency 
                                               
328 Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turkish Workers in Europe 1960-1975: A Socioeconomic Reappraisal, (Leiden: 
Brill, 1976), 7. 
329 Such an example occurred at the Ford plant in Cologne in late August, 1973. Accordingly, the Ford 
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105 
 
permits, representation of foreign workers on government advisory boards, and 
improved access to language and vocational training.”330    
Despite the improvements in the condition of the immigrants, Germany continued 
to manage and limit migration throughout the 1970s. Since the number of the 
immigrants continued to increase with family reunifications and the inflow of refugees, 
the states [Länder] tried to manage the movement of the immigrants within Germany. 
As the population of the large cities increased with family unifications and began to 
threaten the employment opportunities of the natives, the Secretary of Work and Social 
Order initiated policy measures to prevent immigration to cities in April 1975.
331
 Yet, 
the restrictions needed to be repealed in 1977 due to the pressures of the industry, which 
continued to seek cheap supply of foreign laborers.
332
  
 By the mid-1970s, integration became a major issue. In an attempt to develop a 
comprehensive integration policy strategy, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) 
introduced reforms in 1978. The legal status of the foreigners was strengthened through 
amendments in criteria for acquisition of unlimited residence permits and eligibility for 
naturalization. Additionally, a new federal office, i.e. Commissioner for Foreigner 
Affairs [Ausländerbeauftragte], was created to communicate and represent the needs 
and preferences of the immigrants.
333
 In 1979, Heinz Kühn, the first Commissioner, 
issued a memorandum to that supported for full integration of the immigrant 
population.
334
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While the Kühn memorandum found support from the Catholic and Protestant 
churches and the DGB, most others were skeptical of the recommendations due to the 
high costs that integration policies would bring. Increasing wild strikes and the 
worsening of the economic conditions in the 1970s quickly transformed the public 
opinion against foreigners. The more the press evoked racial fears and the more the 
conditions of the labor market declined, the more the general public’s views on labor 
immigrants deteriorated. Throughout 1970s, popular media depicted some West 
German cities, such as Berlin and Kreuzberg, in danger of becoming the new ‘Harlem’. 
During this period the popular weekly news magazine Der Spiegel
335
 published a 
number of articles that emphasized the increasingly unsafe conditions for the local 
German population in some cities.
336
 For example, in the cover of its issue on July 31, 
1973 Der Spiegel highlighted the transformation of the urban centers with the alarming 
slogan: ‘The Turks are coming: save yourself, if you can’ (Die Türken kommen - rette 
sich, wer kann). The magazine warned of the emerging Turkish ghetto threat, and drew 
public attention to an ‘invasion’ that was on the verge of becoming unmanageable. Der 
Spiegel continued its negative portrayal of the urban centers throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. The opinion polls of this period revealed that migrants were blamed for 
increasing the unemployment rates. The results of the opinion polls conducted by 
EMNID,
337
 and Infas
338
 demonstrated that there was an increasing demand for sending 
the migrants back to their homeland.  
Since the policies of 1970s failed to reduce the number of the immigrants and as 
the demand for the return of the labor immigrants increased (Table 3.1), the ruling 
coalition of SPD and Free Democratic Party [FDP - Die Freie Demokratische Partei] 
tried to solve the problem of migration through the introduction of material incentives. 
As Cooper notes due to the increasing inability “to compel foreigners to return their 
                                               
335 First launched in 1947, Der Spiegel is one of the largest circulation (weekly) news magazines in 
Germany. 
336  See Der Spiegel, no. 31 (July 30, 1973), 24-31. The original issue is available at:  
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home countries, the issue of Rückkehrpremien, i.e. the payment of financial incentives 
to those foreigners willing to leave the Federal Republic, was brought into the 
discussion at the start of the 1980s.”339 However, contrary to the expectations of 
SPD/FDP coalition, the population of the foreigners continued to grow throughout the 
1980s.  
 
Table 3.1 Percentage of German citizens favoring the expulsion of immigrant 
workers 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                            
   
 
 
Source: “Ausländerfeindlichkeit: Exodus erwünscht,” Der Spiegel no.18 (May 3, 1982), 
37
340
    
3.3.4. Rise of the Turkish Immigrant Organizations in the 1970s 
Even though with the 1973 moratorium labor migration came to a halt, the 
number of Turks in Germany continued to grow through family unifications, asylum 
requests and illegal migration. Along with the changes in the composition of the 
Turkish immigrant population in Germany, networks began to emerge between political 
parties, trade unions and student associations in Turkey and the immigrant population in 
Germany. From 1970s onwards, the organization of the Turkish immigrants 
“mirrored…the divisions within Turkish society between rightists, leftists, Kurdish 
separatists and the various religious organizations.”341 
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During this period various ‘boomerang patterns’ were established between the 
banned or repressed political parties in Turkey and migrant worker associations in 
Germany. The Nationalist Action Party [MHP - Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi] was the first 
Turkish political party to establish organizational network with the aim of preserving 
the essence of the identity of the Turkish immigrant population. Through cultural 
institutions and mosque organizations the MHP tried to mobilize the Turkish 
immigrants according to its own ideological orientation.
342
 To that end, the Federation 
of Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations in Europe was founded in Germany in 
1978.
343
 The activities of the MHP were soon followed by other domestic movements, 
namely Islamists, left-wing parties and Kurdish nationalists.  
As Grojean argues Turkish political parties tried to mobilize the immigrant 
population to increase their support for their activities in the homeland either by 
infiltrating the existing immigrant interest groups or establishing new ones in 
Germany.
344
 Following that trend, the political parties and left-wing associations were 
the first to mobilize Alevi migrants in Germany. Radical, left-wing organizations such 
as Revolutionary Path [Dev Yol]
345
 included Alevi activists within its ranks and sought 
support from the Alevis living in Germany.
346
  
A more moderate left-wing organization was founded in 1977, under the name of 
Popular Revolutionary Federation [HDF - Halkçı Devrimci Federasyonu]. The HDF 
was significant for the networks it established between the migrants and the political 
parties (i.e. CHP in Turkey and in later periods SPD in Germany).
347
 Yet, neither the 
radical nor the moderate left-wing organization made specific claims concerning the 
needs and preferences of the Alevi community. Instead, since the membership profile of 
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the organizations was heterogeneous, occasional tensions emerged between the Alevis 
and the Sunnis.
348
 The Alevi factions within the left-wing organizations were 
instrumental in the establishment of the Alevi interest groups in the late 1970s. For 
instance, the establishment of the Turkish Workers Peace Union [Türk İşçileri Barış 
Birliği] in May 1979 – which later changed its name to Patriots Peace Union [YB - 
Yurtseverler Barış Birliği ] – was a direct result of increasing dissatisfaction with the 
activities of HDF in the aftermath of the 1978 attacks on Alevis in Kahramanmaraş.349  
Even though many organizations in Federal Republic of Germany included Alevis 
since the late 1950s, no Alevi interest gourp was established until two decades later. 
Parallel to the pattern of organization of articulated migrant interests in Germany, the 
first Alevi interest groups were organized in the form of workers’ associations in major 
cities. Among these, the Union of Workers of Turkey [TALEB - Türkiye Amele Birliği] 
was one of the first Alevi major dominant organizations. Even though it was referred to 
the Union of Alevis of Turkey [Türkiye Aleviler Birliği], TALEB was cautious about 
being labeling as an Alevi interest group. TALEB, which was composed of 34 
associations, was significant due to the close ties it established with the TBP (Union 
Party of Turkey). In the late 1970s, TBP reached out to TALEB and other Alevi 
organizations to obtain financial and electoral support in local and general elections.
350
 
Following that, TALEB and its sister organizations acted as the unofficial branches of 
TBP.  
By 1980, various Alevi organizations had been united under the umbrella of the 
Federation of Patriots Union [YBF - Yurtseverler Birliği Federasyonu]. YBF    quickly 
began communicating the problem of the Alevi rights in Turkey, and protested against 
discrimination and defamation of the Alevis in Germany. To that end, YBF subsidized 
                                               
348 In his autobiographical book, Alevi Kimliğiyle Yaşamak, Halis Tosun – an Alevi activist and political 
entrepreneur (i.e. member of advocacy networks) in Hamburg – describes expulsion of three members of 
HDF due to their derogatory remarks regarding Alevi members of HDF during a conversation with Besim 
Üstünel, former CHP Minister of Finance (June 21, 1977-July 21, 1977) in the summer of 1977. See 
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the production of plays of Ali Haydar Celasun narrating the violence that had taken 
place against Alevis in Kahramanmaraş in 1978. The Theater of the Reality of Kerbela 
in Turkey [Türkiye Gerçeğinde Kerbela Tiyatrosu] – which 32 players of Berlin branch 
of YBF and told the story of Kahramanmaraş Events staged in various cities in 
Germany.
351
 The organization also communicated the specific demands of the Alevi 
living in Germany and highlighted the issues they face in the major German cities. YBF 
also pressured the Turkish broadcasting radio station in Cologne to include programs 
about the Alevi faith and music. While there were no similar broadcasts in Turkey’s 
major media outlets, the Alevi interest groups in Germany gradually succeeded in 
transforming the programs in the media. As a result of the lobbying carried out by the 
YBF broadcasting on Alevi faith began to be aired furing the month of Muharrem in 
1981. Further, the YBF raised protests against the Langenscheidt publication company, 
following the defamation of Alevis in the Turkish-German dictionary because of its 
association of the word incest [blutschande] with the Alevism [kızılbaşlık352]. The YBF 
subsequently sued publishing company, employed Bremen SDP parliamentarian 
Waldemar Klischies to communicate and represent its case, and the Langenscheidt 
publishing company agreed to drop kızılbaşlık from the dictionary.353   
The YBF could not maintain its organizational structure for a long period of time 
and it was dissolved shortly after the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey. Similarly, Dev Yol 
also experienced a membership crisis in the 1980s, and it was closed down in 1986. As 
Massicard notes in the 1980s, “Political activity centered on the country of origin 
gradually petered out, due especially to the forced de-politicisation occurring in Turkey. 
After the coup…many feared reprisals against their family in Turkey.”354 Indeed the 
organizational characteristics and the activities of Alevi interest groups began to change 
in the mid-1980s parallel to the emerging multiculturalism discussions in Germany, and 
the structural changes happening in Turkey. 
 
                                               
351 Güler, Aleviliğin Siyasal Örgütlenmesi: 62. 
352 Kızılbaş is a derogatory term used to identify Alevis since the Ottoman era.  
353 The initial goals of the YBF committee that was established to deal with the law suit were (i) to 
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previous editions of the dictionary. However, the YBF administration settled with the Langenscheidt 
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Kimliğiyle Yaşamak.    
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3.3.5 Towards Multiculturalism: Change in Germany between 1982 and 1990  
The emerging problems concerning the immigrant population and the worsening 
economic conditions cost SDP its coalition partner (and then the 1983 elections) early in 
the 1980s. In 1982, the newly formed conservative coalition between FDP and the union 
parties CDU/CSU were instrumental in the election of Helmut Kohl as Chancellor. 
Kohl’s election marked the change in prevailing politics and policies of migrants in 
Germany. The public support for the Ausländer policies of Kohl355  aided the 
CDU/CSU and FDP coalition to return to government in 1983 and 1987.
356
 In the early 
CDU/CSU and FDP coalition period, Germany adopted a rigid an exclusionary policy 
towards, naturalization and integration of its non-German immigrant population.  
The exclusionary attitude towards immigrants peaked with the draft bill 
introduced by Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU), the Interior Minister. In an attempt to 
revise the 1965 Ausländergesetz, Zimmermann’s proposal aimed at restricting the 
access of families of immigrants residing in Germany. The proposal sought to restrict 
the inflow of immigrants through the introduction of (i) lower cut-off age for 
immigration of minor dependents [Kindernachtzug] (i.e. reduction of the age criteria to 
join their parents from 16 to 6) and (ii) stricter screening criteria for the immigration of 
the spouses of migrants to enter Federal Republic of Germany.
357
 During this period the 
German government attempted to further restrict the inflow of migrants through strict 
screening processes for asylum seekers. at the same time there was also a notable 
increase of deportations from Germany  
However, Zimmermann’s policy to regulate and restrict entry and integration of 
foreigners drew heavy criticisms from both the political elites and the media. Butkard 
Hirsch, FDP’s interior affairs spokesperson, criticized Zimmerman’s policies, noting 
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Gastarbeiter system created, and identified ‘implementation of a humane immigration policy’ as one of 
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356 Cooper, Immigration and German Identity 156 
357 Green, Politics of Exclusion 52-53 & 59.  
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that the rights granted through the Basic Law applied to Germans and non-German 
residents alike.
358
 Similarly, Liselotte Funcke, FDP’s federal commissioner for 
foreigners’ affairs, condemned Zimmerman’s proposals as anti-family and 
unconstitutional.
359
 The hard-line policies on family migration, residency, and 
deportation pushed by Zimmermann, were challenged not only by the opposition and 
government’s coalition partners, but also by CDP/CSP members.360 Ulf Fink, the 
federal chairman of the CDU’s Committee on Social Affairs, called for more 
multicultural policies,
361
 and strongly criticized Zimmermann for provoking panic 
among the German public. In addition to the activities of the political elites, the protests 
of the immigrants gradually transformed the public and media perception of the 
foreigners. Starting from the mid-1980s, more actors began to promote multicultural 
policies to facilitate the integration attempts. 
Despite Zimmermann’s attempts, the number of foreigners continued to grow. 
Even though the rate of the immigrant population slightly dropped in 1983 and 1984 
(i.e. -2.8 per cent and -3.8 per cent respectively), the rates were quickly reversed in 
1985. Indeed, from 1973 to 1989, the percentage of the immigrant population increased 
22 per cent.
362
 By 1988, the Turks made up 33.9 per cent of the entire Ausländer 
population, and they became the largest non-German immigrant group.
363
 As the 
hostility towards the immigrant population increased and the family reunification and 
naturalization policies become more rigid, the Turkish immigrants approached their 
homeland to put pressure on the German government. Particularly, Selma Ertan’s self-
immolation in the Hamburg marketplace on May 26, 1982 to protest growing 
xenophobia,
364
 and the suicide of asylum seeker Cemal Kemal Altun on August 30, 
                                               
358 Triadafilos Triadafiopoulos, Becoming Multicultural: Immigration and the Politics of Membership in 
Canada and Germany, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2012), 129. 
359 “Liselotte Funcke, Unbeirrt und hartnäckig: Die Beauftragte für Ausländerfragen hat einen scheweren 
Stand,” Die Zeit, March 16, 1984; “Recht absonderlich,” Der Spiegel no. 18, May 2, 1988  
360 Triadafiopoulos, Becoming Multicultural 129-30. 
361 See Ulf Fink, “Multikulturelle Gesellschaft – Realität heute,” Gewerkschaftlichen Monatshefte, no. 
7/89 (1989), 443-7 
362 Calculated based on changes in the proportion of foreigners to general public. See BMI, 
Migrationsbericht 2001, (2001), 118. The original document is available at 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Publikation/IB/Anlagen/themen-zuwanderung-
migrationsbericht-2001.html   
363 Data retrieved from Statistisches Jahnrbuch 1990 für die Bundesrespublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: 
Metzler-Poeschel Verlag, 1990) available at: http://www.digizeitschriften.de/en/startseite/. 
364 “Halefoğlu: Selma Ertan olayı düşündürücü” Milliyet August 31, 1982, 12.  
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1983 to avoid deportation to Turkey
365
 was instrumental in shifting the attention of the 
media to the issues and problems of the foreigners in German.
366
 Even though the 
problems of the Turkish immigrants were discussed in the talks between chancellor 
Kohl and Prime Minister Özal in 1985, no significant results were achieved throughout 
the 1980s. It was not until 1990 that major changes occurred in the way in which the 
authorities dealt with the foreigner population in Germany.  
3.3.6. Problems and Policies of the New Order: Germany after the Unification 
By the end of 1980s, the legacy of the guest-worker migration, liberal asylum 
policies along with the increasing migration of repatriated Germans, turned Germany 
into the most open European country. Despite the refusal of the political elites to 
acknowledge Germany as a country of immigration, during 1990s the total population 
of foreigners reached 7.3 million.
367
 Following the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
reunification of Germany, increasing xenophobia and violence targeting foreigners led 
to major discussions on policies of migration, integration and naturalization. 
Additionally, the exclusionary citizenship and rights regimes in Germany paved the way 
for the emergence of parallel societies in migrant dominated cities.
368
 While the parallel 
societies helped migrants to overcome problems of alienation and preserve their 
identity, they evoked fears of multiculturalism in the German public. 
 As the political structure and the population composition of Germany changed in 
the 1990s, the policymakers acknowledged the need to reform the citizenship regime. 
The growing domestic unease with Zimmermann’s policies eventually led emergence of 
a new coalition favoring liberal reforms. Subsequently, to maintain itself in pwoer in the 
upcoming elections, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition introduced a new draft bill (i.e. 
Schäuble draft) that excluded Zimmermann’s draconian measures (i.e. the rules 
governing child migration and family unifications) in 1990. For the most part, the new 
                                               
365 “Sazak cinayetinin sanığı intihar etti,” Milliyet, August 31, 1983, 1.  
366“Panik ist die falsche Antwort,” Die Zeit, no. 31, July 25, 1986  
367 Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, (London: SAGE publications, 
2005), 79. 
368 Among those, the Kreuzberg in Berlin is known to be one of the few urban areas in which the total 
number of foreigner population exceeds the natives. Particularly, Kreuzberg began to be known as “Little 
Istanbul” due to the high Turkish influence shaping the social life and culture of the neighborhood. See 
Ayhan Kaya, Sicher in Kreuzberg: constructing diasporas: Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin, (Berlin: 
Transcript, 2001) 
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law just “ratified what constitutional court rules had long established.”369 Yet, it also 
introduced new categories and guarantees for migrants and their families and 
standardized practices across the German states.
370
  
The new Foreigner Law was criticized by various domestic groups. As 
Triadafiopoulos notes: 
   the opposition SPD and the Greens as well as… advocacy groups, 
including the DGB, the Protestant and Roman catholic churches, welfare 
organizations, and immigrant associations…demanded clearer and less 
complicated conditions for the conferral of unlimited residency permits, 
more expansive sponsorship rights, simplified naturalization procedures, 
dual citizenship, and explicit recognition of the Federal Republic’s de facto 
status as an “immigration country”.371  
Within this context, the “Hot Autumn” protest chants of the East Germans – i.e. “We 
are the People” [Wir sind das Volk!] – replaced immigrants’ call for acknowledgement 
of their rights for membership.
372
 In the 1990s, there was a sharp increase of Turkish 
nationals seeking naturalization for full German citizenship, which in turn was expected 
to provide security of residence and political rights. While the immigrants were granted 
legal rights for naturalization by 1993, perceptions of citizenship as an exclusive 
category created new dilemmas and threats for the immigrant population.  
Although there were legal changes, there were no attitudinal changes in the early 
1990s. The CDU/CSU elites and the media continued to associate foreigners with 
‘false’ asylum claims, ‘welfare abuses’ and ‘criminal behavior’. Despite the warnings of 
the Commissioner Liselotte Funcke, no action was taken to stop defamatory remarks by 
some politicians, and to normalize the relations between the foreigners and the German 
citizens. What is more, the figures of the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution [BfV - Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz]373 reports demonstrated that 
there was a significant increase in the number of right wing-extremist groups and their 
membership in comparison with the previous years. By 1992, BfV statistics indicated 
that there were 30 neo-Nazi groups and 46 other extreme right-wing organizations with 
                                               
369 Christian Joppke, Inmigration and the Nation-state: The United States, Germany and Great Britain, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 84 
370 See “Ausländergesetz”, Bundesgesetzblatt I (July 9, 1990), 1354-56. 
371 Triadafiopoulos, Becoming Multicultural, 135. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Based at Cologne, BfV is specialized in intelligence gathering on right- and left-wing movements, as 
well as extremist/terrorist organizations of foreigner origin.  
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39,800 members operating in Germany.
374
 Since these organizations promoted racist 
ideology and hatred towards the foreigners, the harassment and intimidation of, the 
foreigners increased. 
In 1991, a weeklong arson attack on asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda marked the 
beginning of a series of violent attacks targeting foreigners. The total number of 
registered right-wing criminal activity (both violent and non-violent) almost doubled in 
1992 compared to 1991.
375
 Following the attacks in Hoyerswerda, the extreme right-
wing groups began targeting the Turkish neighborhoods. In the first half of 1993, the 
number of recorded attacks reached 3,365. Following the infamous Mölln (1992) and 
Solingen (1993) attacks, there was a significant domestic and international support for 
the Turkish immigrant community.
376
 Particularly, in the aftermath of Mölln a number 
of pro-Turkish night marches and vigils against racism – the so-called lichterketten 
(lighted candle) marches – were organized. Amids this continuing violence the crime 
prevention laws that targeted extremist organizations and anti-foreşner violence came in 
to affect in December 1, 1994. As the violence continued to increase, on December 1, 
1994, "Crime Prevention Laws", targeting in large part against extremist organizations 
and anti-foreigner violence, took effect.    
The increasing tensions between the Germans and the Turks, and the inability of 
the German authorities to provide security forits immigrant population, led the Turkish 
government to add its voice to the protests.
377
 While the pressures from Turkey had 
little impact in changing the policies of Germany towards foreigners, the emerging 
European integration concerns contributed to the transformation of the debates on and 
organization of the migrants. The desire to strengthen the identity of Europe at the 
individual and state levels led to (i) the introduction of new standards to manage the 
inflow of migrants, and (ii) the improvement of the rights and conditions of migrants. 
As Geddes argues:  
                                               
374 Bundesministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutzbericht 1991 (Dortmund: Fritz Busche 
Druckergesellschart), 72 
375  There were 3,884 attacks in 1991; whereas the numbers reached to 7,121 in 1992. 
376 On November 22, 1992 three Turkish citizens – a woman, her daughter and niece – were killed in an 
arson attack in Mölln. Similarly, on May 29, 1993 Saime Genç (4), Hülya Genç (9), Gülüstan Öztürk 
(12), Hatice Genç (18), Gürsün Gürsün İnce (27) died in an arson attack at Lower Werner Street in 
Solingen.   
377 “Kohl’e açık mektup,” Hürriyet, June 5, 1993 
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   The migrant inclusion agenda that developed at EU level in the 1990s had 
three main elements: EU citizenship rights for third country nationals; 
enhanced anti-discrimination provisions to cover race, ethnicity and 
religion; and treatment of asylum-seekers that accord with international 
standards.
378
   
European Community presented a new opportunity structure for Germany to 
bypass the constraints laid down by domestic legal frameworks, (namely, the asylum 
rights described in the Basic Law). Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, Germany 
increasingly sought support to regulate and restrict migration through regional 
policies.
379
 The emerging EU institutions also provided favorable conditions for non-
discrimination of immigrants. The establishment of the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in 1993 to monitor the phenomena of racism and racial 
discrimination marked the beginning of efforts to standardize foreigners’ rights. The 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty further contributed to the development of standards for non-
discrimination of immigrants.
380
  
The dissatisfaction with the deepening cleavages between the citizens and the 
foreigners, and international pressures gradually led to demise of Chancellor Kohl’s 
exclusionary policies, and the conservative-led coalition of the Christian Union. The 
new 1998 coalition between the SPD and the Greens [Bündnis’90/Die Grüne] was 
instrumental for aligning the debates and policies of migration and integration with 
those of multiculturalism. The reform of the citizenship law initiated in 1998-1999 (and 
the latter changes initiated with Süssmuth Commission in 2001 at the federal level) was 
successful in developing more inclusionary regimes for citizenship and migrant rights.      
        
 
                                               
378 Geddes, Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe 144. 
379 Schengen initiative and the Maastricht had already made Germany’s influence on the emergence of a 
European asylum and refugee policy visible. 
380 As discussed in chapter 1, while non-discrimination principle promoted by the EU institutions, no 
attempts were made to specifically identify and protect the rights of the collectivities residing in EU 
member states. Neither EU nor CoE (Council of Europe) legal provisions provided standards for securing 
meaningful participation of the migrants in social, economic and (particularly) political processes of 
Germany. 
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 3.4. Alevism Goes Public: 
 A New Era for the Alevi Migrant Organizations in Germany (1990s) 
 
As mentioned before, the initial stages of the Alevi interest group formation in 
Germany went hand-in-hand with the Alevi movement in Turkey. Throughout the 
1970s and the 1980s, the organizations established by the immigrants mirrored the 
debates and issues of their homeland. The overall tendency during this period was first 
to establish local organizations, then to create umbrella organizations representing 
smaller (and most often locally based) organizations. Once organizational growth and 
consolidation was achieved, these umbrella organizations competed for power to shape 
domestic policies.  
Due to the social, economic and political changes taking place both in Germany 
and in Turkey and the rising identity politics around the world, the organization of the 
Alevi groups began to change in the late 1980s. Until then, no organization took the 
epithet Alevi. The transformation from organizations including Alevis to organizations 
of Alevis began with the Alevi Cultural Group of Hamburg [HAKG - Hamburg Alevi 
Kültür Grubu] in 1989.381 The Alevi cultural festival (i.e. Alevi Culture Week) 
organized by HAKG, and the subsequent establishment of the Alevi Culture Center  
[Alevi Kültür Merkezi] triggered of the formation of Alevi interest groups in Germany 
and in other West European countries. Local Alevi groups quickly began to emerge in 
other cities like Hanover, Lübeck, Cologne, Mannheim and Berlin. In 1991 the 
increasing number of the Alevi associations established the Federation of Alevi 
Assemblies in Germany [Almanya Alevi Cemaatleri Federasyonu], which was later 
renamed as the Federation of Alevi Unions in Germany, [AABF - Almanya Alevi 
Birlikleri Federasyonu].
382
 These new local Alevi associations and their umbrella 
organizations ensured public visibility of Alevi community. Through organization of 
culture festivals, commemoration ceremonies, talks/meetings, and religious ceremonies 
(cem), the Alevi organizations of the 1990s transformed Alevism into a public religion.  
In the early formative years, the axes of religion and culture were instrumental in 
shaping the identity of the organizations and led to the emergence of two competing 
                                               
381 Isabelle Rigoni, “Alevis in Europe: A Narrow Path towards Visibility,” in Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A 
Comprehensive Overview, eds.  Paul Joseph White and Joost Jongerden (Lediden: Brill, 2003), 162. 
382 Ibid. 163. 
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factions. The groups who perceived Alevism as a culture established Alevi Culture 
centers and associations, whereas those that considered Alevism as a religion were 
organized under the label of Hacı Bektaşi Veli associations in the 1990s. Both groups 
competed with one another for legitimate representation of Alevism in the public 
sphere. As Sökefeld notes:  
   From the perspective of the Hacı Bektaş Veli associations the Alevi 
Culture Centers were strongholds of Marxism and atheism, whereas the 
Alevi Culture Centers tended to regard the others as almost fanatic Alevis 
that isolated themselves instead of opening up.
383
     
In addition to their role in the representation of the Alevi interests in Germany, 
these new organizations were vital for the establishment of new networks of relations 
between Germany and Turkey. The 1989 Hamburg Manuscript by HAKG marked (i) 
adoption of a more right-centered rhetoric among Alevi activists and interest groups in 
Germany, and (ii) emergence of transnational advocacy networks (TAN) between the 
Alevi communities in Germany and in Turkey.
384
 Echoing Keck and Sikking, following 
the announcement of Hamburg manuscript, the underrepresented and excluded Alevi 
organizations in Turkey found new allies in the German public sphere. These newly- 
emerging alliances between the domestic and transnational Alevi organizations were 
crucial in communicating the Alevi demands and problems in Turkey to German (and 
later to EU) parliamentarians and officials.
385
 
Similar to the developments in Turkey the Alevi organizations and networks 
quickly became diversified starting with the mid-1990s. During this period, the Alevis   
in Germany could choose among more than 100 organizations.
386
 The political and 
social freedoms guaranteed with the German rule of law, along with the changing 
composition of the Turkish immigrant population due to increasing inflow of asylum 
seeking activists, lay the ground for organization of Alevi left-wing and Alevi Kurdish-
nationalist organizations. For instance, DHKP-C – similar to the earlier tendencies of 
the left-wing organizations of the 1970s – tried to infiltrate the existing Alevi 
                                               
383 Sökefeld, Struggling for recognition, 82. 
384 Martin Sökefeld, “Difficult Identifications: The Debate on Alevism and Islam in Germany,” in Islam 
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associations to take over its youth branches.
 387
 Even though a number of youth 
branches in Germany were established during the late 1990s, they were quickly 
dissolved.
388
 In addition to DHKP-C, other radical organizations, i.e. The New Alevi 
Movement (Yeni Alevi Hareketi), calling for armed struggle also emerged in Berlin in 
1996. However, these organizations failed to achieve recognition as actors of legitimate 
representation. 
Parallel to the increasing number of asylum requests of Kurds in the 1980s and in 
1990s, the Kurdish-Alevi activists also began to organize their interests in the form of 
associations in German cities. Following the publication of Zülfikar journal in 1994 by 
Kurdish activists, Federation of the Alevis of Kurdistan [FEK - Federasyona Elewiyen 
Kurdistan] was established in 1996. Upon its establishment FEK became the second 
largest Alevi umbrella organization, highlighting the discrimination that Alevis were 
facing in Germany and Turkey. FEK argued that Kurdish and Alevi issues were hitherto 
intertwined as half of the general Alevi population is Kurdish.
389
 They criticized AABF 
for (i) the exclusion of Kurdish issues and demands from its policy proposals, and (ii) 
the underrepresentation of Kurds in administrative positions. However, due to its ties 
with PKK – which was outlawed in Germany in 1993 – FEK never obtained an official 
status.
390
     
In addition to unofficial branches of the left-wing and Kurdish nationalist 
movements, the Alevi umbrella organizations in Turkey also established branches in the 
major German cities in the late 1990s and the 2000s. Among these the Ehl-i Beyt 
foundation established the Ehl-i Beyt Alevi Federation of Europe [ABAF - Avrupa Ehl-i 
Beyt Alevi Federasyonu] in 2001 which sought for the increase of the visibility of the 
Ehl-i Beyt foundation in transnational space. Similar to the homeland organization, the 
depiction of Alevi identity relied on the orthodox (Shia) interpretations of Islam. ABAF 
                                               
387 The most significant activity during this period was the publication of the Kerbela journal. Massicard, 
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Armenians in Athens and Alevis in Germany,” Paper presented at the 6th European Association of Social 
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co-operated with the Sunni organization
391
, such as the Turkish-Islam Union of 
Religious Affairs [DİTİB - Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği],392 in Germany; hence it 
did not enjoy much respect and recognition from other Alevi organizations.
393
 Its main 
activity involves organization of international conferences; yet in comparison to AABF, 
it is not particularly active.
394
 
As Sökefelt points out, following the establishment of a branch in Hesse in 1997, 
CEM Foundation became “the only Turkish Alevi organization that has a direct 
representation in Germany.”395 The foundation was represented by Halis Özkan, who 
belonged to a dede family and was a relative of İzzettin Doğan. Even though the 
organization established ties with local groups in Germany in the late 1990s, like 
ABAF, its influence in Germany remained limited. Particularly, AABF and CEM 
foundations clashed on occasion over the issues of “legitimate” representation of 
Alevis.    
Among the above mentioned organizations, AABF emerged as (and continues to 
be) the largest Alevi representative organization in Germany. Since the 1990s, AABF 
has acted as the primary actor in communicating the needs and preferences of the Alevi 
community.
396
 Since its founding, the organization lobbied for (i) recognition of the 
Alevis as a distinct ethnic and religious community both in Germany and in Turkey; (ii) 
changes in the legal framework on religious freedom, education and citizenship; and 
                                               
391 On January 16, 2008 DİTİB (along with ABAF, Cem Foundation’s European Office coordinator and 
other Turkish (Sunni) organizations) published a press release criticizing the 2008 debate on youth-related 
criminal activities. See, DİTİB, “Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarından Basın Açıklaması,” press release, last 
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(iii) the adoption of non-discrimination principles in Turkey (along with ending the 
favoritism of Sunnis and abolition of the DİB [Directorate of Religious Affairs]).397  
In its formative years under the leadership of Ali Rıza Gülçiçek398 the primary 
goal of AABF was to (i) familiarize the German public with Alevi culture and belief, 
and (ii) lay the ground for political rights struggle.
399
 Following the 1993 Sivas Events, 
AABF pioneered mobilization of the German Alevi community and organization of 
protest activities in the German public scene.
400
 A week after the Sivas Event, a march 
was organized (i.e. Protest March against Sivas Slaughter) in Cologne that brought 
together 60,000 protesters condemning the violence towards Alevis. A year later similar 
protests also took place in the aftermath of the Gazi Events.  
During the 1990s, the protest activity targeting the country of origin, and 
commemorative events aiming to raise consciousness of the German public, became the 
primary medium of the AABF Alevi activists to communicate the human rights 
breaches to transnational audiences in the subsequent years. The boomerang pattern 
emerged between AABF and the Alevi organizations and activist in Turkey in the 1990s 
initially involved transfer of funds – i.e. financial aid for the victims of Sivas,401 and 
compensation of the litigation costs and expenses of the Alevi victims/defendants of 
Gazi riot trials.
402
  
Şener and İlknur note that in 1994, AABF (with the support of SPD 
parliamentarians) lobbied the German parliamentarians to adopt a resolution calling for 
the protection of Alevis (as well as Assyrian and Yezidi) in Turkey.
403
 In the AABF’s 
search for leverage against the policies of Turkey the SPD and the Green 
                                               
397 AABF, “Alevilere yönelik istemelerimiz,” AABF press release, Cologne, November 5, 1996. 
Accessed May 16, 2013, available at http://alirizagulcicek.com/aabf/24.html  
398 Çiçek was the first chair of AABF and an active member of SPD. He later became a CHP MP between 
2002 and 2007. 
399 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 190. 
400 The membership of the organization increased from 32 organizations in 1993 to 130 organizations in 
1996.  
401 AABF raised money (141.593 DM) for the victims of the Sivas events and distributed them in a press 
conference at Çankaya Municipality’s sports center in Ankara on November 21, 1993. See AABF press 
release November, 1993. Last accessed May 16, 2013, available at http://alirizagulcicek.com/aabf/1.html.   
402 A petition by the members of the Gazi-Ümraniye bar association (hukuk komisyonu) dated August 7, 
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parliamentarians became the primary allies of Alevi activists in the German legislature. 
The questions framed by the SPD, and the Green parliamentarians’ plaid a key role in 
expression of the Alevi interests and issues in the legislature.
404
 Among these Ursula 
“Ulla” Jelpke of the Greens became one of the most active supporters concerning the 
issues relating to migrants and human rights.  
In the aftermath of Sivas Events, the AABF also played a significant role in 
strengthening the ties between the Alevi organizations across Europe particularly 
providing coordination between the movements in UK, France, Denmark, Sweden and 
Turkey. The TANs established by Alevi activists and organizations played a significant 
role in the establishment of the Assembly of Alevi-Bektashi Representatives [ABTM - 
Alevi-Bektaşi Temsilciler Meclisi] in mid-1990s.405 This new organization was 
composed of the major Alevi associations both in Turkey and abroad. The aim of 
ABTM was to create a single body to communicate and represent the interests of the 
Alevi community – i.e. (i) recognition of Aleviness, (ii) abolition of the DİB, (iii) 
abolition of compulsory religious education, and (iv) the end of the ‘war’ in the South 
Eastern region (with the Kurdish nationalists).
406
 Overall, ABTM mirrored the 
organizational structure and policy objectives of AABF. 
The emergence of rival organizations as a result of the growing diversity within 
the Alevi identity movement weakened the claims of ABTM as the only representative 
organization. Additionally, the disagreements their elites on the issues of electoral 
support for independent Alevi candidates in Turkey’s 1995 general elections further 
created problems for the coordination of different Alevi organizations. As Massicard 
argues “intense disagreements broke out between those who suggested that ABTM 
should field independent candidates and those who felt it should steer clear of any form 
of electoral involvement.”407 
                                               
404 Following the capture (and subsequent release) of Vahit Kaynar – a defendant in Sivas trials – in 
Germany on September 6, 2011, leftist parliamentarians were the first to draw attention on the issues of 
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With the growth of the TANs, the activists from Germany attempted to establish 
political ties between Turkey and Germany. Following the increasing demands of 
various groups to establish an Alevi party, in 1997 a new Alevi Party called the Peace 
Party [BP - Barış Partisi] was established.408 Funded by Turkish-Alevi businessman Ali 
Haydar Veziroğlu, BP sought to mobilize the Alevi electorate similar to TBP (Union 
Party of Turkey) of 1960s.
409
 In comparison to TBP, BP [previously DBH] lacked 
symbolic markers of Alevism and did not employ an Alevi lexicon in its program.
410
 
Instead, the party was more oriented towards the discussions of ethno-religious 
pluralism and multiculturalism. Even though the party drew support from European (i.e. 
German) Alevi activists, it lacked resources and personnel to branch out throughout 
Turkey. Unlike TBP, BP could not rally significant electoral support. Indeed, it only 
received 80,000 votes in 1999 elections, and dissolved itself on May 9, 1999.
411
        
A final transnational organization emerged as a result of TANs was Cultural 
Association of the Union of Alevi-Bektashi Organizations [ABKB – Alevi-Bektaşi 
Kuruluşları Birliği Kültür Derneği]. Founded on May 30, 1999 ABKB quickly became 
the target of the state institutions. As ABKB’s goal to “build cem houses and contribute 
to the cooperation of Alevi-Bektashi organizations” was considered as a breach of the 
Articles 14 and 24 of the 1982 Constitution and Article 5 of the Law on Associations 
(Law No. 2908), the ABKB was redefine its objectives. After the organization refused 
the demand, the organization was disbanded in 2002.
412
 The establishment of ABKB 
(rather than its closure) drew criticisms from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the 
Ministry of Culture and the Constitutional Court, for encouraging discrimination and 
separatism.
413
  
                                               
408 The party was established with the name Democratic Peace Movement [DBH - Demokratik Barış 
Hareketi] on October 1996. However, as a result of the trial against the party, the party cadre resigned and 
instead established the BP on May 1997. See “DHP’den Barış Partisine,” Milliyet, November 11, 1996,   
18.       
409 “Aleviler Parti Kuruyor,” Milliyet, November 11, 1995,   16  
410 For a detailed account of inception, evolution and dissolution of TBP see Chapter 4 
411 Kaleli, Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri, 95. 
412 TC Ankara 2. Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi, “ABKB’nin Gerekçeli Kapatma Kararı,” Karar No. 2002/59. 
413 “Aleviler’den Diyanet’e Tepki,” Hürriyet, August 21, 2001; “Aleviler kızgın,” Milliyet, February 17, 
2002, 23; “Alevi ismiyle birlik kurmak bölücülük,” Milliyet, April 2, 2003; “Alevi Kimliği anayasal bir 
haktır” ABKB press release, n.d. last accessed May 20, 2013,  available at: 
http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=226:abkb--alevi-
kimlinayasal-bir-hakt&catid=35:abf-tarihi&Itemid=261  
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To counter the growing hostility towards ABKB, in 2001 AABF launched a 
protest campaign to alert the press and decision makers in Germany and the rest of 
Europe.
414
 The organization p sought support from the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the EU officials to put pressure on the Turkish government. As the protests 
grew, the case found its way into the Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards 
Accession in 2002 (and later in 2003).
415
 While the court decision for closure of ABKB 
dropped in 2002, a new organization called ABF (Alevi Bektashi Federation) was 
founded with collaboration of AABF, PSDAK and HBVKD in 2002.  
 3.5. Concluding Remarks 
The history of the organization of the articulated the Alevi interests in Germany 
resembles to the pattern of emergence of Alevi interest groups in Turkey. Similar to the 
case in Turkey, the challenges of migration and the shock of rapid urbanization were 
pivotal push factors for the emergence of the early German Alevi interest groups. 
Although the immigrants were granted certain civil and social rights, (i) the ambiguity 
of the arrangements between the labor migrants and the companies, (ii) the variation 
among the German states in dealing with immigrant issues, and (iii) the lack of 
representation of the immigrants in the German trade unions and workers’ associations 
paved the way for the estabslihment of migrant organizations. Since most of the Alevi 
immigrants in Germany were labor migrants, the early Alevi migrant organizations of 
acted both as labor organizations and solidarity groups. 
Nonetheless, until the 1970s the Alevi immigrants chose to remain invisible in the 
German public sphere. In the aftermath of the 1973 moratoriaum, in addition to the 
Alevi labor associations, the Alevi immigrants also began to establish branches of 
Turkish political parties and left-wing organizations in the cities and states they resided 
in. Starting from the 1970s the organizations of the Turkish immigrants in general and 
the Alevis in particular mirrored the existing divisions within the Turkish society. Since 
the German political opportunity structures were not inclusive of the non-German 
immigrants, most of the activies of the organizations established targeted homeland. 
                                               
414 At the time the director of AABF, Turgut Öker, was a member of ABKB and subsequently was 
summed to court hearings.   
415 European Commission, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, (2002), 17; 
European Commission, 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, (2003), 36 
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The more inclusive the complex web of legal framework, operating with various status, 
permit and residence categories became, the more influence the Alevi interest groups 
sought. 
This chapter showed the political and social transformations of the late 1980s, i.e. 
the unification of Germany, the increasing number of asylum seekers, the problem of 
the integration of the unified immigrant families, required revisions in the citizenship 
and rights regimes in Germany. Increasing hostility towards foreigners, and the 
Chancellor Kohl’s and the Christian Democrats’ tendency to exclude the immigrant 
populations from the decision-making processes pave the way for the rise of close-knit  
communities in Turkish dominant cities and districts. The attempts of the German Alevi 
community to preserve its Alevi culture and religious identity led to the emergence of a 
number of Alevi cultural associations.  
A further outcome of the increasing Alevi associational life in Germany was the 
emergence of the solidarity and advocacy networks. The networks established between 
the Turkish and German Alevi associations, activists, intellectuals and religious 
notables contributed to the framing of the Alevi identity both in Germany and in 
Turkey. The exchange of information, revenues and symbols between the domestic and 
transnational Alevi interest groups was pivotal in standardization of the Alevi demands, 
i.e. the Alevi declaration, in both realms. The networks were influencial because they 
challenged the rights and citizenship regimes in Turkey at a time when EU accession 
process was pressuring the Turkish state to comply with the regional and international 
norms on rights.  
This chapter also indicates that the AABF is not the only Alevi umbrella 
organization in Germany. However, by the end of 1990s, it was transformed into a key 
player in the Alevi struggle for rights both in Germany and in Turkey. As the 
participation of Alevi migrants into social and political processes of the German state 
increased, the networks between the Alevi community and the German political parties 
strengthened. The characteristics of the activists paved the way for inception and 
evolution of ties between the migrant and domestic political actors in the German 
context. As Massicard notes “the political parties took up Alevi issue largely because of 
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the work of intermediaries who were party officials or elected politicians of Turkish or 
Alevi origin, or else who had pro-Alevi sympathies.”416 
 Even though its position and activities were questioned and criticized by the 
Turkish authorities and right-wing/Islamic revivalist media, the AABF continues to be 
an ally for the Alevi organizations in Turkey that cannot access political decision 
making processes in the country. As the example of the inception of ABF [former 
ABKB] demonstrates, the alliances formed between the domestic and transnational 
Alevi organizations are also vital for leverage politics.
417
 The co-operation between 
these domestic and transnational actors has continued in the last two decades through: 
(a) ideational cooperation (conceptualization of Alevi identity; organization of seminars 
and workshops), (b) cultural cooperation (organization of festivals), (c) institutional 
cooperation (lobbying in the European Parliament), (d) material aids (subsidizing local 
Alevi voluntary organizations), (e) religious cooperation (religious services), and (f) 
monitoring states practices and implementation of domestic and international standards 
on rights of individuals and groups (publications of reports).
418
  
Additionally, while the corporatist tradition of the Germany pushed the German 
Alevi interest groups to become more central and hierarchical, the interest group system 
in Turkey led the Alevi interest groups to be fragmented. Since the interest groups, 
particularly non-economic interest groups, cannot directly influence policy outcomes in 
Turkey, the German Alevi interest groups provide potential alliences to pressure the 
Turkish state to comply with the rights-demands of the Alevi community.
419
 
Having introduced the transnational actors of informal Alevi interest 
representation, the focus now shifts to formal representation of Alevi interests. The 
subsequent chapter focuses on the relationship between the political parties and Alevi 
community in Turkey, and discusses how the issues/claims of the Alevi activists and 
organizations are communicated in the legislature.        
 
 
                                               
416 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 192. 
417 Avcı, and  Çarkoğlu “Taking Stock of the Dynamics that Shape EU Reforms in Turkey,” 126 
418 See Chapters 5 and 6 
419 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ALEVI INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN THE TURKISH GRAND 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: LINKAGES WITH POLITICAL PARTIES  
 
 4.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the role of political parties in the communication and 
representation of Alevi interests. It relies on both political participation literature and 
political representation literature in its analysis of the interaction of the Alevi 
community, Alevi elites, and the political parties in TBMM.     Two legacies – i.e. the 
legacy of TBP as the first Alevi party and the legacy of CHP as the hitherto ally of the 
Alevi electorate –are examined in an attempt to understand the dynamics of the 
inclusion of the Alevi interests and its   representation within the political sphere.  
The chapter discusses the implications of the minority empowerment thesis which 
claims that minority representation would encourage political participation and 
strengthen representational links. Following the analysis of the legislative activities of 
the TBP and CHP MPs, I argue that the descriptive representation of Alevis in TBMM 
is not a sufficient condition for achieving a substantive representation of Alevi minority 
interests.
 420
  The mechanisms and content of minority representation instead are highly 
dependent on   political opportunity structures and the organization of political parties.  
In consequence, uninstitutionalized party organizations, strong leadership controls on 
                                               
420 Pitkin, Concept of Representation 89; Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Do 
Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” American 
Political Science Review 4 90: 794-812; and Kenny Whitby, The Color of Representation: Congressional 
Behavior and Black Interests (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997),   132-3.  
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MPs, along with high volatility in the TBMM made substantive representation of the 
constituents’ interests in the legislature difficult.  
 
 4.2. ‘Standing for’ vs. ‘Acting for’ Groups 
Does the election of ethnic, racial and religious minority group members enhance 
the representation of their respective groups in legislative bodies? The assertion that 
shared ascriptive identity between the representative and the represented begets better 
representation of interests was once widely accepted.
421
  Membership in a particular 
group was expected to promote loyalty to the interests of the group represented.
 
422
Consequently, male representatives were assumed   inadequate in representing 
women just as were whites in representing non-whites.  Mansbridge states: 
   Representatives who are female, African American, or of Polish ancestry, 
who have a child with a disability, or who have grown up on a farm, in a 
mining community or in a working-class neighborhood, often feel not only a 
particular sensitivity to issues relating to these experiences but also a 
particular responsibility for representing the interests and perspectives of 
these groups, even when members of these groups do not constitute a large 
fraction of their constituents.
 423
 
In principle, a marginalized group representative in a legislative assembly signals “to 
both dominant and marginalized groups that its perspectives matter."
 424
 With this view, 
the actions of a representative are less important than his or her identity.  Representation 
is thought to “depend on the representative’s characteristics, on what he is or is like, on 
being something rather than doing something.” 425 
                                               
421 Eric M. Uslaner, and Ronald E. Weber, “Policy Congruence and American State Elites: Descriptive 
Representation versus Electoral Accountability”, The Journal of Politics  no. 1 (1983), 184 
422 A. Phillips Griffiths, and Richard Wollheim,  "How Can One Person Represent Another?" Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volumes (1960): 34 
423 Jane Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003), 
523. 
424 Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, and Andreas M. Wüst “Ethnic diversity, political participation and 
representation: a theoretical framework” in The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: 
Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies, eds. Bird et al, , 1-21, (New York: Routledge, 
2010),  
425 Pitkin, Concept of Representation, 61.  
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 Young similarly proposes that “having such a relation of identity or similarity 
with constituents says nothing about what the representative does."
426
 It is not important   
who the representatives are; it is much more important what they do. Additionally, such 
a conceptualization of representation promotes an essentialist understanding by not 
acknowledging cleavages within a minority group and undermining the existence of 
factions within dominant groups. Mansbridge states that “insisting that others cannot 
adequately represent the members of a descriptive group also implies that members of 
that group cannot adequately represent others.” 427  
Such an assumption also undermines the significance of political opportunity 
structures, political culture, and the characteristics of executive-legislative relations. 
Political parties may reinforce the selection of female, ethnic or religious minority 
candidates prior to elections for the purpose of mobilizing electoral support of 
respective groups. However, once elected, the activities of the MPs are constrained by   
institutional frameworks and party policies.  
Descriptive representation does not necessarily turn into substantive 
representation, if the level of institutionalization of a political system is low and 
political parties are characterized with leader dominance and patrimonial relations. Even 
though    female and minority representatives in   assemblies have symbolic value and 
can increase the communication of interests of a given group, their presence does not 
guarantee specific policy outcomes. As studies on American politics reveal, more 
descriptive representation does not necessarily generate better representation.
428
  
Research on women, blacks, and Latinos in the U.S. Congress shows the descriptive 
representation of these groups comes at the expense of their substantive representation, 
i.e. acting in the interest of the represented.  
                                               
426 Iris Marion Young, "Deferring Group Representation," in Ethnicity and Group Rights: 
NOMOSXXYIX, eds. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, 349-76, (New York: New York University Press, 
1997).  
427 Jane Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 
“Yes”,” The Journal of Politics61, no. 3 (Aug., 1999): 637. 
428 Over a study on women legislators of New Hampshire, Irene Diamond (1977) demonstrated that the 
female legislators did not see themselves as representatives of women. Similarly, Swain (1993) concurred 
the insufficiency of descriptive representation in increasing tangible black interests over her study on 
Black members of the U.S. Congress. See Irene Diamond, Sex Roles in the State House ( New Haven: 
Yale University Press,  1977), and Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of 
African Americans in Congress, ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).  
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Chapter Four uses this perspective, to understand the dynamics of formal 
representation of Alevi interests in Turkey. The chapter elaborates the nature of the 
links that the Alevi minority has established with the political parties in Turkey. To that 
end, the analysis of the legislative activities of the MPs, the speeches of the political 
elites, and the elite interviews will be used to determine the extent to which the 
domestic and international political opportunity structures and resources affect 
representation of Alevi interests in TBMM.  
 4.3. Alevi Representation in the National Assembly 
As mentioned in the previous section, the representation of marginalized groups 
(women, ethnic groups, religious minorities, etc.) have been a concern in the 
establishment of the legitimacy of the decisions of the legislative assemblies. Since the 
Federalist Papers, a significant portion of the literature expects legislative bodies to 
mirror the population from which it is drawn to acquire such legitimacy. While the 
demographic characteristics of those elected into the legislatures provide clues for the 
scope of the representation of a group, voting tendencies and party preferences of the 
target group provide insight as to who are the actors of representation in the political 
society.    
In the analysis of the representation of Alevi groups in TBMM, the determination 
of indicators proves to be challenging. In the absence of demographic information on 
Alevi community, acquiring reliable data on the voting behavior of the Alevi electorate 
is an impossible task. Due to urban-rural transformations, no province other than 
Tunceli has Alevi population as the majority. Even though certain regions and provinces 
of central and eastern Anatolia and neighborhoods in Istanbul and Ankara are known to 
be dominated by Alevis, in the absence of reliable census information, determining the 
distribution of Alevis votes is not possible.  
Additionally, acquiring information regarding the religious affiliation of the 
candidate MPs presents a further challenge. As the candidates are not required to 
declare their religious affiliation, information on the numbers of Alevi MPs by province 
cannot be obtained. Even though estimates can be drawn based on newspaper articles 
and former MPs autobiographies, the validity and reliability of the results cannot be 
guaranteed. As a further point, the election of Alevi MPs who publicly identify 
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themselves as Alevis is either from the same cities with which they have patrimonial 
ties with the electorate, or from cities which receive a higher number of seats in TBMM 
(i.e. Istanbul and Ankara).      
In the absence of reliable data on the voting behavior of the Alevi electorate, 
scholars tend to rely on anecdotal explanations and aggregate electoral statistics to 
explain the content and scope of Alevi political representation. Within this context, a 
number of narratives regarding Alevi political behavior emerged in the literature. With 
the exception of TBP in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Alevi political representation is 
mostly associated with the activities of the center-left and left parties.  The Alevi 
electorate is labeled as a devout supporter of either Kemalism or leftist ideologies; 
hence hitherto followers of CHP and the Turkish Labor Party [TİP - Türkiye İşçi 
Partisi,]. Alevi presence in cadres of other center and center-right parties, along with 
the rise of Alevi activism in the Kurdish nationalist movement, is mostly overlooked in 
discussions on Alevi political representation. Additionally, the discussion on TBP, as 
the first Alevi party, and CHP, as the hitherto ally of Alevis, does not deal with the 
specifics of the relationship between the Alevi community and the political elites. 
Questions remain unanswered as to how and by whom the Alevi claims are 
communicated in the legislatures and   what results these claims achieve. 
Following the discussion of political representation   subsequent sections focus on 
the dynamics of formal political representation of the Alevi interests in the legislative 
assemblies. To that end, the national and local election results, the content of the 
motions and legislative bills proposed by the MPs in TBMM, and the speeches of the 
political elites are used to demonstrate how the domestic and international political 
opportunity structures shape the Alevi interest representation in the political sphere. The 
chapter claims that the alliance between CHP and the Alevis is not a matter of constant 
partisanship.
429
 Alevi electoral support is (g)estimated to shift from center-left to center-
right parties and vice versa from time to time. Similarly, as Chapter 3 briefly discusses, 
there have been attempts to establish ‘Alevi’ parties, i.e., the BP of 1997. Following 
that, in order to elaborate on the dynamics of the links the Alevi minority has 
established with political parties in Turkey, the sections below focus on the two legacies 
                                               
429 Both DP in the 1950s and Motherland Party [ANAP] in the 1980s received electoral support of the 
community. See Schüler, Türkiye’de Sosyal Demokrasi, 162-71.    
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dominating the literature on Alevis, i.e. the legacy of TBP as the sole Alevi party and 
the legacy of CHP as the "only" ally of the community in the political arena.   
4.3.1. The Legacy of the TBP (1969-1980) 
 
Although the two-party system
430
  that began with the 1950 elections came to an 
end with the 1960 military coup d’état, the regime breakdown and introduction of the 
1961 Constitution paved the way for emergence of a new political system.
431
 The 1961 
Constitution not only expanded   civil liberties and granted social rights for   citizens but 
also introduced a number of checks and balances to the political system to prevent the 
emergence of another tyranny of the parliamentary majority in TBMM. Starting with 
the 1961 elections,
432
 proportional representation was introduced to convert votes to 
seats in the TBMM and inadvertently leading to fragmentation in the party system and 
introduction of coalition governments in the TBMM. In addition to political 
transformations, there have been significant changes in the composition of Turkish 
society. The Migration phenomenon that began in the 1950s had a tremendous impact 
on transforming the cleavage structures in Turkey.   New forms of interest groups with 
political objectives – i.e. student movements, workers’ associations, trade unions, 
ideology based associations, etc. – began to emerge in the urban settings following the 
transformations in the society and in politics.  
                                               
430 Political parties in Turkey have an older pedigree than does nation-state building. Starting with the 
formation of the New Ottoman Society (1865) the political life of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was 
marked with party activities. Parties played a significant role in shaping the debates and institutions of 
national politics. Yet, it was not until the 1940s and the introduction of democratic politics that the 
influence and effectiveness of the political parties increased. The infamous 1946 elections and the 
emergence of a legitimate opposition (DP) marked the beginning of the transformation of both the regime 
and party system in Turkey.  See Dankward A. Rustow, “Political Parties in Turkey: An Overview” in 
Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, eds. Metin Heper, and Jacob M. Landau, 10-23, (London & 
New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1991);;Tarık Z. Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952 
(İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952). 
431 Sabri Sayarı, “The Changing Party System” in Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey, eds. Sabri 
Sayarı, and  Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 12-13; Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish 
Dynamics, 93-97   
432 Even though the Constitution did not specify the type of electoral system (Article 55), through Basic 
Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers [Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen Kütükleri Hakkında 
Kanun] (April 26, 1961) proportional representation mechanisms were specified. Original document 
retrieved from http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/SecmenKaydi/298.htm    
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While CHP and Justice Party [AP - Adalet Partisi]
433
 became the two leading 
parties in the parliament, the party system and the political debates in the 1960s were 
altered by the newly emerging parties. The changes in the electoral system before the 
1965 elections [i.e. milli bakiye systemi]
434
 allowed smaller parties such as TİP to 
successfully convert votes to seats in TBMM. The newcomers
435
 were vital to the 
functioning of the system as they held coalition-bargaining and blackmail potentials.
436
  
Additionally, the 1960s and the 1970s were marked with the rising power of 
religious collective action. While AP gradually established bonds with the Nurcu 
movement and system-oriented Islamists in the 1960s, Erbakan’s Islamic revivalist 
National Viewpoint [Milli Görüş] organizations challenged the political system and 
tried to incorporate traditional (Sunni) religious values, norms, and practices to   
political institutions.
437
 The two political parties, the National Order Party [MNP – Milli 
Nizam Partisi] founded by Erbakan [and Mehmet Zahid Kotku
438
] and its heir, the 
National Salvation Party [MSP – Milli Selamet Partisi] emphasized the need for revival 
of an authentic identity through the reconstruction of Ottoman morality and mobilized 
                                               
433 The former DP’s votes from the periphery were split between two parties, AP (34.8 per centper cent) 
and YTP (13.7 per cent in the 1961 elections. Yet, by 1965 AP declared itself as the sole heir of DP and 
won decisive electoral victories in 1965 and 1969 elections. See Avner Levi, “The Justice Party, 1961-
1980,” in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, eds.  Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, (London 
and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 136-40; Sayarı, “The Changing Party System,”13-4; Kalaycıoğlu, 
Turkish Dynamics, 95-6.  
434 The Milli bakiye system refers to the distribution of the remaining votes after the application of 
d’Hondt formula among   political parties in terms of their share of the pooled surplus votes.  
435 As the electoral laws were amended before the 1965 elections and the pool of the national remainder 
[milli bakiye] was established, a number of smaller parties could access to the National Assembly. 
Among those, the leftist Turkish Workers Party (TİP), the extreme right-winged Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP), Alevi oriented Turkish Unity Party (TBP), Islamist-based National Order Party (MNP)  and its 
successor the National Salvation Party (MSP)  all became   representatives of the expanding ideological 
and political spectrum.      
436 Coalition-bargaining potential and blackmail potential are applied throughout the work in line with 
Sartori’s conceptualization. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, 
(Essex: ECPR Press, 2005) 107-9.   
437 Haldun Gülalp, “Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s Welfare Party”, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies33 (2001): 433-48. Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of 
Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, Third World Quarterly18, 
no. 4 (1997):743-66. 
438 Mehmet Zahid Kotku was the Sheikh of the Nakşibendi order; his objective was the restoration of 
morality and virtue. He became the leader of the group that was known as İskenderpaşa cemaati after he 
was appointed to the İskenderpaşa Mosque as an imam in 1958. 
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the periphery. Parallel to the organization of articulated Islamic revivalist interests in the 
form of political parties, the Alevi community also founded a political party.
439
  
Overall, the interaction between the political parties of the early 1960s, coupled 
with the socio-economic transformation of both the Alevi elites and the community, 
paved the way for the emergence of an Alevi-based party in 1966. The emergence of an 
Alevi elite movement dedicated to organize the Alevi communal interests in the form of 
a party can be attributed to the following:       
i.    institutional opportunities, the 1961 Constitution, and the changes in 
the electoral system enabling the emergence of a fragmented and later 
ideologically polarized party system, 
ii. institutional arrangements that enable more effective involvement by 
political opposition parties and deputies   in legislative activities, such as 
framing questions and motions of interpellations, ,   
iii. the 1961-1963 debates on the proposed bills on the organization and the 
budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs [DİB] in the TBMM and 
the media,   
iv. the perceived failure of the Alevi deputies and the existing parties to 
communicate the problems and demands of the community 
v. the role of rising student movements paying special emphasis on  issues 
regarding Alevis in Turkey. 
 
4.3.1.1 Formative years of TBP 
During the early formative periods, the party established bonds with the Alevi 
dedes.
440
 The religious charismatic power of the Ulusoy family particularly contributed 
to the growth of the organizational capacity of the party. By 1967, TBP had begun to 
establish local party organizations in Istanbul, Ankara, Sivas, Erzincan, Tunceli, Maras, 
                                               
439 However, rather than challenging the control of religion by the state and seeking recognition of their 
difference, TBP called for strengthening secularization principles and equal treatment of citizenship under 
the law.      
440 Similar to the role played by Sunni religious leaders, dedes can mobilize the electorate and determine 
whether a candidate can gain a seat in TBMM. For instance, the Doğan family (the leaders of the Balıyan 
tribal confederation, and dedes near Malatya) and Ulusoy family (Çelebi family of Hacıbektaş) played a 
significant role in electoral mobilization in the 1950s. See Nedim Şahhüseyinoğlu, Anadolu Kültür 
Mozaiğinden bir kesit: Balıyan (Ankara: Ürün Yayınları, 1996), 190; Kelime Ata, Alevilerin ilksiyasal 
denemesi, 43-4.   
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Mersin, İskenderun, Çorum, and Yozgat. However, the founding elites could not control   
factions within the organization. The inexperienced leader Berkman and Secretary 
Özbey were soon challenged and replaced by the former deputy of Nation Party [MP - 
Millet Partisi], Hüseyin Balan, who during the Ortaca events of 1966441 and in the 
Elbistan events
442
 in 1967,
443
 was the only active deputy to challenge  AP policies.  
The Berkman-Balan leadership struggle led the Ulusoy family to withdraw its 
support from TBP and created a vacuum, threatening the survival of the party 
organization. Furthermore, TBP under the leadership of Balan was marked with a series 
of conflicts. While some of the conflicts were limited to individual vendettas (i.e. the 
lawsuit filed by former secretary Özbey), others were based on the dissatisfaction of the 
factions adopting leftist ideologies with right-wing rhetoric and policies of leadership.
444
   
In addition to the problem of fractions within the party, there was also a question 
of identity. Due to the institutional constraints preventing the establishment of 
denominational parties and the concern of some of the founders, TBP communicated its 
Alevi identity through symbols. The articles of the party program concerning religious 
freedom, the party flag, posters and slogans indicate that the party has a strong Alevi 
sentiment. The party flag which had the figure of a lion (symbolizing Ali) at the center 
surrounded by 12 stars (symbolizing 12 imams) became the most visible marker of the 
Alevi character of the new party.
445
 By the end of 1960s, TBP was labeled as a sectarian 
(Alevi) party by the press.
446
 Yet, the Party was hesitant to declare itself as an Alevi 
party. Party cadres refused identification of TBP as a denominational party. Instead, 
TBP was presented as a party including Alevis rather than a party of Alevis.
447
   
                                               
441 Huseyin Balan’s speeches regarding the events taking place in Ortanca (1966). See, Millet Meclisi 
Tutanak Dergisi 7, session 98, (June 17, 1966) 94-7; and session 99, (June 20, 1966) 139.  
442 It refers to the clashes between the Alevis and Sunnis triggered by a cultural event organized by Ehli 
Beyt journal editor Doğan Kılıç in Elbistan in 11 June 1967.    
443 Proposal for establishment of a commission to investigate the events took place in Elbistan (No. 10/19) 
Speeches regarding the issue in  Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 22, session 16, 471-76 
444 Ata, Alevilerin ilk Siyasal Denemesi,122  
445 Ibid,  67 
446 Akis, no. 669 (April 15, 1967); Cem no.  8 (December, 1966);  
447 In an interview Berkman stated; “This party is not an Alevi party. Our door is open to Sunnis, Alevis, 
and Christians. As a Union Party we do not discriminate people. Unfortunately the press released the first 
news about the party under the Alevi party. This is not true. And it’s our greatest affliction” See CEM, 
no. 10, (January, 1967), 17.  
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This tendency to reject a sectarian label continued with Mustafa Timisi.
448
 Parallel 
to Bekman’s and Balan’s views, in an interview in 1969 Timisi stated: 
   It disturbs me greatly that our party is known as an Alevi Party…The ones 
who voted for BP are indeed Alevis. However, it is not a sufficient indicator 
of electoral support for a sectarian party…The public should know that BP 
is not an Alevi Party. BP is the party of the people, and the two major 
parties (AP, CHP) that held the destiny of Turkey in their hands are 
responsible for this misrepresentation. BP is the true party of Ataturkism. It 
is a political organization rooted in the principles of Atatürk...449  
 
Under the leadership of Timisi, the TBP did not formulate specific policy objectives 
targeting the needs of the Alevi community of the time.
450
 The demands for non-
discrimination and equal treatment were incorporated into the leftist lexicon of the party 
program.  
 
4.3.1.2 1969 Elections and its aftermath 
The 1969 elections were a turning point for TBP as for the first time an Alevi 
based party entered TBMM. The party received 2.8per cent of the total votes (See Table 
4.1) and won 8 seats.
451
 The results were seen as both a success and a failure. It was a 
disappointment for the opposing parties since they did not expect TBP to get significant 
votes or any number of seats. The analysis of the village and sub-province level election 
results indicate that the Alevi votes were distributed among CHP, TBP and independent 
candidates in the five cities with a significant number of Alevi population (i.e. Sivas, 
Tokat, Çorum, Kahramanmaraş, and Malatya).  
 
 
 
 
                                               
448 However, a comparison of press releases by Mustafa Timisi from the 1969 and 1977 period and from 
the last decade indicates a discrepancy in the way in which the BP was represented. In the later interviews 
Timisi recognized the party formation as a party of the Alevi movement emerging in the 1960s.   
449 “Adı: Mustafa Timisi İşi: BP Genel Başkanı” Milliyet, November 26, 1969, 1 & 11. 
450 Birlik Partisi Program ve Tüzügü Istanbul. 1967.4-5.   
451 The 8 seats of the BP were held by Kazım Ulusoy (Amasya), Yusuf Ulusoy (Tokat), Ali Naki Ulusoy 
(Çorum), Haydar Özdemir (İstanbul), Sami İlhan (Malatya), Hüseyin Balan (Ankara), and finally Mustafa 
Timisi and Hüseyin Çınar (Sivas). The party got no seats from Tunceli where Kurdish Alevis are 
dominant.  
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Table 4.1 The 1969 national election results in Turkey 
Parties 
Total votes 
(per cent) 
Number of seats 
in the National Assembly 
AP 46.5 256 
GP 6.6 15 
CHP 27.4 143 
MP 3.2 6 
MHP 3.0 1 
TBP* 2.8 8 
TİP 2.7 2 
YTP 2.2 6 
Independents 5.6 13 
 
Notes:  
* At the time, the name of the party was the Union Party [Birlik Partisi] 
Source: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DIE), Millet Vekili Seçim Sonuçları, 12 
Ekim 1969, (Ankara: DİE, 1970). 
 
On the other hand, results were disappointing for the party elite due to their higher 
vote expectancy.
452
 Despite the resources of the Ulusoy family, TBP could not mobilize 
Alevi votes in all of Turkey. For instance, in Tunceli, TBP did not show much   
electoral power with the exception of the district of Pülümür.453 Even though the tribes 
did not always automatically rally behind their patron families, in the case of Tunceli, 
the tribal conflicts were decisive in shaping the electoral outcome. While the Kureyşan 
offered their votes en bloc to AP during the 1969 elections, the Hiran tribe rallied 
behind CHP. As different tribes support different parties, the Alevi votes were 
inevitably divided.
454
 The limited electoral ‘success’ of the TBP in Tunceli (and in other 
parts of Turkey) was dependent on a number of factors: (i) absence of an 
institutionalized party organization, (ii) overdependence on personal networks and 
                                               
452 Bozkurt, Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinde Alevilik 83. 
453 In Sivas BP got 46.6per cent of the vote in Divriği and 32.6per cent of the vote in İmranlı. Similarly, in 
Tokat, Almus (42.5 per cent) and Çorum Alaca (32per cent) TBP emerge as the first party, whereas in 
Çorum, Mecitözü (32per cent) and Tunceli Pülümür (24.7per cent) came second.   
454 Ayşe Kudat, “Patron-client Relations: the State of the art and Research in Eastern Turkey,” in Engin 
D. Akarlı and G. Ben Dor (eds.) Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Backgrounds and Present 
Problems, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Ünivertesi, 1975), 81 & 84-5. 
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mobilizing capacity of the candidates (or Alevi dedes in the provinces),
455
 and (iii) the 
alienation of the Kurdish Alevi electorate as a result of TBP elites’ emphasis on the 
Turkish-Alevi synthesis in conceptualization of the party identity.  
What is more, in November 1969 Mustafa Timisi became the new leader of BP. 
During the Timisi period, the limited electoral success did not transform itself into an 
active and skilled opposition akin to TİP. In the third term of the National Assembly 
(22.10.1969-25.07.1973), none of the BP deputies had taken the role of effective and 
continued opposition communicating Alevi communal interests in the assembly.. 
Instead, they either followed case-works or put emphasis on broader issues, i.e. 
economy, in their legislative activities. Among the eight BP deputies, Amasya 
representative Kazım Ulusoy456 proved to be a true "gentleman of the periphery"457 for 
providing case work, ranging from infrastructure problems of the villages to personal 
inquiries, for a number of constituents.  
Debates on Alevis and Alevism and sectarian relations that dominated the floor 
debates a term earlier were also missing in the activities of MPs in TBMM.
458
 While the 
budget meetings regarding DİB continued to lead lengthy debates and speeches on the 
value of religion and DİB as an institution, the issue of sectarianism was absent from 
the agenda. Deputies from the opposition no longer framed questions about the 
protection of Alevi rights or discrimination of the community. In other words, echoing 
the identity claims of the party, BP did not act as an Alevi-based party in TBMM.  
Lack of institutionalization continued to be a problem for TBP in the 1970s. The 
party had neither solved its internal problems nor was able to establish and activate 
local branches throughout the country. The problems with fractions reached to a 
                                               
455 As the party failed to get organized in at least 15 provinces, BP had to forfeit the 1968 senate elections 
and compete only in local municipal elections of cities with an Alevi majority. The biggest achievement 
for BP during 1968 elections was the 20.7per cent vote in the municipal elections of Amasya, where BP 
emerged as the third party behind CHP (24.45per cent).    
456 An analysis of the speeches of and motions proposed by Ulusoy indicate that in his three terms as an 
MP (i.e. 1965 MP representative, 1969 BP representative and 1991 SHP representative of Amasya), he 
remains to be a "gentleman of the periphery" who do continuous case work arising from his connections 
in Amasya.  
457 I employ the term as it was used in Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, ”The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A 
brief Inquiry into the Politics of Representation in Turkey,” in Turkey: Political, Social and Economic 
Challenges in the 1990s, ed. Çiğdem Balım et al., 42–60, (Leiden, New York, Köln: E. J. Brill, 1995)  
458 With the exception of the motions of Alevi deputies of CHP and AP proposing to put the widow of 
Aşık Veysel on a salary, i.e. Proposals No. 2/852 & 2/853.  
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breaking point when five MPs of TBP
459
 gave vote of confidence for the AP 
government in March 15, 1970
460
, contrary to the decision of the party group. Since 
MPs are hardly free agents in Turkish politics, the five was declared traitors and 
excluded from the party organization. Yet, support for AP was not only presented as an 
indicator of political disloyalty but also as a form of treason to the Alevi community. 
The party cadres ostracized these five MPs from the community
461
 and declared all of 
them as outcasts/fallen [düşkün]. However, as three members of the Ulusoy family who 
held significant charismatic power over the Alevi community for being one of the oldest 
dede/baba lineages were among the outcasts, TBP suffered a tremendous decline in 
resources and support. Since the party was highly dependent on patrimonial networks of 
Ulusoy family, the result of the interparty conflict was drastic in the long run.  
Timisi tried to transform the perception of TBP from an Alevi party to a more 
inclusive, leftist party in the aftermath of the 1971 military intervention. Timisi changed 
the name of the party from Unity Party to Turkish Unity Party in November 27, 1971 
during the third party congress, and began to present the party as a follower of 
principles of Ataturkism and defender of social justice and economic equality, echoing 
both CHP and TİP of the time. Within this period, migrants residing in Germany462 
along with unions and worker movements in the domestic arena tried to provide new 
material sources and personnel for the party. However, the weak organization of TBP 
led to poor performances in the 1973 and 1977 elections. Additionally,   institutional 
opportunity structures were not favorable for smaller parties. The party could only win 
one seat in 1973 from Sivas and remained insignificant in the 1977 elections, and finally 
was shut down after the coup d’état of 1980. 
Despite TBP’s low level of institutional organization, inter-party conflicts, limited 
electoral power and irreligious identity, the Party remained to be the first and only 
example of the organization of the articulated interests and resources of the Alevi 
community in the form of a political party. Even though the party elites were 
                                               
459 Yusuf Ulusoy, Kazım Ulusoy, Ali Naki Ulusoy, Hüseyin Balan and Hüseyin Çınar 
460 Cemal Şener, and Miyase İlknur, Kırklar Meclisi’nden Günümüze Alevi Örgütlenmesi: Şeriat ve 
Alevilik (Istanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1995) 70. 
461 According to Alevi faith, the intra-communal conflicts are mediated by dedes. As religious leaders of 
the community, they have the power to outcast/ex-communicate individuals found guilty of misdeeds for 
a certain period of time. Ex-communication [Düşkünlük] is considered as the ultimate form of punishment 
and evokes great fear in the village settings as no one is allowed to interact with the outcast in any form.    
462 See the discussions on TALEB and YBF in Chapter 3 
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unsuccessful at mobilizing the entirety of the Alevi community and establishing a stable 
party organization, their failure strengthened the spread and expansion of the Alevi 
associational life that began in the late 1980s. Additionally, the TBP case indicates that 
even though the descriptive representation of the Alevi community somewhat increased 
in the TBMM in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this increase did not pave the way for 
substantive representation. During the period they were in the legislature, the Party did 
not challenge the government on issues specifically related to the Alevi community or 
communal interests.       
4.3.2 The Legacy of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) (1923-onwards)  
The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is the oldest political party in the history of 
modern Turkey. Founded in 1923 by Atatürk, the founder of Turkish Republic, and later 
led by such prominent political personalities as Ismet Inönü, the party became the main 
political mechanism of the newly emerging republic. In transition to multi-party 
politics, CHP acted as “a model for organization and a school for the training of 
Turkey’s future politicians.”463  Since all kinds of opposition to the dominant coalitions 
and the leadership were particularly discouraged, the leaders of the fractions within the 
Party eventually left to form their own parties. CHP has always been an important 
political actor in shaping the debates, issues and organizations in Turkish politics.
464
  
Yet, ideological and structural change of the party that started in the 1960s led to 
significant electoral victories in 1970s and reconstructed the party image. The ‘Left of 
the Center’ perspective of the CHP emphasized humanitarianism, social security, value 
of labor, land reform and a nationalist outlook on foreign policy.
465
 This transformation 
and attempts to become a mass party paid off during the 1973 and 1977 elections, CHP 
got plurality of the votes; hence, the biggest number of seats in TBMM.    
                                               
463 Kemal Karpat “The Republican People’s Party 1923-1945” in Political Parties and Democracy in 
Turkey, eds. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (New York: LB. Tauris, 1991), 53. 
464 Ayşe Güneş Ayata, CHP: Örgüt ve İdeoloji (Ankara Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992); ; Frank Tachau, “An 
Overview of Electoral Behavior: Toward Protest or Consolidation of Democracy?” in Politics, Parties 
and Elections, eds. Sayarı and Esmer, 33-54. 
465 Ayşe Güneş Ayata, “Ideology, Social Bases and Organizational Structure in the Post 1980 Political 
Parties” in Political and Socio-economic Transformation of Turkey Since 1980, eds. Atila Eralp, 
Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Yeşilada 31-50 (Westport: Preager Publishers, 1983),; Hikmet Bila, CHP 
1919-1999, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1999).   
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The changes in the institutional framework with the 1980 coup affected the way in 
which CHP was organized and acted in the political sphere. The 1980 coup and the 
1982 Constitution that followed aimed to (re)establish stability while holding a 
democratic façade. The new institutional design was suspicious of both the political 
elites and the civilian bureaucrats, and curbed down the Dahlian “procedural minimal” 
conditions.
466
 The attitude of the new regime towards participation was selective.  
While voting in elections was promoted by the new regime, other forms of participation 
were discouraged or limited.  For the sake of stability, political parties of the ancient 
régime were closed down, trade unions were weakened, freedom of association and 
expression was severely restricted, and the links between the political and civil society 
organizations were cut off.
467
 
In 1982, CHP and other major political parties (AP, MHP, MSP, etc.) were 
banned. As both the parties and the leaders of the old order were banned by the new 
regime, their proponents reorganized under different names with different leaders. 
Indeed, the banned parties of the old order could not reestablish themselves until the 
amendments of 1995. With the initiative from the former CHP cadres in 1983, the 
Social Democrat Party [SODEP - Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi] was founded by Erdal 
İnönü (the son of İsmet Inönü). However, the party did not qualify for the 1983 
elections, and most of its members were vetoed by the National Security Council [MGK 
- Milli Güvenlik Kurulu], including İnönü. In 1983 only three parties were permitted to 
enter the elections: the Populist Party [Halkçı Parti], the National Democracy Party 
[MDP – Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi], and Motherland Party [ANAP - Anavatan 
Partisi]. In the absence of a clear successor, most former CHP votes were channelized 
to HP in the 1983 elections. 
After the 1983 elections, MGK lost its veto power. Subsequently, SODEP quickly 
qualified to run in the local elections of 1984. In the local elections of 1984, İnönü’s 
SODEP received 23.4 per cent of the votes. After SODEP established itself as the heir 
of CHP, to avoid dividing votes, HP merged with SODEP in 1985 and established the 
                                               
466 That is “(1) the freedom to form and join organizations, (2) free and fair elections, (3) eligibility for 
public office, (4) the right of political leaders/elites to compete for votes and/or support, (5) right to vote, 
(6) freedom of expression, (7) availability of alternative sources of information, and (8) existence of 
institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference”. See 
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1971), 3.  
467 Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics 57-9; Sayarı, “The Changing Party System”, 15-8 
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Social Democrat People’s Party [SHP - Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Party]. Due to the ban 
on parties of the old era, CHP elites had to work under the newly formed SHP.  In the 
1987 elections, SHP came in second with 24.8per cent of the votes and received 99 
seats in the parliament. The success of the party continued in local elections of 1989 as 
SHP got 33per cent of the votes. However, despite the electoral achievements of the 
new SHP, intra-party leadership struggles between Erdal İnönü, the SHP's president, 
and Deniz Baykal, who had served in pre-1980 governments, challenged stability within 
the party.
468
 Baykal and 21 followers left to re-establish CHP, after the ban on party 
names was retrieved on September 9, 1992. While the left vs. right dichotomy in the 
ideological spectrum was vital in transformation of CHP in the 1970s, the Islamist vs. 
secular dichotomy was crucial in redefinition of the role and identity of the ‘new’ CHP 
in Turkish politics. With the rise of political Islam, CHP was transformed into a 
defender of secularism in the 1990s.      
4.3.2.1 Question of electoral support and the enigma of the Alevi vote 
 
Both in the literature and the popular media, the support of the Alevi community 
is recognized as a significant resource for the CHP electoral success. CHP as the 
founder of the Republic, defender of secularism and the mother of multipart-politics is 
considered as a natural ally for the Alevi community. However, there is no empirical 
evidence indicating that CHP ever had a monopoly on the mobilization of the Alevi 
votes or on the number of Alevi representatives in the TBMM.  
Starting with the multi-party politics of the 1950s, depending on their economic 
preferences or ideological self-placement, the vote of the Alevi electorate is shared by a 
number of parties. While it is not possible to determine the magnitude and change of the 
Alevi electoral support, due to problems of sampling and measurements, one may still 
challenge the partisan support hypothesis based on the geographic distribution of the 
votes (Table 4.2).  
Among the provinces with a high Alevi density, Tunceli province returned a 58.7 
per cent vote for the DP in the 1950 elections. Although the vote distribution between 
DP and CHP gradually declined, it was not until 1973 election that CHP received 70per 
cent of the votes. The only address that created challenge for CHP in the province was 
                                               
468 İlter Turan, “Old Soldiers Never Die: The Republican People's Party of Turkey”, South European 
Society and Politics11, no. 3-4, (2006): 559-78 
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the Malazgirt district, where CHP received 54.4per cent of the votes and the 
independent candidates got 34.8per cent.
469
 
The role of ethnicity in shaping the preferences of the Alevi electorate has been 
weak.
470
 The analysis of the 1995 election results in the Tunceli province indicate that at 
village level, the majority of the votes were distributed among HADEP, CHP, and the 
independents. Although HADEP received some of the Alevi votes from the villages 
with the exception of Pülümür district, CHP continued to be a significant party in the 
region.  
 
Table 4.2   The number of seats won by the two major parties in the predominantly 
Alevi electoral districts in the National Assembly, 1950-1957 
Provinces 1950 1954 1957 
 CHP DP CHP DP CHP DP 
Amasya 0 4 0 5 0 6 
Çorum 0 8 0 9 0 10 
Elazığ 0 5 0 5 6 0 
Erzincan 5 0 1 4 6 0 
Malatya 11 0 12 0 9 0 
Maraş 0 7 0 7 9 0 
Sivas 0 12 0 14 15 0 
Tokat 1 8 0 9 10 0 
Tunceli 0 2 2 1 3 0 
 
Source: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DIE), 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 
1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu üye seçim sonuçları (Ankara: DİE, 1966) 
 
Contrary to claims in the literature that associated the CHP’s poor electorate 
performance   in 1999 elections to declined Alevi support, the analysis of the village 
data from Sivas Alevi villages does not indicate a statistically significant shift to 
Democratic Left Party [DSP - Demokratik Sol Parti].
471
 A significant increase in DSP 
                                               
469 T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DIE), Millet Vekili Seçim Sonuçları, 14 Ekim 1973, 
(Ankara DİE Yayınları, 1974).   
470 Güneş-Ayata, and Ayata, “Ethnic and Religious bases of voting,” 146 
471 Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, . The Republican People's Party. Turkish Studies 3 , no. 1 (2002): 105-110. 
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votes in Alevi populated villages of Sivas would be expected if SHP/CHP’s failure to 
“provide security to the fundamentalist threat” in the aftermath of the 1993 Sivas 
events
472
were to be a factor. The samples drawn out of 465 Alevi villages in Sivas do 
not provide enough evidence to support the claim that the CHP lost electoral support 
whereas the DSP gained support.   
While one explanation can be that a sampling bias of the research exists, the other 
can be attributed to the different concerns and preferences of the Alevi villagers. Yet, 
because research relies on aggregate data, it cannot explain   why such a trend does not 
exist. The problems related with data collection and interpretation on the issue of Alevi 
electoral participation shifts the focus of the research to the issues of representation in 
TBMM and the civil society to understand the dynamics of the Alevi – CHP bond. 
While the latter issue has been elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, subsequent sections will 
focus on   communication of Alevi interests in the legislative assembly.    
4.3.3. Problem of Representation in the TBMM 
 
The electoral districts are not single-member constituencies in the Turkish 
political system. The institutional design expects the MPs to be mandates rather than 
delegates. Article 80 of the 1982 Constitution says the “members of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly represent, not merely their own constituencies or constituents, but 
the Nation as a whole.”473 Parliamentary seats are filled according to the Electoral Act 
No. 2839, Article 4, which does not involve special quotas for women or ethnic and 
religious minorities. Additionally, within the non-insitutionalized political parties and 
the party system, candidate selection is not a transparent process. The party names tend 
to carry more weight than do the names of the candidates and independent candidates 
are generally   elected if they have strong patrimonial ties that can mobilize masses.
474
 
 Yet, once elected, a Member of Parliament is a vital tool for groups to 
communicate their views and demands to the government. Even though individuals or 
groups can submit petitions and letters, they are replied to by civil servants. Despite the 
                                               
472 Ibid, 107. 
473 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey as amended on October 17, 2001, available at: 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC
_OF_TURKEY.pdf  
474 Kalaycıoğlu, “The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A brief Inquiry into the Politics of 
Representation in Turkey,” 45. 
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limited capacity to affect policies, the deputies enjoy a formal status denied to 
individuals and groups. Through speeches on the floor, framing questions, sponsored 
bills or parliamentary inquiry requests, the MPs can draw publicity for an issue or 
acquire formal responses from the members of the Cabinet.
475
 
As far as representation of the Alevi community is concerned, all political parties 
had some level of descriptive representation of the Alevi community either in   
Parliament or at the organization level. As the exact number of Alevi representatives 
cannot be determined (since not all Alevi deputies reveal their identity), it is not 
possible to claim that CHP has a monopoly on Alevi representation. In the 1950s, DP 
had deputies with Alevi origin, such as Sivas representative Ercüment Damalı and 
former CHP representative of Malatya Hüseyin Doğan. Similarly, in the National 
Assembly of the 1960s AP, YTP and MP had Alevi MPs. Indeed former DP and AP 
Çorum representative İhsan Tombuş claimed in the early 1960s that these [right-wing] 
Alevi deputies who did not associate them with the policy claims and ideology of CHP 
and TIP constituted the base of the BP.
476
 The 1991 elections also turned into a 
contestation for Alevi votes among political parties and right-wing, system oriented 
Alevi elites found their way into the party organizations of Motherland Party 
[ANAP].
477
, the Welfare party is Similarly known to represent the interests of political 
Islam court Alevi notables in an attempt to receive votes from the revivalist  Alevi 
community in both 1991 and 1995 elections.  
During the fieldwork with the CHP activists in Ankara, many of the CHP 
members noted that the Alevis “came to CHP” since the other parties and government 
institutions were/are exclusive towards the community. In an interview, an (non-Alevi) 
official stated that: 
   right now the only place the Alevis can find employment are the 
municipalities of CHP. There is no single Alevi governor [vali]; there is no 
single deputy governor; no single undersecretary…they are not in 
government[al posts] except the staff in minor departments…In Ankara 
                                               
475 İrfan Neziroğlu, Habip Kocaman, and Semra Gökçimen, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Yasama El 
Kitabı, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2011)   
476 İhsan Tombuş, Politikada 41 Yıl (1946-1987), (Ankara: İzgi Yayınları, 1997), 166. 
477 Ali Doğdaş (dede) from the Ehli-Beyt association and founder of New Path Party[Yeni Düzen Partisi, 
1983] and former True Path Party (DYP) member Vahap Esendağ joined to ANAP in 1991 with a public 
ceremony. See “250 Alevi ANAP’ta” Milliyet, October 30, 1991. 
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other than Çankaya and Yenimahalle municipalities they do not have a 
chance to be employed.
478
    
The  subsequent sections focuses on the 2002-2012 period, and tries to elaborate the 
mechanisms and scope of Alevi interest representation in the TBMM parallel to the 
influence of Alevi identity politics of the last decade.  
4.3.3.1 Political context 
The level and scope of representation of the Alevi minority in the legislature is not 
independent of the changes in the party system and the elite culture dominating the 
relationship between the deputies and the party. The 2002 elections marginalized the 
major players in the party system of the period between 1991 and 2002 and paved the 
way for a new player, i.e. AKP, to take over the government. The 2002 elections 
generated a new parliament controlled by the absolute majority of AKP. The 
proportional representation system with 10per cent national quota enabled this 
newcomer to capture 66 per cent of the seats (363 seats out of 550); after winning 34.2 
per cent of the vote, the party captured 66per cent of the seats.   
In the post-2002 elections, CHP was the only other party that could receive 
parliamentary seats. Within this new two-party parliamentary system CHP became the 
principal rival of the governing AKP in the parliamentary arena.
479
 However, as AKP 
controlled more than the two-thirds of the seats, the legislative activities were marked 
with the power asymmetry between the government and the opposition. CHP, which 
won only 178 seats in the National Assembly had little effect on policy formation of the 
government. CHP was already labeled as a party of elite struggles and continuous party 
congresses, and it was further undermined and marginalized due to the increased 
factionalism and opposition to party leadership in the aftermath of 2002 elections.
480
   
Among the 363 MPs of AKP, there were no Alevi MPs and during this period the 
government had little attempts to engage with the representatives of Alevi associations 
                                               
478 Interview, Ankara CHP headquarters, November 8, 2012.  
479 Sabri Sayarı, “Towards a New Turkish Party System,” Turkish Studies 8, no. 2, (2007), 197-210; Ali 
Çarkoğlu, “The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: the Justice and Development Party 
Phenomenon in November 2002 Elections in Turkey,” South European Society and Politics 7, no3 
(2002): 123-56. 
480 Güneş-Ayata, “The Republican People’s Party,”115 
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and Alevi civil society institutions.
481
 CHP deputies offered the only mechanisms to 
communicate the issues and concerns of the community. Yet, the legislative design and 
the internal conflict within CHP undermined the role of the party in Alevi interest 
representation.     
The July 2007 elections reinforced the dominant position of AKP in TBMM. The 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) captured 347 of the 550 seats, and the power 
asymmetry continued in legislative relations. Even though in the aftermath of the 2007 
elections MHP, DSP, and DTP gradually got seats, the Alevi interest representation 
within the opposition was continued to be performed mainly by the deputies of CHP. 
However, the governing AKP also had taken a number of steps, which were popularly 
coined as “the Alevi opening”, to address the issues and concerns governing the Alevi 
identity movement that began in late 1980s. Through workshops and symbolic gestures 
by the Prime Minister and the cabinet, AKP became more inclusive towards the Alevi 
community.  
4.3.3.2 The mediums of communication of Alevi interests in the legislature  
 
Access to the legislative chamber floor for speeches tends to be controlled and 
restricted in TBMM, with the exception of the budget meeting discussion in December 
of each year; political parties strictly control access to the floor. Since the minutes are 
limited (hence very valuable), issues related to Alevi claims in most cases cannot get 
enough floor time as they are overshadowed by economic problems, foreign policy, and 
security issues. Therefore, communication of any issue to the other members of TBMM 
poses a challenge for the individual MPs, particularly if the content of their speech is 
not approved by the party elites.    
Within this context, parliamentary questions became the most popular tools 
employed by MPs in TBMM as the content and the frequency of the questions are not 
restricted by the parties.
482
 As Hazama, Gençkaya, and Gençkaya note, “Parliamentary 
questioning is a signal to both the government and extraparliamentary audiences to 
obtain or to give information on particular topics or to force a policy statement to be 
                                               
481 Chapter 5 will provide a detailed account on the topic. 
482 The Article 96/1 of the Rules of Procedure of the TBMM defines a question as ‘a way of requesting 
information from the PM or ministers on certain matters excluding personal and private life without a 
reason of statement and personal opinion’.  
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made.”483 In principle, they are a mechanism at the disposal of MPs for holding the 
executive branch accountable, while strengthening their relations with their constituents. 
The questions addressed to Ministers and the Prime Minister, become the quickest 
means of eliciting information about matters within their official responsibility. 
Through oral
484
 and written
485
 questions, MPs can lay blame upon the government for 
policy failures or seek substantive answers to the problems of their constituents. The 
questions (and the answers to those questions) can also lay the foundations for drafting 
member sponsored bills. However, since the probability of an opposition party bill to 
pass is very low, “a question is the only significant weapon in the hands of an individual 
MP during his or her parliamentary life. Thus, when MPs fail to initiate policy and 
influence the content of legislation, they attempt to control ‘the government’s general 
conduct on affairs’ [through submitting questions]. ”486  
An overview of the total number of oral and written questions submitted to 
TBMM indicates that there has been a significant increase over the years parallel to the 
increase in overall activities of the MPs. While the total number of oral and written 
questions was 3,313 in the 17
th
 legislative period (1983–87), they were 3,457 in the 18th 
period (1987–91). The numbers continued to increase in each subsequent term reaching 
9,374 in the 19
th
 (1991-1995), 8,211 in the 20
th 
(1996-1999), and 10,220 in the 21
st
 
(1999-2002) periods.
487
 Paradoxically, the Alevi activists in general do not give much 
credit to parliamentary questions as they have no impact on the transformation of the 
government policies.
488
 During the interview period, a former consultant to CHP’s MP 
concurred with this perception of Alevi activists. He stated that even though   question 
framing is popular among MPs, the activity has no real “value” since unlike a bill; 
question framing has no tangible impact.     
                                               
483 Yasushi Hazama, Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, and Selma Gençkaya, “Parliamentary Questions in Turkey,” 
The Journal of Legislative Studies 13, no.4, (December 2007): 539. 
484 Oral questions, which must usually contain fewer than 100 words, are put on the agenda after five days 
following the referral date to the relevant ministry. 
485 According to Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure written questions must contain fewer than 500 
words and answered within 15 days (previously 20 days) following their referral to the relevant ministry. 
Then the answers are sent to the relevant MP, and the answer is published as an annex to the Minutes of 
the TBMM. 
486 Hazama et al, “Parliamentary Questions in Turkey,” 544. Emphasis added.  
487 Ibid. 
488 During the fieldwork period some activists stated that the MPs sent a copy of their question (and if 
received the answers) to organizations. Yet, most activists considered them as unnecessary/ineffective as 
neither the questions nor the answers given can provide policy solutions. 
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In addition to question framing, the MPs speeches   on the floor are vital mediums 
to draw the TBMM members' attention to the issues, needs, demands, or values of the 
Alevi community. However, since the access of MPs to floor is blocked, frequency of 
the off-the agenda speeches becomes more important (than their content) as they 
provide clues regarding the significance political parties attribute to the issues.    
 
4.4.3.3. The Alevi representation in the National Assembly 
 
During   TBMM’s 22nd term, representation of the Alevi interests by the CHP 
deputies was relatively substantial. In comparison to earlier terms, CHP elites were 
more sympatric towards the issues communicated by the Alevi activists and the Alevi 
organizations. During the data collection process in CHP offices in Ankara, one official 
– who used to act as a consultant to MPs in TBMM – stated that during the 1990s, CHP 
refused to acknowledge the status of Alevis in Turkey as a problem.  Consequently, 
there was no significant floor activity on the issues involving Alevi claims.
489
 As the 
public’s familiarity with the Alevi issues increased as a result of the solidarity and 
advocacy networks established among the domestic and transnational Alevi actors (the 
last of which took place in 2001 with the beginning of the trial against ABKB), CHP 
tried to reach out to the Alevi communities.      
In 2002, CHP managed to get the former AABF director and prominent Alevi 
figure Ali Rıza Gülçiçek   elected for the National Assembly. While TAN’s inflow of 
information and monetary aids had become a common phenomenon by 2000, 
Gülçiçek’s election was significant as for the first time Alevi identity movement has a 
activist selected for TBMM. Contrary to the earlier generation of Alevi political elite, 
such as the Ulusoy family, Hüseyin Balan or Mustafa Timisi, Gülçiçek was not a 
"gentleman of the periphery." Instead he was a prominent figure in the German Alevi 
movement. During his term as an MP, he acted as a lobbyist for both the issues 
regarding the Alevi minority rights protection and the problems that the Turkish 
immigrants in Europe face in the home and host countries (See Table 4.3). The 
legislative activities of Gülçiçek indicate that he remained a broker for organized 
interest groups established by European and Turkish Alevis.  
                                               
489 Interview in CHP Ankara District quarters, on November 8, 2012.   
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Table 4.3 Ali Rıza Gülçiçek’s activities as an MP 2002-2007 
 
#Speech in 
TBMM * 
#Questions 
framed 
 
#Sponsored 
Bills 
#Proposals 
for inquiry 
 
Activities in 
international and 
supranational assemblies 
 F C Oral Written   Speaker 
Norm 
Entrepreneur 
**  
Issue Areas         
Breach of 
Non- 
Discrimination 
principle 
2 0 2 6 1 0 0 0 
DİB and its 
organs 
2 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 
Compulsory 
religion courses 
0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
Cem houses and 
their problems 
2 0 1 6 1 0 0 0 
Sivas Events of 
1993 and legal 
process 
2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Problems of 
migrants 
residing in 
Europe 
7 0 1 1 0 2 3 1 
Alevi culture 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Other490 11 0 0 33 0 0 2 1 
 
Notes:  
* In the table F stands for speech given on the floor, and C stands for speech given in Commission. 
** I am inclined to identify Gülçiçek as a norm entrepreneur whenever he is assigned as a consultant in 
reports of the CoE institutions. 
Source: Based on the data retrieved from the TBMM minutes 
 
                                               
490 Other category refers to activities related to discussions on legislative bills not related directly to Alevi 
community, budget meetings, terror and issue of refugees in TBMM. Whereas the category refers to 
activities involving reintegration of convicts, marriage and child marriage issues, the practice of principle 
of equality in political participation in international and supranational assemblies.    
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Even though CHP was   the opposition and had no control over the course and 
content of the policies of the government or legislative bills, the legislative activities 
regarding the Alevi community were crucial in transformation of the relationship 
between the Alevis and state institutions. Through framing questions, Gülçiçek forced 
the Ministers and AKP deputies to talk about the issues of worship, religious education, 
the status and funding for cem houses and bias in TRT broadcasts. Although the party 
had other MPs directly or indirectly involved in legislative activities, most of them 
remained   passive representatives. They either continued to be involved in caseworks 
or remained as signatory to proposed bills and parliamentary inquiry proposals of the 
party.
491
 
Other than Gülçiçek’s legislative activities, the only other significant event in the 
22
nd
 term of TBMM was the bill sponsored by the CHP Istanbul representative Berhan 
Şimşek.492  Following the campaign triggered by the Alevi Bektashi Federation in 2005, 
in 2006 Şimşek sponsored a bill to transform the Madımak Hotel, site of the1993 Sivas 
events, into a museum. Although the bill was rejected by the AKP majority, the 
rejection sparked new campaigns in the civil society and new member sponsored bills in 
the 23
rd
 term of the TBMM.   
However, in TBMM’s 23rd term, CHP did not have another broker such as 
Gülçiçek, though 75 deputies directly or indirectly were involved in legislative activates 
regarding the Alevi community (Table 4.4). During this period, most participants were 
signature holders in party documents. Instead of the identity and minority issues related 
to the Alevi community in Turkey, the economics, ethnic problems, and relations to 
foreign and neighboring countries dominated the speeches of the opposition parties on 
the floor. Yet, this decline in activities involving representation of Alevi interest can be 
attributed to the willingness of the governing AKP to communicate and deal with the 
Alevi organizations and intellectuals. During the 2007-2011 legislative terms, the 
situation of the Alevis in Turkey was recognized as a problem by the government and 
                                               
491 Within the current legal framework 20 signatures are required to submit a proposal for opening a 
parliamentary inquiry commission.     
492 It is important to note here that other CHP MPs, including Ensar Öğüt, Erol Tınazepe and İsmail 
Değerli, brought Alevi issues into the agenda by framing questions.  However, in comparison to  
Gülçiçek, their overall legislative activities were less Alevi oriented. In my interview with a former CHP 
secretary of the era confirmed also this difference between the MPs. 
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other state institutions for the first time. Subsequently there was more room for debate 
in the public sphere and more opportunities of interaction with the government. 
Nonetheless, the themes that dominated the earlier term of TBMM continue to be 
brought up during this period. Off the agenda speeches regarding the importance of 
Muharrem (the holy month of the Alevi faith), and commemorative speeches on Alevi 
religious and cultural figures were still floor activities of some CHP members. 
Additionally, the organization and functioning of the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
continued to be an area of concern. However, of the 72 questions framed by the MPs 
regarding DİB, only 1 directly related to the Alevi concerns on Alevi worship and the 
status of cem houses; whereas, the rest directly or indirectly seek to investigate the level 
of corruption or role of patronage networks within DİB. 
 
Table 4.4 Discussion of the Alevi-related issues in the National Assembly,  
2007-2011 
Legislative year 
Oral 
questions 
Written 
questions 
Member 
sponsored  
bill 
 
Proposal for 
parliamentary 
inquiry 
 
Off schedule 
speech 
 
(23/07/07-
30/09/07) 
0 1 0 0 0 
(01/10/07-
30/09/08) 
3 11 1 1 1 
(01/10/08-
30/09/09) 
1 0 1 0 0 
(01/10/09-
30/09/10) 
0 5 0 4 5 
(01/10/10-
23/04/11) 
0 4 1 0 1 
 4 21 3 5 7 
 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the data retrieved from TBMM minutes 
 
Most activities regarding Alevis instead revolve around the breach of non-
discrimination principle in state institutions and in media. Following the Alevi 
workshops of the governing AKP, the content of the speeches and questions addressed 
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by the opposing CHP deputies began to involve issues regarding the functioning and the 
outcomes of the organized workshops. While the Alevi rapprochement was a factor in 
the content of the Alevi related activities during the   23
rd
 term, the lack of substantial 
policy changed by the government determined the content of the debates in the post-
2011 period.  
In the current parliament, CHP emerges as the only party among the opposition. A 
significant number of CHP MPs continuously conducts floor work on issues regarding 
the Alevi minority. Other than the annual sessions budget planning on December, other 
oppossion party MPs do not brought Alevi issues to the attention of the TBMM. While 
the other opposition MPs highlight Alevi issues to lay blame on the government and 
other state institutions, i.e. DİR, during budget meetings, CHP MPs continue to 
communicate the demands and preferences of the Alevi community remainder of the 
legislative year. The MPs’ activities revolve around four issue areas – i.e. (i) the Sivas 
Massacre & its aftermath, (ii) elaboration of Dersim events, (ii) the breach of the non-
discrimination principle, and (iv) the application of principles of international treaties.  
THe issues related to Dersim events have been a concern for independents as well 
as CHP and Peace and Democracy Party [BDP - Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi] MPs.With 
the exception of one question addressed to the office of Prime Minister, the language 
and content of the framed questions by the independent and BDP MPs highlight the 
effects or significance of the event on the Kurdish minority, history, and identity. 
What’s more, when included in the texts, Alevi or Alevism appears as name dropping. 
BDP MPs do not provide substantial requests for Alevi minority rights. Additionally, 
the topic is far invisible in the legislative activities of the MHP deputies. 
An analysis of the content of the questions show that (i) the situation regarding the 
suspects of the Sivas events, (ii) the issue of discrimination at school and public offices, 
(iii) the application of the decisions of ECtHR and (iv) the issues regarding the 1937-
1938 Dersim events constitute core themes in the written questions were submitted. 
Even though CHP parliamentarians offered 41 questions regarding the structure and 
functioning of Directorate of Religious Affairs, only two particularly stressed issues 
related to the Alevi community.  Like the findings of Hazama et al for the earlier 
legislative terms, the questions framed between 2002 and 2012 manifest a tone of 
blaming and have little success in receiving concrete answers from the relevant 
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Ministers or the Prime Minister.
493
 On the other hand, constituency relevant issues, such 
as questions regarding the layoff of an “Alevi” from his/her workplace can draw more 
concrete answers. The answers of the blaming questions generally involve justifications 
of the prevailing policies and practices. For instance, whenever the MPs ask about the 
amount of subsidies the cem houses and/or Alevi associations receive from the state 
institutions, the emphasis of the relevant Minister remains on the non-discrimination 
principle upheld in distribution of the funds, followed by the total amounts distributed 
to association in general. In other words, while MPs particularly frame questions to 
compensate for their disadvantageous position to shape policy decisions, the Ministers 
(and the Prime Minister office) use it to (i) demonstrate their capabilities, and (ii) justify 
their policies. 
Of the four proposed bills in the first legislative year of the 24th term, only one is 
a new motion and the remaining three are resubmissions of Tunceli representative 
Kamer Genç’s proposed bills in the 23rd term. With the exception of the bill on 
foundation of a commission and determination of the damages of the Dersim events, the 
member sponsored bills offer amendments in the existing legal framework. They do not 
deal with substantive changes on religious rights, or differentiation individual rights of a 
citizen belonging to a minority and collective rights of the minority. Other than Kamer 
Genç’s initiatives, CHP proposed only three more member sponsored bills in late 2011. 
While two of these member sponsored bills was focusing on recognition of cem houses, 
the third was seeking to establish July 2, the day of the Sivas events, as a 
commemorative holiday. 
Through the new bill on the regulation of places of worship, the party seeks to 
expand the extension of the concept of "place of worship" to include Alevi cem houses. 
The emphasis is on the application of the requirements of international treaties or 
decisions of ECtRH
494
 rather than reevaluating the institutional design. A similar 
tendency can also be seen in Genç’s two proposed bills. While one of the bills seeks  
amendments to Articles 2 and 91 of the Village Law (1924) to include cemevis, another 
                                               
493 Hazama et al, “Parliamentary Questions in Turkey,” 553. 
494 Following the Article 90 (on ratification and application of the international treaties) of 1982 
Constitution, proposed bill particularly seeks applications of the Article 18 of the Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) (on religious freedom), Article 6 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) (on rights regarding worship and 
practice) and Article 9 of Council of Europe’s ECHR (on freedom of thought, conscience and religion) 
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put forward a series of amendments to the Law on Organization of Higher Education 
Institutions No. 2809 to enable establishment of Alevism and Bektashism Research 
Institute at the universities of the country.  
In the 24
th
 legislative term, CHP MPs has continued to be the most active 
representatives of the TBMM on Alevi issues. Other than the three questions framed, 
and the speeches on the organization and activities of DİB during the budget sessions, 
Alevi issue areas BDP MPs has drawn little attention to the specific problems of the 
Alevis on the floor. However, the Dersim events of 1938 continue to be a source of 
tension between and within political parties. Particularly, CHP – the governing party of 
the era – continues to be hesitant even to make symbolic gestures. For instace, the 
address of Hüseyin Aygün, CHP MP for Tunceli (Dersim), to the National Assembly 
for restoration of the honor of Seyit Rıza, the leader of Dersim resistance, on November 
2011 triggered a crisis within CHP.
495
 The apology demand of Aygün from the state and 
CHP was heavely criticized by the cadres of the CHP. Additionally, the tensions within 
the CHP were used by the other opposition parties and the AKP to lay blame on CHP 
for its past and contemporary practices and rhetoric.
496
  
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 The Alevi MPs are expected to be more inclined than their Sunni collegues to 
conduct floor activities issues in the National Assembly to attend to the needs and 
demands of the Alevi constituents. From a theoretical perspective it is likely that Alevi 
MPs in the TBMM would share common understanding of which issues should be 
connected to the Alevi community in Turkey, and address these by framing questions, 
giving off-the-agenda speeches, sponsoring bills, and proposing inquiries. Despite the 
constraints of the formal institutions, the members of the parliament play a vital role in 
shaping the representation of the Alevi interests. By virtue of its status the debates in the 
TBMM attract publicity. As a result, most MPs employ parliamentary questions to 
                                               
495 See “Dersim krizi büyüyor,” Milliyet, November 18, 2011. 
496 Another crisis was triggered by a speech of Onur Öymen, the vice-chair of the CHP at the time, on 
November 11, 2009. Öymen’s justification of the heavy-handed repression of the Dersim riots in the late 
1930s in his speech during the discussions on Kurdish rapprochement in the National Assembly drew 
heavey criticisms not only from the Kurdish Alevis of Dersim and the Alevi interest groups, but also from 
the CHP officials and MPs, such as Kemal Kılıçtaroğlu. See “Alevilerden CHP’li Onur Öymen’e Dersim 
isyanı,” Zaman, November 12, 2009.   
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challenge or press the incumbent government over policy or personal/institutional 
conduct. By framing oral/written questions on issues related to Alevi claims, MPs 
contribute to the communication of Alevi interests to decision-making actors. If an issue 
is not already the subject of public debate, then National Assembly attention can help 
get it on to the political agenda [such as the 1963 debates on the organization of DİB].   
One conclusion which logically follows from the TBP experience in the 1970s 
and the CHP-Alevi relations in the last two decades is that political opportunity 
structures matter in determining the scope and content of representation of the Alevis in 
the political sphere. The case of TBP also shows that establishment of an Alevi party 
and the entry of Alevi MPs into the National Assembly could not guarantee substantial 
representation of the Alevi interests. The preciding discussions indicate that even 
though TBP used Alevi symbols and select its candidates from Alevi notables and 
activists, the Party did not address itself as an Alevi Party. Both in 1969 and 1973, the 
TBP promoted its identity as a party with an Alevi base rather than a sectarian party.  
Contrary to the expectations, the Alevi MPs of the TBP in 1969 did not address to 
the Alevi issues continuously. Instead, the MPs, like most of their colleques in the 
National Assembly spent their time on chasing case-work. Since, the patrimonial ties 
were pivotal in the success of the TBP in the 1969 general elections, the demands of the 
constituents dominated the questions framed by the TBP MPs. For instance, none of the 
14 questions framed by Kazım Uluoy specifically drew attention to the problems of the 
Alevis as a community. The significance of the role of patrimonial ties between the TBP 
elites and the Alevi constituents became evident in the 1973 general elections. The more 
the TBP incorporated the premises and the demands of the established left-wing parties, 
the less it appealed to the Alevi masses. Additionally, the loss of the support of the 
Ulusoy family following the political crisis of the 1970 hindered the organization and 
mobilization capability of the TBP.         
The analysis of the activities and characteristics of the CHP MPs in the last two 
decades indicates that there is no sufficient evidence to claim the CHP elites specially 
promote Alevi candidates and support the Alevi MPs works. Even though both at the 
local and national levels Alevi political activists are incorporated into the CHP cadres, 
CHP cannot be labled as an Alevi party. Many respondents during my fieldwork 
considered the relatively high number of Alevis in the party cadres as an unintended 
consequence. Neither the governing AKP, nor the other major political parties in the 
National Assembly are equally inclusive of Alevis.  
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Additionally, both my fieldwork and the discourse analysis of the releases of the 
CHP officials point out that the CHP promotes the principle of equal treatment. While 
this enables the promotion of competitive claims of the Alevis in the National Assembly 
– such as the demands for incorporation of the Alevi faith and institutions into the 
framework of DİB – by CHP MPs, it hinders the likelihood of the promotion of 
proactive or reactive Alevi claims – like the calls for apology from CHP for its role in 
the supression of the Dersim events, or amendments to the Law on lodges, shrines and 
other similar sites of religious organization, so that Alevi religious sites can be reopened 
as a place of worship. As a result, descriptive representation does not guarantee 
substantial representation of the Alevi interests. Other than Ali Rıza Gülçiçek, the 
known Alevi MPs tend to address a number of issue areas rather than focusing solely on 
Alevi specific ones.  
Despite the increasing legislative activity regarding Alevi issues, the absence of 
concrete answers to the policy problems on Alevi demands provide little help to 
transform existing relations and institutions. Unless a question begs for help or pertains 
to particular constituencies, the opposition MPs receives little feedback.  The Ministers 
and Prime Minister used the parliamentary questions to reinforce the official discourses 
on the issues and to justify their actions in their responses. The overall picture that 
emerged from the preceding analysis indicates that both the opposition MPs and the 
government officials use the floor activities to justify their positions on the Alevi issues.  
The next chapter focuses on the governing AKP between 2002 and 2012, and 
analysis of the legislative and non-legislative activities of the government officials. In 
an attempt to provide more insight on the mediums of the communication of Alevi 
interests (and their relative success), the chapter focuses on the Alevi rapprochement 
project.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
NEW GOVERNMENT, OLD ISSUES:  
THE STATE-ALEVI RELATIONS BETWEEN 2002 AND 2012 
 
 
 
 5.1. Introduction 
 
The meteoric rise of the AKP since its founding in 2000 has been a popular 
subject in the Turkish politics.
497
 The reign of the AKP government has been marked by 
a number of domestic and international events, the effects of which also had a 
significant impact on the strategies of the Alevi interest groups as they sought non-
discrimination and non-assimilation. Following the 2002 Copenhagen Summit, the 
newly elected AKP government, represented by the then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül 
was given “a date for a date” to start the Turkish accession talks for full membership to 
the EU. The EU’s demands for policy change and institutional transformations before 
being considered for full membership, particularly in the aftermath of 2004 Brussels 
Summit that marked the official beginning of accession talks, paved the way for 
emergence of new inclusionary and exclusionary channels for the Alevi interest groups 
and networks.   
This chapter builds on the previous chapters’ discussions of the emergence of the 
Alevi interest groups in Turkey and Germany and the challenges these groups face in 
                                               
497 The reasons that facilitated the rise of AKP and the impact of their electoral success has been 
discussed by a number of scholars. See (on party systems) Sabri Sayarı, “Towards a New Turkish Party 
System?,” Turkish Studies 8, no. 2 (2007): 197-210; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Justice and Development Party 
at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the Right-of-Center Predominant Party?, ” Turkish 
Studies 11, no. 1 (2010): 29-44; (on democratizaton) William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, 
Democracy, and Liberalism in Turkey: The case of AKP, (New York: Routledge, 2010); (on the role of 
the party in the processes of Europeanization and EU conditionality) Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk 
Gençkaya, Democratization and politics of constitution making in Turkey, (New York: Center European 
University Press, 2009).   
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their struggle for rights, and analyzes the strategies of the Alevi TANs and the domestic 
Alevi advocacy networks. By combining the discussions on bottom-up and top-down 
approaches to Europeanization, this chapter questions the role of Alevi interest groups 
in the transformation of state policies and institutions.      
 
 5.2. Advocating for Policy Change: Theoretical Framework 
“Europe takes the other, transforms it and makes it own” 
Agnes Heller
498
 
 
5.2.1. Identifying the Domestic Impact of the Regional Actors 
 
Embedded in the “logic of appropriateness” the TAN model emphasizes the role 
of norm entrepreneurs, i.e. domestic change agents. As previously discussed in Chapter 
3, TANs make new resources available to the domestic opposition by establishing ties 
among domestic and transnational actors, and create new channels for such groups to 
access to the international system so that they can pressure the states to change target 
domestic policies. These are powerful tools for pressuring states to make policy 
changes. Yet, as Thomas Risse-Kappen put forward, the ability of transnational actors 
to promote norms and influence state policy is dependent on domestic structures 
understood in terms of state-societal relations.
499
 In a very oppressive state in which 
information flow is restricted, the emergence of TANs is an unlikely event: TANs can 
emerge only if the target state has some level of inclusiveness.  
In states where information flows can be established between domestic and 
transnational actors, TANs engage in several tactics to influence and transform the 
policies and institutions of the state. Through their activities in the transnational space, 
such as meetings, seminars, and protests, TANs attract attention to the issue areas they 
mobilize around, for instance information politics. This first stage of influence, which 
                                               
498 Agnes Heller, “Europe: An Epilogue,” in The Idea of Europe: Problems of national and transnational 
identity, eds. Brian Nelson, David Roberts, and Walter Veit, 12-25, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992).    
499 Thomas Risse-Kappen: "Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction," in Bringing 
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, 
ed., Thomas Risse-Kappen, 3-33, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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can be called agenda-setting, involves intense competition with other interest groups for 
the limited attention spans of the media and the public.
500
 By providing facts and 
testimonies on issues, or identifying symbols to attract greater attention, networks try to 
secure a place in the public agenda long enough to attract the attention of policy-
makers, at which point TANs seek to transform the position of the states and/or 
international organizations on the issue. As a further tactic, TANs seek leverage with 
which to change targeted policies and institutions by either “shaming” the target state 
for its violations, or reminding the potential ‘ally’ states or organizations in the 
international arena of their position and experiences on the issue area.
501
  
Whatever tactic is adopted, empirical evidence indicates that all else being equal, 
the likelihood of the TANs to gain greater leverage on the target states increases if the 
demands of the networks can be incorporated into the existing international 
discourses.
502
 In other words, the TANs’ effectiveness in changing policy-outcomes 
depends on the framing of the issues by activists and interest groups. Additionally, the 
characteristics of the actors and the target state’s level of vulnerability constitute the 
second dimension of a successful outcome for the TANs, such that, all else being equal, 
the more vulnerable the target state is to external pressures, the higher the likelihood 
for policy change.  
Consequently, unless, the desired norms and institutions addressed by the 
European intergovernmental organizations are compatible with the ‘national interests’ 
of Turkey, and the costs for rule adoption and implementation is high, then the 
likelihood of state actors to act to transform the laws and practices increases. As Keck 
and Sikkink argues the TANs through their activities seek to transform the perception of 
‘national interests’ and alter cost-benefit analysis of the political actors.503 
Proponents of the transnational model emphasize different aspects of issues in 
determining the impact of the TANs. Finnemore and Sikkink, proposed various factors 
that make the adoption of norms and the transformation of policies more likely, 
                                               
500 Ibid, 22. 
501 Keck, and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 19-20. 
502 See Patrice C. McMahon, “Between Delight and Despair: The Effects of Transnational Women’s 
Networks in the Balkans,” in Human rights and diversity: Area studies revisited, eds. David P. Forsythe, 
and Patrice C. McMahon, 111-36 (n.p.: University of Nebraska Press, 2003); Jens Lerche, “Transnational 
Advocacy Networks and Affirmative Action for Dalits in India,” Development and Change 39, no. 2, 
(2008): 239-61. 
503 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 203. 
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specifically legitimacy, prominence, intrinsic qualities, adjacency, and world-time.
504
 
They claim a norm is more likely to be adopted, hence the domestic policies more likely 
to change, if: 
(i) it will reduce domestic opposition by legitimating the state in the 
eyes of its citizens,  
(ii) there are successful examples of norm-adoption. The norm-
violating states adopt the norms of the prominent states to improve their 
image.  
(iii) the norms to be followed are perceived by the target state as 
appropriate and transferrable to the domestic level. The norms that "fit" in 
existing frameworks of the target states are more likely to be adopted, i.e. 
path-dependence.  
(iv) the intrinsic characteristics of the norms are deemed appropriate for 
the policy-makers of the target state.
505
  
In their discussion of human rights norms, Keck and Sikkink have advanced that norms 
involving bodily harm to innocent people are more likely to be effective due to the 
difficulty of legitimating the policy on any official grounds.
506
 Risse-Kappen also 
discussed the role of the intrinsic characteristics of the norms, showing that economic 
and environmental issues are more likely to face opposition.
507
  Following that, the 
ambiguity of the norms on collective rights, particularly on the rights of religious 
communities, poses a challenge of the Alevi TANs to successfully transform the state 
policies and institutions. 
 The process of policy change involves several ‘boomerang patters’.508 Risse and 
Sikkink transform the ‘boomerang pattern’ into a five-phase ‘spiral model’ focusing on 
the strategies of both target states and TANs (Table 5.1.). Following the establishment 
of the transnational advocacy networks in the first stage, TANs working at the domestic 
and international levels publicize the atrocities committed by the target state. The 
                                               
504 World-time refers to the adoption of norms following a shock, such as adoption of the victor’s norms 
at the end of a war.  
505 Finnemore, and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
506 Keck, and Sikkink, Activitst Beyond Borders 
507 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Structures of governance and transnational relations: what have we learned?,” 
in Bringing Transnational Relations Back In,  Risse-Kappen, 280-313. 
508 Chapter 3, Figure 3.3. 
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reports, testimonies, and symbol created in this early stage later serve as evidence to 
pressure key stakeholders (such as states, international organizations) via ‘shaming’ 
schemes against the norm-violating state.
509
 In the second stage, target states resist the 
pressures from the key stakeholders and refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
claims.  
 
Table 5.1.  The stages of the spiral model 
 
PHASE 
ACTOR 
(TANs) 
TARGET 
(Norm violating state) 
1. Activation of the 
networks 
Agenda-setting Repression 
2. Denial 
 
Leverage politics: moral-
consciousness raising, 
persuasion: Shaming and 
lobbying activities 
Refusal to accept the 
legitimacy of the agenda 
3. Tactical concessions 
 
Adjustments in the agenda 
and strategies 
Cosmetic changes due to 
escalation in international 
pressures 
4. Prescriptive status 
Maintenance of the 
networks and its activities 
(if necessary) adjustment in 
the agenda and strategies 
Acknowledgement of the 
validity of the norms / no 
or little rule adoption 
5. Rule consistent 
behavior 
Decline of the network 
Policy change and 
internalization of the norms 
 
  Source: Risse and Sikkink, “Socialization of international human rights norms,” 17-33. 
 
The more the TANs expand and increase their activity spans, the more the target 
states “adopt cosmetic changes to pacify the international criticisms.”510 At this stage, a 
target state will try to improve its international reputation through gestures and 
initiatives reaching out to the domestic opposition.  Even though these cosmetic changes 
do not create policy changes, they can provide new opportunity structures for the 
domestic opposition to mobilize and communicate their interests. If the TANS can keep 
their issues in the international and domestic agendas and put enough pressure on the 
target state, then they can transform the target state perception on the legitimacy of the 
norms on the targeted issues While recognition of the norms on an issue does not 
                                               
509 Risse, and Sikkink, “socialization of international human rights norms,” 23. 
510 Ibid, 25. 
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guarantee rule-adoption on that particular issue, it can lay the foundation for the 
institutionalization and internalization of the desired norms.       
In the case of Alevis’ struggle for political representation, the activities of the 
networks for change in policies and institutions are intertwined with the processes of 
Europeanization. The collective and individual right norms emphasized by the domestic 
Alevi opposition and the transnational Alevi networks were already part of the human 
rights and minority rights standards laid down by the organizations of which Turkey is 
either already a member (i.e. CoE) or seek membership (EU). It is also important to 
note here that even though the acquis communitare has been a significant external factor 
facilitating domestic change in Turkey, it cannot be labeled as the sole reason for such 
transformations.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the EU neither has a legally-binding minority specific 
jurispuradence, nor considers freedom of religion as part of the acquis. Consequently, 
the EU has limited leverage on the candidate states to transform the institutional 
arrangements regarding both minority rights and religious freedoms. On the issue of 
rights, amendments in the institutional frameworks do not guarantee substantive change, 
and habituation of the norms on rights. Nonetheless, the issue of religion and minorities 
EU accession process acts as a supplement to the legally-binding processes of the 
ECtHR, since the process contributed to expanding the impact of the CoE’s 
jurisprudence. By doing so, it also increases the visibility of the Alevi community and 
keeps the Alevi issues identified in Chapter 2 on the public and political agenda. 
The following sections focus on the period between 2002 and 2012, and discuss 
the scope and nature of the relationship between Alevi interest groups and the governing 
AKP. Through analysis of the press releases, interviews with the Alevi and non-Alevi 
elites, EU progress reports and ECtHR documents, the chapter analyzes the dynamics of 
the policy change (or lack thereof) on Alevi issues.   
 5.3. The AKP and Alevi Relations between 2002 and 2007 
 
 
By 2000, the domestic Alevi interest groups had already established strong ties 
with their European counterparts, and begun to challenge the policies and institutions of 
the state. Before the 2002 elections, the AABF and the other domestic Alevi 
foundations and activists already had a strong and continuous network engaging in 
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activities to set agendas in the domestic and the international spheres. Echoing Keck 
and Sikkink, the Alevi TANs of the 2000s were working to uncover and investigate the 
problems of the Alevi individuals and cem houses, and alert the media and the policy-
makers for the solution of the issues (i.e. information politics). Additionally, the Alevi 
interest groups continued to lobby in the international sphere and sought allies to put 
pressure on the Turkish state.
511
 In line with the increasing Alevi activism in the 
domestic and international arena, some new initiatives (i.e. tactical concessions) were 
also introduced by the new government in the early 2000s.  
There were no Alevis among the 363 AKP MPs in TBMM, and the speeches of 
the Prime Minister Erdoğan did not highlight any Alevi agendas. The Alevi issues and 
demands, while some recognized, was not a major concern for the government. During 
this period, the demands highlighted by the Alevi activists were either considered 
threatening to the ‘unity’ of the nation, or as issues that can be incorporated into the 
existing policy agendas. Two issues:  (i) the status and activities of the DİB, and (ii) the 
content and the structure of the religious education, dominated the debated on the early 
debates on the state-Alevi relations in Turkey.  Additionally, even though in the summer 
of 2003, the TBMM ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR, Turkey continued its reservations 
on women and minority rights. 
Despite the resistance of the government to officially acknowledge the issues 
framed by the Alevi interest groups as a problem, there were also individual initiatives 
to reach out to the problems of the Alevi constituents. Mehmet Aydın, Minister of State 
on Religious Issues, emphasized the importance of increasing the dialogue between the 
Sunnis and Alevis.
512
 He suggested organizing an Alevi summit to discuss Alevism. He 
and argued that:  
   Once scientific foundations are established, we can do something 
regarding Alevis. We do not know the depth of thought and knowledge in 
the Alevi world. One group of our Alevi friends say something, the other 
group denies it. They say very different things. This means, there is a 
richness of information. We need to sit down and talk about it.
513
    
                                               
511 The most significant activity of the Alevi TANs in this period was on the issue of religious education. 
Both the domestic Alevi opposition and the transnational Alevi groups played a significant role in making 
the Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey case in ECtHR public.  
512 “Diyanet’e kısmi otonomi verilmeli ve başkanını da ilahiyatçılar seçmelei,” Zaman, December 24, 
2002. 
513 “Mehmet Aydın: Islam dünyasındaki akıl tutulmasını aşmak için dini düşüncede reform şart, AB’ye 
girmek bunu çabuklaştırır,” Hürriyet, December 12, 2002. 
165 
 
 
However, dialogue suggestions of Aydın drew criticisms from his fellow AKP MPs. 
Mehmet Çiçek, former DİB vice-president and the AKP MP from Yozgat, criticize 
Aydın’s suggestions for “creating diversity, where none [previously] existed”514    
Starting with the 2003 annual budget planning sessions, the TBMM sessions on 
the budget of DİB turned into an area of contestation. Since the budget assigned to 
activities and personnel of the DİB increased drastically with the new budget proposal 
of the government, led various MPs to question the employment and wage figures of 
DİB, along with its criteria for employment.515 During the budget sessions in 2003, in 
response to oral question framed by Ensar Öğüt (CHP MP from Ardahan) Mehmet 
Aydın addressed the issue of underrepresentation of Alevis in the DİB framework, and 
legitimized the requests for more funding as: 
   I repeat again; while spending the contemporary budget…we take the take 
philosophy into consideration. I mean…if a service were to be provided to a 
village, we do not ask; we cannot ask whether that village is a Sunni village, 
town or Alevi village....For instance, the issue whether or not a particular 
cem house receive funding is brought to the agenda frequently….I as the 
Minister responsible from the Religious Affairs do not know; meaning… 
whether or not [these cem houses] get subsidies…if so when…and the 
amount…has nothing to do with the budget of the Religious Affairs….But 
we want to pay more attention to scientific research….we are aware of the 
negligence…we sincerely support publication of Alevi resources….by the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs starting from this year.
516
   
In addition to the debates in the floor in TBMM, the Alevi interest groups also 
attracted the attention of the public and the media to limited and discriminatory 
activities of the DİB officials and institutions. The groups seeking competitive rights, 
i.e. the CEM foundation in Istanbul, mobilize Alevi and other heterodox religious group 
organizations to establish a religious representative organization that mirrors the 
activities of DİB. The establishment of Directorate of Religious Services of Alevi-Islam 
[AİDHB – Alevi İslam Din Hizmetleri Başkanlığı] in 2003 was criticized by both the 
DİB officials who considered the initiative as a threat to “unity”, and the Alevi reactive 
and proactive claim-making groups. Particularly, groups who frame Alevism over 
cultural dimensions were critical of the establishment and the activities of the AİDHB, 
                                               
514 “Çiçek’ten bakana: Hepimiz Aleviyiz,” Milliyet, December 11, 2002. Emphasis added 
515 In the 22nd term of the TBMM legislative assembly, Ali Rıza Gülçiçek was the most prominent Alevi 
figure that continuously communicate the issues and positions of the Alevi community/activists/interest 
groups on this issue area     
516 See TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 31,  session 22 (December 2, 2003), 475 
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for de facto Sunnifying Alevism.
517
 Instead, these domestic and transnational Alevi 
organizations, i.e. AABF, ABF, PSKAD and HAVAKV, called for the dissolution of 
the institution.  
The European Commission’s 2003 report on Turkey also included a reference to 
the violations of the rights of Alevis. The report noted that: 
   as far as the situation of non-Sunni Moslem communities is concerned, 
there has been a change as regards the Alevis. The previously banned Union 
of Alevi and Bektashi Associations was granted legal status in April 2003 
which allowed it to pursue its activities. However, concerns persist with 
regard to representation in the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) 
and related to compulsory religious instruction in schools which fail to 
acknowledge the Alevi identity   
However, no other references were made to the specifics of the situation of Alevis in the 
text. The framing of the Alevi issues in the 2003 Commission report, as well as in the 
other reports between 1998 and 2012, indicate a superficial analysis. In her analysis of 
the transformation of the state-military relations in Turkey, Cizre points out the bias in 
the reports and their tendency to ignore the ideological and historical dimensions in the 
analysis of the level of the domestic changes taking place in Turkey. The reports 
“occasionally show signs of recognizing the paucity of an approach that focuses 
exclusively on the design of institutions and the distribution of power between them.”  
518
 Despite their limitations, the reports have been valuable sources of information to 
identify the place of the Alevi issues in the EU accession agenda.  
The 6
th
 EU harmonization package of July 2003, created a legal loophole for the 
construction of the cem houses. The Supplementary Article 2 to the Act on Construction 
was rewritten to take into consideration the needs for places of worship.
519
 With this 
amendment, not only the freedom of religion expanded, but also a created new 
opportunity for to subsidize cem house constructions. However, since the ‘place of 
worship’ was not specifically identified in the Act, local cem houses and the major 
Alevi organizations submit petitions to receive subsidies. When their demands were 
                                               
517 An earlier fieldwork I conducted in PSAKD and HBVAKV in Ankara (2005) revealed that the 
organizations located in Ankara were particularly critical of the CEM Foundations’ initiatives. The 
mimicry of the DİB framework and activities were considered dangerous and treated as another strategy 
to assimilate Alevis.  
518 Umit Cizre, “Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and the 
European enlargement zone,” European Journal of Political Research 43, no. 1 (2004): 120. 
519 T.C. Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, Türkiye’de Siyasi Reform: Uyum Paketleri ve 
Güncel Gelişmeler, (Ankara: n.p.,  2007), 17.  
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declined, they took the cases to local courts. Since the law was ambiguous, the rulings 
of the court varied.  
In 2004 the increasing criticisms highlighting the lack of Alevi representation in 
the DİB framework triggered new initiatives to transform the DİB. While the necessity 
to reform the organization and activities of the DİB was acknowledged, the scope of 
change was interpreted differently. In October 20-24, 2004 during the 3
rd
 Religion 
Council [Din Şurası] of the DİB the role of the institution in EU accession processes, 
along with the need for new strategies to provide religious services to Turkish citizens 
residing abroad, were discussed. The most significant outcome of the meeting was the 
proposal to translate and publish Alevi-Bektashi classics.
520
  
The comments of Ali Bardakçıoğlu, the Chair of DİB by the time, in an interview 
in November 2004 sparked a controversy on the position of the DİB on the Alevi issues. 
Both the Alevi activists and the opposition party MPs condemned Bardakçıoğlu’s 
association of Alevis with Islamist revivalist tariqats. During the 2005 budget 
discussions Ali Rıza Gülçiçek, the former AABF chair and CHP MP from Istanbul, 
called for a reform in the organization of the DİB framework and criticized 
Bardakçıoğlu’s earlier comments:  
   On November 21, 2004 our Director of Religious Affairs gave a speech to 
the media stating that ‘Alevis are not minority, they are sub-belief group; we 
cannot bring services to every group; in that case what happens if 
Aczmendi’s make demands’. My dear friends, religious interpretations are 
inconsequential for the essence, sprit and aim of our religion. In any case, 
this situation is understandable from their activities and this perverted 
interpretation is rejected by our society. However, Alevi and Sunni 
interpretations are accepted by the majority of our society. If Alevism is a 
sub-belief group of Islam, so does Sunnism
521
 
In response to all criticisms directed at the DİB and the government in the 36th session 
of TBMM, Mehmet Aydın discussed the desire of the DİB officials to incorporate an 
Alevi dimension to its services, namely the publication of the Alevi-Bektashi classics.
522
  
However, the actual publication did not take place until 2007, and after the series 
began to be published by the Turkish Religion Foundation [Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı] the 
                                               
520 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, “III. Din Şurası Kararları,” Diyanet Aylık Dergisi Haber Bülteni 167, 
(November, 2004): 3-23. 
521 See TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 70, session 36, (December 21, 2004), 71. 
522 Ibid, 100. 
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efforts were labeled as cosmetic changes. On the one hand, the selection of both the 
texts for publication and the reviewing committee has continued to be criticized by the 
Alevi activists. In comparison, to the enormous number of publications on Sunni Islam, 
the publication of a set of books was considered as another form of assimilation. On the 
other hand, these publications were significant for providing the only canonical 
documents published on Alevism by a state institution. Necdet Subaşı523 emphasized the 
significance of the publication of the Alevi–Bektashi classics, and discussed the 
negative reaction of [some] Alevi organizations as:  
   The famous sources of Alevis, which sometimes transmitted from mount-
to-mount, or pass from hand-to-hand….was made available for the readers 
and simplified by researchers after a rigorous review processes….however 
the issue was perceived by the Alevis as Sunnis…Sunnis and Directorate are 
intertwined… began to alter our classics to distort Alevism….Why would 
Directorate do such a thing…if you continuously and increasingly identify 
Directorate in such a manner…then you cannot see anything positive.524   
Contrary to the Alevi organizations tendency to label the publication of the series as an 
all-Sunni project, Subaşı noted that Alevis, i.e. Velayaettin Ulusoy and Osman Eğri525, 
were also involved in preparation/editing of the texts for publication. These texts 
published by the Turkish Religion Foundation, whatever bias they involve, still valuable 
resources and remains to be the only state-sponsored publication on Alevi faith. These 
publications can also be treated as evidence for active inclusion of the Alevi community 
into the state institutions. In other words, rather than complying with the reactive and 
proactive claims of the Alevi interest groups, the DİB and its sister organizations 
incorporate the Alevi elements into the existing frameworks to counter the pressures put 
on the institution.    
The relationship between the DİB and the Alevi community strengthened through 
providing aids for the Alevi dedes who wish to visit the Alevi congregation residing 
abroad. On February 5, 2007 various newspapers publish a story about 6 Alevi dedes 
from CEM foundation receiving subsidies from the DİB in their travel to Germany. The 
news report sparked harsh criticisms among the Alevi associations and foundations 
                                               
523 Subaşı was the organizer of the 7 Alevi workshops between 2009 and 2010, and was also appointed as 
the chair of the DİB’s Strategy Development Unit [Strateji Geliştirme Birimi] in 2011. 
524 Interview with Necdet Subaşı, Ankara, January 18, 2013. 
525 In the Alevi forums and the Alevi news sites, Eğri has been accused of voluntarily engaging in 
activities to assimilate Alevism. For one such example see “Osman Eğri Assimilasyon memurluğuna 
devam ediyor,” Alevi Haber Ajansı, November 11, 2007, accessed April 25, 2013 available at: 
http://www.alevihaberajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=695&Itemid=45.   
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demanding the abolition of the DİB framework. Particularly, ABF and PSKAD 
criticized the CEM foundation and the DİB officials for trying to assimilate the Alevi 
values and institutions into the Sunni religious framework. In their websites these 
organizations published the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as evidence of 
the ‘treachery’. However, the response of the state officials was significant for 
identifying the bureaucratic loopholes that could be exploited by the Alevi activists.       
By 2007 the DİB did not acknowledge the religion-based/faith-based demands of 
the Alevi community in general and Alevi interest groups in particular. Depending on 
the content and scope of the event, the Alevi initiatives were funded either by the Alevi 
congregation or by the local or national administrative bodies ranging from 
municipalities to the Ministry of Culture. Since the Alevi dedes as spiritual and 
religious leaders of the community could not be hired by the DİB, they did not 
automatically receive grey passports.
526
 However, the individual Alevi dedes and/or the 
dedes of the associations could apply to Ministry of Foreign Affairs for to obtain a grey 
passport. In the specific case of 2007, upon the request of the officials of the European 
branch of the CEM Foundation, 6 Alevi dedes were asked to be subsidized. Following 
the correspondence between the DİB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs justifying the 
intended activity of the Alevi dedes as “service”, 6 Alevi dedes were granted grey 
passports. In the following years this practice also continued, much to the dismay of the 
other major Alevi organizations residing in Europe and in Turkey.
527
 Through this 
bureaucratic process, the organizations and individuals making competitive Alevi right-
claims were de facto incorporated into the DİB. 
Another significant event in the 2002-2007 period that brought the AKP 
government into conflict with the Alevi interest groups (and later with EU and CoE 
institutions) was Hasan Zengin’s application to the ECtHR for breach of his parental 
right to choose the education of his daughter (January, 2004). The Hasan and Eylem 
Zengin v. Turkey case was significant for attracting attention of both Turkish public, and 
international and domestic political actors to the issue of religious education in Turkey. 
                                               
526 Grey passports are aggined to individuals who (i) were sent abroad by the government, municipalities 
or other administrative units for official duty, (ii) in organizations the Turkish state is a member of , or 
(iii) are the members of the families of grey passport holders 
527 Necdet Subaşı noted the number of the applications received from Minsity of Foreign Affairs each 
year as 40-60.  
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During the trial period both the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups 
publicized the case, and tried to keep it in the agenda.
528
   
The amendments to the legal framework continued in the second half of the 
2000s. The new law on the Population Services in 2006 provided new legal 
justifications for identity claims of the Alevis. Since the Articles 82 of the new law 
enabled modification and deletion of the information in the national identity cards,
529
 
the Alevis were presented another opportunity to remove Islam from religious affiliation 
sections. Similar to the amendment in the Construction Act, the law on Population 
services introduced to the Turkish legal framework as a part of the policy harmonization 
process. This top-down policy change, while emerged independent than the activities of 
the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups, provided new channels to justify 
the right-claims of the Alevis in Turkey. More importantly, the successful 
implementation of these new rules adopted could be monitored through the response of 
the Turkish state to the demands of Alevi individuals and interest groups in said issue 
areas. The Sinan Işık v. Turkey case in ECtHR provided evidence for both the dynamics 
of the policy harmonization processes, and the fragmentation of the Alevi right-claims.  
On May 9, 2004 Işık applied Izmir District Court to replace his religious 
affiliation from Islam with Alevi in his national identity card. Following the court’s 
dismissal of the case, on the basis of the opinion of the legal adviser to the DİB, Işık 
applied to ECtHR claiming that his rights guaranteed under the Articles 6, 9 and 14 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were violated by the Turkish state. 
Even though the 2006 amendments changed the some of the conditions regulating the 
registration of the religious affiliation of the Turkish citizens, it did not change the legal 
procedures about leaving this section blank or changing the affiliated religion. Instead, 
the law, while introduced new freedoms, generated new forms of exclusion. 
Additionally, the demand of Işık to identify his religion as Alevi drew criticisms not 
only from the official institutions, but also from the Alevi organizations. The groups 
that framed Alevism within Islam criticized Işık for filing the lawsuit. In contrast, the 
                                               
528 The process and implication of the case will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
529 “Nüfus Hizmetleri Kanunun Uygulanmasına İlişkin Yönetmelik, 2006/11081,” Resmi Gazete, 
November 23, 2006, available at http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/11/20061123-2.htm. 
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groups, such as ABF, PSKAD, and AABF, who did not align Alevism with Islam, were 
supportive of the ECtHR lawsuit.
530
  
  5.4. AKP and the Alevi Rapprochement: Between 2007 and 2012 
By 2007, increasing top-down and bottom up pressures led to acknowledgement 
of an “Alevi issue” in turkey. The constant information flow between the European and 
the Turkish Alevi interest groups, the trials in ECtHR of the Alevi citizens, the 
increasing references to Alevi right-claims in the EU accession reports and discussions, 
along with the increasing awareness of the public and the media about Alevi issues pave 
the way for significant changes in AKP-Alevi relations. The nomination and election of 
three Alevi MPs, i.e. Reha Çamuroğlu, İbrahim Yiğit, and Hüseyin Tuğcu, in the 2007 
national elections marked the beginning of a series of initiatives and symbolic gestures 
between the AKP elites and (some) Alevi notables.  
Outside TBMM, Çamuroğlu played a significant role in promotion of a new 
dialogue between the government and the Alevi interest groups who frame Alevism 
along the lines of/closer to the Sunni interpretations. To that end, a dinner event was 
organized by Çamuroğlu. Largely on his initiative; Prime Minister Erdoğan attended to 
the dinner and gave a speech. Yet, right after its announcement the event drew heavy 
criticisms from the major Alevi interest groups, the Alevi press and the opposition 
parties. In TBMM, Çamuroğlu had to defend the dinner event in the floor as: 
   We are see that we are causing great distress and unfortunately we will 
continue to cause distress, because we are working for the good of our 
nation 
   We organized this event as an Alevi initiative…and Prime Minister is a 
guest…This dinner…this fast-breaking-dinner is not a fast-breaking-dinner 
organized by the Justice and Development Party…we can invite whoever 
we want to this civil and private event
531
  
Both the dinner event and the speech of Erdoğan on January 11, 2008, highlighted 
Alevism as embedded in Islamic tradition.
532
  Yet, increasing criticisms and pressures 
led Çamuroğlu to distance himself from the Alevi rapprochement initiatives. In an 
                                               
530 The legal representative of Işık during the trial was Kazım Genç, who was a prominent figure in ABF 
and PSKAD. Genç was also the legal representative of the case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey in 
ECtHR.  
531 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 30, session 4 (December 5, 2007), 105.   
532 The low Alevi participation to the event was mocked by the Alevi press. See, “Alevisiz Alevi iftarı,” 
Evrensel, January 13, 2008.  
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interview in late 2008 Çamuroğlu criticized the negative attitude of the Alevi interest 
groups and their attempts to impede democratization efforts.
533
 He stated: 
   We are talking about a 1000 year old problem. Are these friends mocking 
us? Reha Çamuroğlu holds a magic wand; Justice and development Parti 
holds a magic wand. We touch and voilá! We started a process and it is 
going well…What did the CHP … have ever done for them? They say they 
want the abolition of the Directorate. Fine, I want people to fly. In the near 
future it is not a possibility. What you say in practice is this: Do nothing 
until the Directorate is abolished…We didn’t choose this path.534   
 
The Muharram fast-breaking dinner repeated in 2009 attracted more attention 
from the Alevi interest groups. Before the second Alevi dinner, as a good-will gesture 
Ertuğrul Günay, the Minister of Culture, apologized from the Alevis on behalf of the 
state.
535
While Cem Foundation and World Ehl-i Beyth foundation joined the second 
dinner, the other major organizations continued to boycott the event. The second Alevi 
dinner held in Istanbul on January 7, 2009 was also aired on TV; the main state TV 
channel, TRT 1 broadcasted its primetime news from Karacaahmet Cemevi as a good-
will gesture.
536
 Such good-will gestures continued with programs on Karbala, Alevi 
faith, culture and rituals during the month of Muharram put on air by TRT 2.  
In 2009 the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups became more vocal 
about their identity based right-claims. The Grand Alevi Rally – organized by ABF on 
November 9, 2009 in Kadıköy, Istanbul – was the second of the large-protests organized 
to voice the social and political concerns of the Alevi community.
 537
 The participants of 
the rally confronted the AKP government and its Alevi rapprochement policies, and 
demanded for ‘equal citizenship rights’. While World Ehl-i Beyt Foundation, 
AVF/CEM Foundation and their sister organizations boycotted the rally, non-Alevi 
associations and groups – ranging from radical-left wing associations to trade unions.  
                                               
533 In his recent interviews Çamuroğlu also criticized the AKP  for not supporting him, when he was 
targeted  by the  radical Suni and radical Alevi groups. See “Yalnız bırakıldım,” Milliyet, January 17, 
2013. 
534 “AK Parti milletvekili Reha Çamuroğlu: Alevilerin meselesini gündeme getirmek istedik,” Radikal, 
November 14, 2008. 
535 “Bakan Günay: Alevilerden devlet adına özür diledi,” Radikal, December 23, 2008. 
536 The broadcast from Karacaahmet had a symbolic value, since Erdoğan was accused of trying to 
demolish the Karacaahmet cem house when he was the Mayor of Istanbul.  
537 A relatively smaller protest was held in Ankara in 2008, emphasizing similar endeavors. 
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In addition to these events, Ministry of State initiated an Alevi workshop series 
between 2009 and 2010. The workshops organized by Necdet Subaşı, upon request of 
the government, sought to enhance dialogue about the issues of the Alevi community in 
Turkey between the government and civil society actors. The workshops problematized 
(i) the conceptualization of Alevism, (ii) the status of the cem houses as places of 
worship, (iii) the structure of the DİB and its activities, (iv) the status and content of the 
compulsory lessons in religious culture and ethics, (v) the status of dedes as religious 
leaders, and (vi) de facto and de jure discrimination of Alevi citizens in the public and 
state-owned institutions. Additional topics were also discussed during the workshops: 
the ECtHR decisions on the two Alevi cases, and the preservation of the Madımak Hotel 
in Sivas as a symbol of violence. 
The workshops were designed to facilitate information flow between state and 
non-state actors. Alevi notables, DİB officials, media representatives, academics, retired 
and incumbent MPs, trade union officials, and other civil society activists were invited 
to frame the issue areas of the Alevi question in Turkey. However, both the exclusion of 
transnational Alevi actors from the workshops and the inclusion of certain controversial 
figures
538
 caused great distress. Indeed the workshops were accused of being biased. 
Subaşı refused the claims and instead argued that all major associations were invited to 
the workshops. He further stated:  
   Nobody was forgotten…in the first workshop we called 
everyone…radicals, moderates….we also brought common Alevis…to 
understand the difference between the rhetoric of the common Alevis and 
the associations…to understand how the citizen Alevi and the representative 
Alevism happen to be….In the third workshop we invited the theology 
professors and the Directorate officials. Not a single Alevi was on that 
workshop because we didn’t call. Because the topic of the 3rd was this: 
“how do you Sunnis look at the issue?”…they stretch this… when I told 
them this format they all agreed to it.     
 The final report of the workshops also acted as a catalysis for new interest group 
activities. None of theAlevi group participated in the workshops were satisfied with the 
result. While some criticized the workshops for being cosmetic changes, others accused 
them of being systematic efforts to create rival/state-sponsored Alevism. The failure of 
Alevi Workshops to produce substantive policy changes led the Alevi interest groups to 
readjust their agendas and strategies to communicate their interests and raise 
consciousness of the press and the public about the Alevi issues.  
                                               
538 Namely  Ökkeş Şendiller (Kengir), one of the suspects of the 1978 Kahramanmaraş Events. 
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Since 2009 the EU Commission reports on Turkey’s accession were increasingly 
portraying a positive picture of the AKP initiatives of rapprochement between the 
Alevis and the AKP.  Both the workshops, fast-breaking dinners and the apology of 
Günay were addressed as positive developments. To counter the illusion created by 
these cosmetic changes in the summer of 2010 the Confederation of Alevi Unions of 
Europe [AABK – Avrupa Alevi Birlikler Konfederasyonu]539 chair Turgut Öker 
announced that the European Alevi federations would lobby to “fix the confusion AKP 
created”.540  
The lobbying and the protests of the AABF and ABF continued in the remainder 
of the second term of the AKP rule. The Alevi interest groups continued to accuse the 
government for trying to assimilate the Alevi community and establishing organizations 
labeled as “fake Alevi organizations” [Çakma Alevi Organizasyonları] by the major 
Alevi interest groups.
541
 ABF and its sister organizations also continued to organize 
demonstrations to protest the government policies. In a press conference to announce 
the third rally for “Equal citizenship rights” ”in 2011 Balkız (ABF) declared: 
   In the previous two rallies we cried out the demands of the Alevi 
community. But AKP government refused to meet our demands, instead 
they called “opening” and exploited them in their policies and after the long 
“Alevi Workshop “series it has been understood that the “Alevi Opening” 
was a lie. We were too close in Ankara, they didn’t hear us. They didn’t 
hear the Istanbul crowd; we thought maybe…they would hear us better if 
we went to Izmir
542
 
 
Other groups such as AVF, CEM Foundation and the World Ehl-i Beyt 
Foundation carried on their consciousness raising activities, i.e. organizing meetings, 
talks, seminars and workshops. Unlike the ABF representatives, these groups also 
continued to participate in the dinner events and other activities that brought the 
government and Alevi notables together. In other words, in line with the assumptions of 
                                               
539 On November 25, 1997, during the AABF convention, a new transnational umbrella Alevi 
organization, titled Confederation of Alevi Unions of Europe, was agreed to be established.  
540 Turgut Öker, “Avrupalı Aleviler’den AB’ye sert tepki”, press release, last accessed May 20, 2013  
available at 
http://www.alevi.dk/BASIN%20ARSIV/Avrupali%20Alevilerden%20AB%20ye%20sert%20tepki%20.ht
m 
541 A number of Alevi associations were established during and shortly after the Alevi workshops. The 
Anadolu Alevi Bektashi Federation [Anadolu Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu] – founded by Cengiz Hortoğlu 
– drew harsh criticisms from the ABF and its sister organizations for its support of the policies of the 
governing AKP.  
542 “ABF Başkanı Ali Balkız: Alevi Açılımı kof çıkmıştır,” Radikal March 4, 2011. 
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the spiral model, in this period in Turkish state’s commitment to regional norms took 
place the form of tactical concessions, which facilitated the mobilization and 
empowerment of the domestic Alevi interest groups.  While the first term of the AKP 
rule was subjected to increasing pressures from the transnational and domestic actors, 
the second term was marked with cosmetic changes. As Hale and Özbudun note even 
though the good-will gestures of the AKP between 2007 and 2010 “was meaningful, it 
has not been followed by any concrete steps to meet the Alevi demands. Just as in the 
case of its stand on the Kurdish question, the AKP government seems to have opted for 
a ‘politics of avoidance.’”543  
 5.5. Towards a Conclusion 
Since AKP came to power in 2002 the relationship between the state institutions 
and the Alevi community has been tense. The preceding discussions show that the first 
term of the AKP rule was marked with domestic and international law suits, rising Alevi 
activism in Europe, and increasing pressures from the CoE and the EU for compliance 
with the conditions of the ratified treaties. Blocked and/or limited channels of 
participation and representation led both Alevi citizens and interest groups to seek 
alliances and international linkages to pressure the Turkish government to transform the 
existing institutional arrangements. This chapter shows a boomerang pattern of Alevi 
TANs emerged as a result of:  
(i) the exclusion of the Alevi population by various governmental 
organizations in Turkey,  
(ii)  the emergence of the Alevi TANs as a result of the inclusive 
opportunity structures in Germany, and  
(iii) the establishment of linkages with the European organizations that can 
persuade the Turkish state to adopt and internalize the norms on 
collective and religious rights.            
Even though the Turkish state has little incentives to fully co-operate with the 
European organizations, the second term of the AKP rule involved a number of 
initiatives and projects to enhance a dialogue with the Alevi community in Turkey. 
                                               
543 Hale and Özbudun, Islamism,Democracy and  Liberalism in Turkey,  79. 
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Neither the symbolic gestures of the high ranking AKP notables and the DİB 
bureaucrats nor the Alevi workshops organized can be explained as a direct product of 
EU accession process. Both the characteristics of the Alevi TANs and the Turkish 
political actors played a role in increasing the dialogue between the Turkish state and 
the Alevi community. However, since the Alevi networks have not been dense and 
strong, and the Alevi right-claims have been highly heterogenous, the capability of the 
Alevi TANs to alter policies and institutions has been limited.  
The 2011 elections confirmed the third consecutive victory for the AKP, which 
got the 49 per cent of the total valid votes and the majority of the seats in the TBMM. 
The gestures of Erdoğan and AKP notables that dominated the 2007-20011 period, 
gradually replaced with new initiatives and policies promoting discrimination against 
Alevis. Among the three Alevi MPs of the previous term, only İbrahim Yiğit was 
nominated and elected in this period. In addition to the decline in representation of 
Alevis in AKP cadres, the emphasis on dialogue in the speeches of both Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and other key AKP figures underwent a decline. Lack of substantive reforms 
and policy-changes to improve the conditions of Alevis in Turkey along with the 
introduction of bans on commemorative festivities in Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, and 
Çorum increased in the tensions between the AKP and the Alevi  interest groups (except 
World Ehl-i Beyt foundation and its sister organizations). The transnational Alevi 
interest groups continued to organize rallies to protest the policies and institutions of the 
AKP era.  
Even though the pressures of the EU for democratic consolidation and 
internazliation of human rights, combined with the ECtHR judgements have shaped the 
scope and content of the reforms in Turkey, the substance and the implementation of the 
reforms have been limited. The absence of initiatives to comply with the decisions of 
the ECtHR cases fuelled new discussions both in the National Assembly, and in the 
media. While during both the ECtHR’s rulings on the Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. 
Turkey, and Sinan Işık v. Turkey cases the Turkish decision-makers stressed the need for 
change of the institutional arrangements, the proposed reforms have yet to create a more 
inclusive system. The ECtHR can only identify the violations of rights, rather than 
propose and push for substantial solutions. As a result, the reforms continue to act as a 
mechanism to justify the exclusionary rules and practices.  
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The practice of compulsory cources on religion and morals still prevails. Even 
though the need for inclusion of the Alevi faith in the textbooks was recognized by the 
government officials since the mid-200s, the coverage of the Alevi issues have been 
criticized by the Alevi activists and the interest groups since it created a new 
mechanism for assimilation of the religious identity of the Alevi community. 
Particularly the discussion the compulsory religion courses and the introduction of a 
new education policy, coined as “4+4+4 system”, further antagonize the Alevi and AKP 
actors. The following chapter by focusing on the debates on Alevi religious education in 
Germany and Turkey discusses how different policy demands and domestic and 
transnational opportunity structures shape the decisions of the political actors.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ALEVI ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN ACTION: 
THE STRUGGLE OVER RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
 6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapters provided information on the Alevi interest groups’ role in 
both framing and communicating the community’s right-claims. This final chapter 
analyzes their impact in transforming the states’ policies through the study of policy 
debates over religious education in Turkey’s public schools. Analysis of this case study 
will also help us understand the role of external actors and processes in shaping the 
policy outcomes. Following the TAN model outlined in chapters 3 and 5, this chapter 
discusses how different opportunity structures determine the impact of Alevi advocacy 
networks’ activities in the absence of clear international and regional standards on 
religious education. To that end, the chapter first introduces the perspectives of the key 
international and regional institutions, namely UN, OSCE, CoE and EU, on religious 
education, and then focuses on the activities of the Alevi TANs around the issue of 
Alevi religious education at public schools in Germany and Turkey.  
I have chosen Alevi religious education as the focus of this study because it is the 
only issue area in which the Alevi TANs played a role in changing state policies in both 
countries. The scope of the Alevi advocacy networks’ impact varied in the two 
countries, providing two outcomes for analysis. In Germany, starting in the early 2000s, 
the issue of the right to Alevi religious education has became a matter of integration, 
leading to the German Alevi interest groups to retain the right to give religious 
instructions at public schools in various federal states. In Turkey, while the activities of 
Alevi TANs around the content of religious instruction were effective in putting 
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pressures on the Turkish government, the subsequent changes did not lead to favorable 
policy outcomes for the Alevi community.   
  
 6.2. International Perspective on Religious Education 
Religious Education is as much an international political issue as it is a domestic 
one. International norms in the field of education compel states to act neutrally to 
protect the rights of citizens and non-citizens to the religious education of their choice. 
The norms on citizens’ right to religious education emerged in the mid-1960s, starting 
with the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 18 
of the Covenant recognized the right to religious education as a human rights issue but 
addressed the issue only in the context of a parental right to choose for their children.
544
 
It was not until the 1980s that the protection of the right to religious education was 
accorded to groups and communities. With the Declaration of the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief (1981) the UN 
acknowledged that protection of individual rights was not sufficient to protect and 
maintain the rights of the religious communities and groups.
545
   
In 1993 the UN Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 22 
concluded that “article 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the 
general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way.” The 
Committee stated that:  
The liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure that their children receive 
a religious and moral education in conformity with their own convictions, 
set forth in article 18.4, is related to the guarantees of the freedom to teach a 
religion or belief stated in article 18.1.
546
  
As long as the content of religious education was compatible with human rights 
commitments, religious instruction at public schools was deemed acceptable.  
                                               
544 Section 4 of the Article 18 of the 1966 Covenant declares that: “the States Parties to the present 
Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” The 
original document is available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-
999-I-14668-English.pdf. 
545  UN, Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on 
Religion and Belief (1981), available at:  http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm. 
546 UN Human Rights Committee, 48th session, General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 1993, available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15.    
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The reports of Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, brought the significant variation in religious education policies to the 
attention of the UN. The reports submitted indicated that many states had compulsory 
religious instruction in the religion of the majority, and that minority religious 
communities and groups experienced difficulty in establishing their own religious 
institutions for religious practice and religious education.
547
  
Within this context, the Dakar Framework for Action (2000) emphasized the role 
of schools in general and religious education in particular in the promotion of tolerance 
and understanding among religious communities.
548
 The issue of religious intolerance 
and religious education, and the need to protect the rights of religious communities 
gained further significance in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 in the 
US (hereafter 9/11). The International Consultative Conference on School Education in 
Relation to Freedom of Religion or Belief, Tolerance and Non-Discrimination on 23-25 
November 2001 further highlighted the importance of designing an international 
educational strategy focusing on the right to freedom of religion and belief among 
students at the primary and the secondary educational levels.
549
  
Another UN initiative co-sponsored by Spain and Turkey called the United 
Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) was introduced in 2005 to counter 
increasing religious and cultural intolerance. Like other UN bodies, the High Level 
Group of the UNAOC stressed the significance of educating citizens about their own 
religion and the religion of others.
550
 Since its establishment, the member states of 
UNAOC seek to raise the consciousness of its citizens living at home and abroad on the 
issues of religious rights and religious tolerance.
551
 For instance, the Turkish 
                                               
547
 The annual reports on religious freedom and religious intolerance from 1987 to 2012 and sub-
commission reports on the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities are available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/Annual.aspx. 
548 The Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments (Paris: 
UNESCO, 2000), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf.  
549 For more information on the subject see UN General Assembly, Interim report of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on human Rights on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of 
discrimination based on religion or belief, A/56/253, July 31, 2001 available at:   
http://www.oslocoalition.org/html/project_school_education/final_document_madrid.html. 
550 UNAOC, Report on Education, Second High Level Group Meeting e-report, 26-28 February 2006, 
available at: http://www.unaoc.org/repository/8183Second%20Meeting%20of%20High-
level%20Group%20Report%20on%20Education.doc.pdf.   
551 It is important to note here that religious rights and religious education constitute only a minor portion 
of the issue areas the UNAOC deals with. Women rights, youth issues, and cultural exchanges constitute 
the majority of its concerns. 
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government (the co-chair of UNAOC High Level Group) has been (i) organizing 
conferences, seminars, workshops and panels on intra- and inter-religious dialogue, (ii) 
funding and organizing vocational training programs for religious leaders (imams) who 
will be appointed abroad, and (iii) organizing and encouraging student exchanges at 
different educational levels.
552
  
In addition to these UN initiatives, the EU, CoE, and OSCE have been 
instrumental since the 1990s in promoting religious education not only as a basic right, 
but also as a means to strengthen social cohesion and tolerance. In the case of Alevi 
religious education, these regional bodies played a significant role first by framing 
standards on rights of religious communities which, despite their problems, helped 
Alevi activists and interest groups legitimize their policy demands. Second, the 
European institutions provided new opportunity structures to influence the state policies 
in Germany and Turkey both directly and indirectly. 
 
 6.3. Regional Perspectives on Religious Education 
While the relationship between education and human rights has been an area of 
concern for the key European institutions, religious education rarely received attention. 
There are very few regional legally-binding provisions in the field of right to religious 
education. Within this context, Article 2 of the CoE Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights provided the founding legal provision in dealing with the 
demands for religious education. Regardless of the model of state-religion relations 
within a country, the role of states in protection of the right to religious education was 
noted as: 
   No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any 
functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State 
shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.
553
  
                                                                                                                                         
 
552 For more information on Turkey’s national strategy see T.C., Alliance of Civilizations National 
Strategy, (2006), available at: http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/Turkey-National-Strategy1.pdf, 
and T. C., Medeniyetler İttifakı İkinci Ulusal Eylem Planı, (2013), available at: 
http://www.medeniyetlerittifaki.org.tr/images/stories/trkiye%20kinci%20ulusal%20eylem%20plan.pdf 
553 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS 
No.: 009, opened for signature by the Member States on 20 March 1952, entered into force on 18 May 
1954 available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/. 
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It is important to note here that the legal provisions framed by the CoE do not compel 
member states to provide a system of education in accord with parental beliefs. It only 
recognizes the rights of parents to object to the content and structure of the education 
given to their children and withdraw their children from such forms of education should 
they disagree with the content. 
In addition to parental rights, minorities and religious communities’ rights to 
religious education, and the responsibilities of the states were also addressed in the legal 
framework of the European institutions. Article 12 of the CoE’s Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) stated that: 
1. The Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of 
education and research to foster knowledge of the culture, history and 
religion of their national minorities and of the majority. 
2. In this context the Parties shall inter alia provide adequate opportunities 
for teacher training and access to textbooks, and facilitate contacts 
among students and teachers of different communities. 
3. The Parties undertake to promote equal opportunities for access to 
education at all levels for persons belonging to national minorities.
554
  
Governing religious diversity and protecting the rights of the individuals and the 
religious communities has been a concern for the CoE since the late 1990s. In addition 
to the introduction of legally binding provisions, the CoE was involved in initiatives to 
promote tolerance for different religious groups and encourage principles of non-
discrimination. In 2002 the CoE began its first project, entitled “the challenge of 
intercultural education today: religious diversity and dialogue in Europe,” to address the 
issues emerging in the education system due to increasing religious diversity in Europe. 
As Cesar Bȋrzéa , the general rapporteur of the CoE meetings on education in the 1900s, 
notes, the aim of the project was “to construct an approach to intercultural learning that 
promotes dialogue, mutual understanding and living together.”555   
In 2003, experts in religious and intercultural education met in Paris to identify 
the key issues in relation to the religious dimension of intercultural education, and to 
assess the pedagogical implications of policy changes. The working group, including 
                                               
554 Council of Europe, The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and 
Explanatory Report, H(1995)010. The original document is available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/PDF_H(1995)010_FCNM_ExplanReport_e
n.pdf. 
555 Cesar Bȋrzéa, “Introduction,” in Religious diversity and intercultural education: a reference book for 
schools, John Keast, ed. (Paris: Council of Europe Publishing, 2007), 11.  
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the members from Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands and the 
UK, recommended that regardless of the model of religious education in a particular 
state, inclusion of education in religious diversity in school curriculums was necessary 
to counter rising religious intolerance.
556
 Following the 2004 Oslo Conference, the CoE 
organized another working group to prepare a guide for teachers, teacher trainers, 
administrators and policy makers to deal with the issue of religious diversity in schools.  
In addition to working groups and conferences, annual meetings begun in 2000 
further contributed to discussions of the role of religious institutions in both the 
promotion of human rights and addressing social and cultural issues in member 
states.
557
 In the 2004 meeting in Malta, the participants proposed establishing a regional 
program for teaching religion, along with a new CoE body focusing on education and 
religion, i.e. European Center for Religious Education.  
These recommendations laid the groundwork for the 2005 recommendation of 
the Parliamentary Assembly. In Recommendation 1720, the Parliamentary Assembly 
argued that introduction of religion in the curriculum of the primary and secondary 
schools would be beneficial in countering religious intolerance and discrimination. To 
that end, the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers should 
“encourage the governments of member states to ensure that religious studies are taught 
at the primary and secondary levels of state education.”558 The Assembly also warned 
that the structure and the content of religious education should (i) increase students’ 
knowledge of their own and other groups’ religious views, (ii) provide information on 
the history of the main religions, as well as on having no religion, (iii) provide an 
educational environment that protects students from religious radicalism, (iv) not breach 
the principle of non-assimilation and impose the values of a certain faith, (v) include 
specific vocational training compatible with previously mentioned criteria for the 
                                               
556 For more information on the CoE Project See Robert Jackson, Rethinking Religious Education and 
Plurality: Issues in Diversity and Pedagogy, (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004); Robert Jackson, “Is 
diversity Changing Religious Education? Religion, Diversity and Education in Today’s Europe,” in 
Religious Diversity and Education: Nordic Perspectives, ed. Geir Skeie, 11-28 (Müster: Wasmann, 
2009). 
557 Jackson, “Is diversity Changing Religious Education?,” 17-8.  
558 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1720 (REC_1720), (2005), available at:  
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta05/erec1720.htm 
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teachers of religion, and member states should supervise the training of teachers and 
preparation of syllabi.
559
     
The seminar on religious tolerance and dialogue in Kazan, Russia, held in 
February 2006, continued to address the needs for establishing regional centers and 
formulating regional strategies for the teaching of religion. In May of 2006, the 
Committee of Ministers discussed the 2005 recommendations made by the 
Parliamentary Assembly. Although they recognized the importance of instruction of 
religion in education, the policy recommendations of the Assembly were incorporated 
into the existing cultural and educational policy areas of the CoE rather than put under 
the purview of specially-established bodies and projects for religious education.
560
  
In the field of religious education, rather than ‘faith-based education’ the CoE 
bodies continued to emphasize ‘education about religions and beliefs’. Whether or not a 
member state provides faith-based education in public schools was considered to be a 
domestic issue, and member states were left to choose their own model for faith-based 
education.  As long as the structure and content of the education did not breach the 
rights of individuals and groups, the CoE bodies saw no reason to get involved in 
national education strategies.  
In addition to promoting education on religion and beliefs, the CoE bodies also 
emphasized strengthening the dialogue between different religious groups as a 
necessary measure to counteracting increasing religious intolerance. To that end, in May 
2008, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs formulated the White Paper on Intercultural 
Dialogue: Living Together as Equals in Dignity to draw attention to the importance of 
inter-faith dialogue.
561
 The White Paper argued that: 
   Not to engage in dialogue makes it easy to develop a stereotypical 
perception of the other, build up a climate of mutual suspicion, tension and 
anxiety, use minorities as scapegoats, and generally foster intolerance and 
discrimination.
562
 
                                               
559  See Article 14 of the Recommendation 1720.  
560 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Reply to Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1720 
(2005), Doc. 10944, 31 May 2006, available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=11244&Language=EN. 
561 Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living 
Together as Equals in Dignity, (Strasburg, 7 May 2008), available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf 
562 Ibid., 16. 
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Analysis of this and other documents launched by the CoE bodies in the last two 
decades indicates that the aim of the CoE is not to achieve homogeneity across 
European education systems. Rather than development of a single education model, the 
emphasis has been on the necessity of developing projects involving the promotion and 
application of human rights principles to education issues to develop models for policy 
and practice that can be adopted by member states.    
In contrast to CoE, OSCE mostly adopted a security-based approach in assuring 
the individual’s right to appropriate religious education in the region. Even though they 
were not legally binding, the documents of the OSCE in the field of religious education 
of minorities and religious communities contributed to the framing of standards and 
improvement of the rights protection regimes of the European states. The 1990, the 
OSCE Document on the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimensions of the Conference on the Security and Co-operation in Europe articulated a 
number of points related to the rights of minorities. Among those, Article 32 of the 
Copenhagen Document addressed the rights of national minorities to religious 
education, stating that “persons belonging to national minorities...have a right…to 
profess and practice their religion, including the acquisition, possession and use of 
religious materials, and to conduct religious educational activities in their mother 
tongue.”563 
Since the breach of rights has been a source of conflict in the region, the OSCE 
treated the issue of minority religious education as a security concern and in 1992 
established the post of High Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM) to 
strengthen states’ awareness of minority rights.564 The initiatives of the HCNM were 
instrumental in the development of a number of non-legally binding provisions on the 
issue. The Hague Recommendation, published in 1996, contributed to the framing of 
standards for the education of minorities. Although the document did not specifically 
deal with the issue of religious education, it began to clarify the extent of states’ 
responsibilities. The education rights of minorities were noted in the Hague 
Recommendation as: 
                                               
563 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), 
1990, 19, available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304. 
564 Max van der Stoel, the Netherlands Minister of State, was appointed as the first High Commissioner in 
December 1992, but began operations in January 1993. 
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   The right of national minorities to establish and manage their own 
institutions, including educational ones, is well grounded in international 
law and must be recognized as such. Although the State has the right to 
oversee this process from an  administrative perspective and in conformity 
with its own legislation, it must not prevent the enjoyment of this right by 
imposing unreasonable administrative requirements which might render it 
practically impossible for national minorities to establish their own 
educational institutions. 
   Although there is no formal obligation for States to fund these private 
establishments, these institutions should not be prevented from seeking 
resources from all domestic and international sources.
565
 
The OSCE did not specifically deal with religious education until the aftermath of 
9/11. Within the post-9/11 context, recommendations and guidelines framed in the field 
of education were treated as early-warning and conflict prevention mechanisms. Among 
these, the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public 
Schools (2007) is of particular significance as it provides a blueprint for the member 
states to enhance religious freedom through religious education policies.
566
 The Toledo 
Guiding Principles provided broad suggestions for the member states to reform their 
education policies, stressing (i) the importance of religion as a cultural factor, (ii) the 
role of education about the freedom of belief, and (ii) the promotion of mutual respect 
and tolerance between members of different religions and denominations.
567
   
According to the provisions of CoE and OSCE, the development of policies 
regarding the structure and content of education is the responsibility of the member 
states. Similarly, the regulation of religion and religion related issues are considered 
primarily a matter of domestic politics. In other words, the principle of subsidiary 
regulates the EU law. Within this context, EU institutions and officials rely on the 
existing international and regional provisions and recommendations in dealing with the 
issues on religion and education.
568
  
                                               
565 Organization for Security amd Co-operation in Europe, The Hague Recommendations Regarding the 
Education Rights of National Minorities, High Commissioner on National Minorities, October 1, 1996 
available at: http://www.osce.org/hcnm/32180?download=true. 
566 Olga Schihalejev, From Indifference to Dialogue? Estonian Young People, the School and Religious 
Diversity, (Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 195. 
567 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Toledo Guiding Principles about Religion and 
Beliefs in Public Schools, (2007), available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/29154.  
568 See Norman Doe, Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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Articles 14 and 165 of the TFEU provide more insight into the attitude of the EU 
in the field of religious education. In Article 14 the EU acknowledges the parental rights 
of the individuals, and states that: 
The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for 
democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the education and 
teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical 
and pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the 
national laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right.
 569
  
 
With Article 165 TFEU defines its role in the field of education in general and 
agrees to:  
contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and 
supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the 
Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education 
systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.
570
 
Even though the legal provisions of the EU has references to the protection of 
religious freedom and rights, the EU has yet to develop mechanisms for the protection 
of the rights of individuals, minorities, and religious communities in religious 
education. The Union mostly adopts a non-interventionist policy towards her members, 
particularly in the field of religion in general.
571
 Particularly on issues concerning 
minorities, the EU does not take action unless the proposed action can be achieved by 
the individual member state. With regards to the protection of the right to religious 
education, the EU has more leverage on the candidate states: if the existing domestic 
institutional arrangements threaten the rights of individuals and/or groups in a candidate 
country, the EU can demand policy and institutional changes as part of the accession 
process.
572
  
                                               
569 European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 
December 2007, 2010/C 83/01, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML. 
570 Ibid. 
571 The rulings the Court of Justice provide a number of examples for the application of the principle of 
subsidiary. Examples include the rejection of the court to provide ruling on the morality of abortion, and 
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572 For more information on the transformative power of the EU on domestic policy change see Keith 
Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, eds., The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University 
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Increasing cultural and religious diversity in Europe over the last two decades has 
generated new problems in the implementation of norms of the right to religious 
education particularly. The right of migrants or third country nationals to religious 
education has become a problem in debates on integration and democratic citizenship in 
Europe. A European consensus has emerged on the need for strengthening the role of 
religious education in public school education to strengthen in turn the intercultural and 
interfaith dialogue within and between the members of the European community and 
third country nationals.
573
 Particularly in the aftermath of 9/11 all three institutions 
began to focus more on the issues of religious education in Europe. To strengthen the 
dialogue between different religions and between denominations, each European 
institution organized a number of initiatives focused on the recognition of religious 
diversity and encouragement of religious tolerance, rather than the harmonization of 
policies regulating religious education. Even though the three European institutions 
acknowledged the right to faith-based education, none of them forced their member or 
candidate states to adopt a specific model for religious education. As a result, the 
reforms and transformations in the religious education policies are mostly a product of 
domestic concerns and needs. Unless, serious rights violations, or security concerns 
emerge, the regional organizations do not deal with the issues of religious education in 
legal terms.   
 
 6.4. Right to Religious Education: Teaching of Alevi Issues in Germany 
The religious instruction in schools is guaranteed by Article 7 of the Basic Law 
and it is the responsibility of the federal states (Länder). Even though there are slight 
variations in the organization of religious education between different states in 
Germany, religious education is treated as “an “ordinary school subject” to be taught in 
accordance with the principles of the respective religious community.
574” While the 
                                                                                                                                         
Eastern Europe, (Ithaca and London: Cornel University Press. 2005), and Tanja Börzel, “The 
Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded: The Limits of External Europeanization,” Kolleg-
Forschergruppe (KFG) Working Paper Series, No. 11, (February 2010).  
573 See Hans Günter Heimbrock, Christoph Th. Scheilke and Peter Schreiner, “Introduction,” in Towards 
Religious Competence: Diversity as a Challenge for Education in Europe, eds. Hans Günter Heimbrock 
et al., 9-20, (Münster: LIT, 2001). 
574 Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe, with special reference to Austria, England, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands,” in Religion and Education in Europe: Developments, Contexts and 
Debates, eds. Jackson, et al.  (Münster: Waxmann, 2007), 75. 
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states provide funding for structural issues (i.e. financing teachers, funding schools), 
religious communities determine the content and nature of religious education. The 
rights of the religious communities to decide the training of teachers, and content of the 
textbooks and the syllabi, are secured in the Basic Law.  Article 140 clarifies the rights 
and duties of the religious communities with corporation of public law [KÖR – 
Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts] status.575 Due to the religious heritage of the 
country, only the Protestant and Catholic Churches were granted the right and duty to 
organize the content and scope of religious education in accordance with the values and 
principles of their denomination. As a result, groups with non-corporate status do not 
have the right to determine the instruments and content of religious education. The legal 
framework regulating religious education poses a challenge particularly for Islamic 
communities.
576
 Since KÖR status requires the religious communities to adopt/have a 
hierarchical organizational structure, which can negotiate with the state on behalf of the 
religious community; Islam with no church-like structure lacks the means to fulfill the 
criteria.
577
  
The previously discussed provisions about religious education had two significant 
effects on incorporation of Muslim communities into the education framework of the 
European states: (i) equality and non-discrimination principles emphasized in the 
documents strengthen the Muslim individual’s right to religious education, and (ii) the 
role attributed to religious education in integration provide Muslim 
communities/individuals with new opportunity structures.
578
 The challenge in the 
German case has been not ‘if’ but ‘how’ the federal states would incorporate religious 
education of the German Muslim migrant communities.  
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 Gerdien Jonker “Muslim Emancipation? Germany’s Struggle over Religious Pluralism,” in Religious 
Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: the Position of Islam in European Union,  eds. Wasif A.R. 
Shadid, and Pieter Sjoerd van Koningveld, (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2011), 39. 
576 The 2009 report by the Federal Office for Migrants and Refugees has shown that the Muslims were 
constituting approximately 5 per cent of the total German population. The expressed percentage of the 
Muslims ranged from 4,6 per cent to 5,2 per cent. Among these the Alevis account for 13 per cent of the 
Muslim population; whereas Sunnis constituted the majority (74 per cent). See Sonja Haug, Stephanie 
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Westphalia,” in Islam and Muslims in Germany, eds. Ala Al-hamarneh, and Jörn hielmann, 241-266 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008). 
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By the late 1990s, after generations of labor-migrants, asylum seekers and 
refugees, the population of Germany has become manifold. Starting with the 1998 
coalition between SDP and the Greens a lively debate on the organization of German 
society dominated the political and public debates: “was German society able to 
consider itself as multicultural society, or was it still to learn how to become of such a 
society first?”579 In the 2000s, Europeanization of the citizenship and immigration 
regimes acted as catalysis for transformation of the policies on education. The 
citizenship reform of 2000 was the first step to transform the old citizenship regime of 
Germany based on the norms of ius sanguinis. The change in the Citizenship Act 
facilitated an increase in the number of naturalizations. The second important step was 
the introduction of the 2005 Law for Managing and Containing Immigration and for the 
Regulation of the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens and Foreigners, also known 
as Immigration Act [Zuwanderungsgesetz].
580
 The most significant outcome of the 
Immigration Act was the start of integration courses of the new immigrants.
581
 The new 
reforms also introduced new opportunity structures for the migrant communities to 
communicate their interests.  
To facilitate the integration of the Muslim immigrants, and enhance the dialogue 
between the German and non-German residents, education system and policies had to 
be revised. The increasing demands of the Muslim communities and organizations put 
further pressures on the federal states. The more the faith-based migrant interest groups 
spread and organized, the more they sought ways to aggregate their interests to policies. 
Since the right to control religious education is shaped by the neo-corporatist interest 
group system of Germany, the policy demands and strategies of each religious group 
(Sunni, Shiite, or Alevi) involve competitive right-claims. Rosenow-Williams notes that 
“to facilitate their activities, Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany seek 
recognition both as official cooperation partners of the German government and as 
                                               
579 Thorsten Knauth, “Religious Education in Germany: a Contribution to Dialogue or Source of Conflict? 
Historical and Contextual Analysis of the Development since the 1960s,” in Religion and Education in 
Europe, Jackson, et al. 243-66 
580 Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany: New 
Developments in the 21st Century, (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 
581 It is important to note here that the scope of the Act was limited, since it did not involve clauses for the 
‘old’ minority groups. The focus of the integration classes were mostly remained on language and 
“culture” of Germany. 
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religious communities or corporations of public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen 
Rechts).”582   
  Since the late 1990s, the courts played a significant role in institutionalization of 
both orthodox and heterodox interpretations of Islam in the German states. By the mid-
2000s, a number of court cases were communicated on the issue of religious education 
by the Muslim umbrella organizations. In Berlin, the integration projects were launched 
under the slogan “Promote diversity; Strengthen Cohesion”, [Vielfalt fördern; 
Zusammenhalt stärken].583 The emphasis on diversity made the experience of the 
Muslim immigrant communities was significantly different than the other German 
states.  
The ruling of the case submitted by the Islamic Federation of Berlin [IFB – 
Islamische Föderation in Berlin] on religious education set the case law on integration 
of Muslim/Islamic communities into the Berlin’s religious education framework.584  
Following the example of IFB in March 2002 Culture Center of the Anatolian Alevis 
[AAKM – Anadolu Alevileri Kültür Merkezi]585 submitted an application, and in April 
2002 was granted permission to organize Alevi classes in public primary schools.
 586
  
Since the right to teach is intertwined with acquisition of KÖR status, the decision of 
the Berlin court was significant for recognizing Alevism as a genuine religion. Starting 
with the 2002-2003 academic year, AAKM became responsible for Alevi religious 
education in Berlin.
587
  
In North Rhine-Westphalia, the Alevi interest groups followed a different path to 
acquire right to organize Alevi religious courses. The Federal Court, while rejected the 
demands of the Council of Islam and Central Center of Muslims, granted AABF the 
right to organize classes. As a result, not only Alevism was recognized as a separate 
                                               
582 Rosenow-Williams, Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam, 55. 
583 See Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, “Vielfalt fördern; Zusammenhalt stärken: Das Berliner 
Integrationskonzept - Handlungsfelder, Ziele, Leitprojekte,” printed paper 16/0715, July 3, 2007.   
584 “Allah an der Tafel,” Die Zeit, June 9, 2004. 
585 The organization is later renamed as Berlin Alevi Society Cem House [Berlin Alevi Toplumu Cemevi] 
586 Jozsa, Islam and Education in Europe, 77. 
587 AAKM guidelines for the organization and content of the religion courses state that the students 
receive separate certificates/reports for the Alevi religious courses. The grades students are given grades, 
these do not affect whether or not the student passes a grade level.  For more information on the subject 
see Berlin Alevi Toplumu Cemevi, Berlin İlkokullarında Alevilik Dersleri, 2001, available at: 
http://www.alevi.org/images/aru/ARU_Flyer_17112011.pdf?phpMyAdmin=wjZ3oP7TwJyroJWxwR2Bc
Mefub6.  
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entity, but also unlike their Muslim counterparts, the AABF was granted a de facto 
religious corporation status.
588
   
In Hamburg, the Alevi initiatives for religious education followed a different path. 
The control of the organization of the religious education in public schools was entirely 
left to the Protestant Church.  Since, Catholics had private denominational schools and 
there were no other ‘legally recognized religious communities’589 the Alevi 
organizations established alliances with the Protestant Church. In the late 1990s, a 
project by the Protestant Church, aiming to enhance cooperation and dialogue between 
different religions, enabled introduction of Alevism into the school curriculum. Through 
the “Round Table for Interfaith Religious Classes” project, Alevism became part of the 
curriculum first in primary schools in 1998 and then in secondary schools in 2003.
590
  
The most important development that secured the rights of the Alevi community 
in Hamburg was the signing and ratification of a contract between the Alevi religious 
community and the Hamburg Senate in August 15, 2012. With this unique contract, the 
Hamburg senate (i) recognized AABF as the official representative of the Alevi 
community in Hamburg, (ii) recognized Alevism as a separate denomination, and (iii) 
guaranteed faith-based rights of Alevis. The 11 page document declared the mutual 
rights and responsibilities of the AABF and the City of Hamburg. Hüseyin Mat, the 
current Chair of ABBF highlighted the significance of the document in his speech 
during the signature ceremony as: 
   While Alevism and 800 000 Alevis are recognized by our new homeland, 
the 20 million Alevi residing in Turkey not only lack religious or minority 
rights, but also assimilated 
   In Germany our cem houses are acknowledged as places of worship and 
officially recognized; whereas, the Turkish Prime Minister R. Tayyip 
Erdoğan considers our cem houses as monstrosities. 
   While our religious holidays are recognized in Germany, the state of 
Republic of Turkey does not recognize any of our holidays or sacred 
days.
591
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The success of AABF in transformation of the policies on religious education,
592
  and 
the increasing recognition of the German Alevis as a unique religious community in 
different states also had impact on the strategies and content of the right-claims of the 
domestic Alevi interest groups in Turkey.    
 
6.5. The Right to Alevi Religious Education in Turkey:  
The Impact of European Actors 
 
The education in general is highly centralized in Turkey. Unlike the case in 
Germany, the religious education in Turkey is organized and monitoted by the state 
institutions. The Constitutions, laws regulation education and instructions, government 
programmes, development plans and the National Education Councils shape the 
structure and the content of education in the schools.   
In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the state began to re-emphasize the role of 
religion and the significance of religious educaion to secure the course of secularism, 
and to strengthen the bonds among the citizens through ‘correct’ instruction of religion 
(Islam). To that end, the new government introduced compulsory courses on religion 
and morals. Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution declared that “education and instruction 
in religion and ethics shall be conducted under the State supervision and control. 
Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula 
of primary and secondary schools.”593   
Except the children of the minorities identified in the Laussane Treaty all students 
were expeced to attend the courses on religion and morals. However, since the aim of 
the law was to control and ‘correct’ the information flow on Islam for security reasons, 
the content of the curricula and the text-books include information only about the Sunni 
interpretations of Islam with little references to other world religions. Even after the re-
transition to democracy, the organization and the content of these courses continued to 
be biased.      
                                               
592 AABF through various initiatives secured the right to organize Alevi religion courses in 7 states. The 
total number of students attending to Alevi religion courses is around 1.200 as of 2013. See AABF 
“Internet Üzerinden Alevilik Dersleri (ARU) için Başvuru Bilgileri,” press release February 25, 2013, 
available at http://alevi.com/TR/internet-uzerinden-alevilik-dersleri-aru-icin-basvuru-bilgileri/ 
593 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey as amended on October 17, 2001, available at 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC
_OF_TURKEY.pdf 
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Consequently, the compulsory nature of the courses on religion and morals has 
become one of the major concerns of the Alevi rights movement in Turkey. Starting 
with the 1990 Alevi declaration, the Alevi intellectuals and interest groups began to 
emphaze the need for a revision in Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution. Even though 
some revisions were made in the text-books in 2001 to include some of the prominent 
figures of the Alevi faith, they were labeled as cosmetic changes.
594
  
The more the domestic administrative courts declined the lawsuits of the Alevi 
citizens on the issue, the more ECtHR emerged as a new legal opportunity structure to 
justify the demands of the Alevi community, and put pressure on the Turkish state. The 
Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey case in the ECtHR and the following law suits 
communicated to the local court in 2008 led to increasing pressures on government for 
policy-change on religious education. Following the Alevi rapprochement project of 
AKP, instruction of Alevi faith and practices became a part of the curriculum in 2011. 
The status and the content of religion education continued to be criticized by the 
domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups following the introduction of the new 
education reform in 2012. Through an analysis of the interaction between the EU, 
ECtHR, Turkish State, Alevi community in Turkey and the transnational Alevi 
organizations in Europe, the sections below focus on these said events, and elaborate the 
multi-layered mechanism of impact. 
  
6.5.1. ECtHR-ization of the Individual Citizen Action 
 
Turkey’s membership to CoE provided new opportunity structures for the 
individuals belonging to minorities to communicate violations of their rights in Turkey 
to European institutions, and seek leverage in transforming domestic practices through 
cases brought to the ECtHR. Most frequent cases brought to the attention of the court by 
the Alevi citizens are on the violations on Article 9 of European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). The pioneering case on the issue of religious education was the Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey case,
595
 which set the case-law.  
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In the law suit, Hasan Zengin accused Turkey for violating his parental rights on 
his daughter’s education. The state representatives in their defense highlighted the 
“unbiased” nature of Turkish education, and claimed that the syllabus “did not take into 
consideration the vision of members of mezhep [a branch of Islam] or tarikat [a 
religious order] represented in the country.” After the assessment of the case, ECtHR 
acknowledged that although 9
th
 grade text book included some information on Alevi 
religious figures, the overall content of the text-books and the curriculum was 
insufficient to address the demands of Zengin. Additionally, the compulsory nature of 
the religious education was a further violation point. The ECHR ruled that “the 
exemption procedure is not an appropriate method and does not provide sufficient 
protection” since it required citizens to declare their religious affiliation.596  
The decision was celebrated by both the domestic and transnational Alevi interest 
groups. Even though the Turkish state did not comply with the ruling, non-compliance 
shape the course of the public and international debate on Alevi minority rights. The 
case also found its way to the EU’s challenge on minority regime in Turkey. Starting 
from 2004 the development and outcomes of the case were used by the commission 
both to determine the problems, and monitor the particular issues regarding the 
protection of the rights of the Alevi community. The Commission reports monitored the 
progress of the case between 2004 and 2007, and continued to bring the non-compliance 
of the Turkish state to the court judgment. 
 
6.5.2. Transnational and Domestic Linkages on the Issue of Religious Education 
 
 The ECtHR trial paved the way for emergence of a number of joint activities 
between the domestic and transnational Alevi interest groups. The ABF and its sister 
organizations campaigned during the trial period both to attract the attention of the 
media to the ECtHR trial and raise consciousness on the issue. Since Kazım Genç, the 
legal representative of Hasan Zengin, was also an Alevi activist from PSAKD there was 
credible information flow on the progress of the case between organizations.  
 The progress of the case was also monitored by the CHP MPs in the TBMM.  By 
framing questions on the issue the MPs tried to keep the issue of religious education on 
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the agenda. In this early period, the AKP officials did not consider the law suit as an 
issue. In response to Ali Rıza Gülçiçek’s questions on religious education, Hussein 
Çelik, the Minister of Education, legitimized the position of the government on the issue 
as: “in accordance to our state’s programme for alignment with the aquis, our Ministry 
is organizing education initiatives, and with respect to alignment with the aquis there is 
no problem with the content and structure of the Religious Culture and Ethics 
Knowledge courses.”597   
In 2005 to put more pressure on Turkish government ABF submitted a petition 
to EU Parliament including 1 million signatures asking for dissolution of compulsory 
religion courses in Turkey. The three major federations ABF, AVF and ADF also 
lobbied to include the Alevi demands and issues in the 2005 progress report. In this 
period, foundations of another lawsuit were laid by CEM Foundation, who sought a 
revision in the content of the religious education rather than its structure. On June 22, 
2005, 14 applicants submitted a petition to the Ministry of National Education, 
demanding a revision in the content of religion education. The applicants demanded 
revisions in the curriculum in accordance to a consultation with officials of the Alevi 
faith, and asked Alevi culture and philosophy to be incorporated into the program. The 
applicants also called for revisions in the training of teachers of religious education. In 
its response, the Ministry emphasized the “supra-confessional approach” of the 
curriculum preparation process and declined the request. Following the response letter 
of the Ministry, a class-action suit was filed in the same year. After exhausting all 
domestic options, the case was introduced to ECtHR on February 2, 2011 and 
communicated on October 26, 2012.
598
 Like the Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey 
case the Turkish state is accused of violation of the Articles 9 and 14 and Protocol 1.2 
of the ECHR. 
The announcement of the judgment of the Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey 
case in 2007, led to a change in the way the law was interpreted in the local courts. 
While some courts continued to refuse to exempt students, others ruled in favor of the 
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598 The case is still pending. During the interview with Hıdır Akbayır on October 10, 2012, I was 
informed the case was about to be communicated to the government and the court was waiting for the 
‘defense’ of the Republic of Turkey on the issue.  See also ECtHR , Sofuoğlu and others v Turkey, 
(application no. 21163/11) (October 26, 2012) available at: 
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applicants.
599
 In March 2008, the Council of State issued a ruling aligning itself with the 
judgment of the ECtHR ruling in 2007.
600
  Even though the Turkish state did not 
comply with the ruling, non-compliance shaped the course of the public and 
international debate on Alevi minority rights.  The case also found its way to the EU’s 
challenge on minority regime in Turkey.  Starting from 2004 the development and 
outcomes of the case were used by the commission both to determine the problems, and 
monitor the particular issues regarding the protection of the rights of the Alevi 
community. The Commission reports monitor the progress of the case between 2004 
and 2007, and continue to bring the non-compliance of the Turkish state to the court 
judgment.  
   
6.5.3. AKP and the Reforms in the field of Religious Education 
 
 Increasing pressures from below, external pressures from the EU and the 
ECtHR, accompanied with increasingly lenient attitude of post-Islamist intellectuals 
emerged as a catalyst for the incumbent government to officially recognize ‘Alevi 
situation’ as a problem in 2007. In this period AKP promoted organization and 
maintenance of a dialogue between different state institutions, political parties, 
bureaucrats and (Alevi and non-Alevi) artists, civil society organizations, interest 
groups and academics to discuss the problems of the Alevi community in Turkey.  
As previously discussed in chapter 5, the workshops particularly problematized (i) 
the demand for a definition for the community; hence determining its boundaries, (ii) 
the status of the cem houses, (iii) the status and organization of DİB, (iv) the status and 
content of the compulsory lessons in religious culture and ethics, (v) along with the 
status of dedes as religious leaders, and (vi) de facto and de jure discrimination of Alevi 
citizens in the public and state-owned institutions. Other issues, such as the status of 
Madimak Hotel as the symbol of violent discrimination against the Alevi community 
were discussed. The workshops were designed to facilitate to communicate the 
concerns, perceptions and recommendations of the domestic Alevi organizations to the 
state officials.  
                                               
599 Massicard, Alevis in Turkey and Europe, 158. 
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The first workshop (June 3-4, 2009) was significant for identifying the variation 
among the Alevi actors on religious education. Even though each group emphasized the 
need for equal citizenship rights in their speeches, the interpretation of “equality” 
differedt significantly among the Alevi actors.  While the groups with competitive 
claims asked transformation in the content of the religious education, the groups with 
reactive and proactive claims focused on the structure of the religious education in 
Turkey.  In other words, while the former groups has stressed on the principles of non-
discrimination, the latter has drawn the attention of the government to the principles of 
non-assimilation.  
For instance, the representatives from CEM foundation, demanded neutrality in 
the content of the religious education text-books; and asked the government to conduct 
extensive revisions in the content of the curriculum. Fermani Altun, the chair of World 
Ehl-i Bayt Foundation, in his speeches emphasized the significance of faith-based 
knowledge, and inter-faith dialogue, and suggested that: “distorted, misrepresented 
knowledge on beliefs is a danger to humanity.”601 The representatives from ABF and 
ADF put emphasis on the on-compliance of Turkey with the decisions of the 
international courts and called for a change in the structure of religious education, rather 
than it’s content. Tekin Özdil, the Chair of HBVAKT, emphasized the need for a policy 
change on the issue of compulsory religious education.
602
  
The experience of Alevis in Germany particularly shaped the debate on 
reorganization of courses on religion.
603
 The participants of the third workshop (August 
19, 2009) also tried to propose solutions to the problem. By drawing lessons from the 
German experience the representatives called for a solution within the existing legal 
framework. The main discussion revolved around the content of the courses rather than 
their structure.
604
 However, as the final report indicates, the workshops did not generate 
a consensus on the issue of religious education.  
In response to the criticisms on the content of religious education text-books, the 
Ministry of education prepared new textbooks to be used in the 2011-2012 school year.  
Starting from the 4
th
 grade books, the new material introduced concept and issues 
                                               
601 T.C. Devlet Bakanlığı, 1. Alevi Çalıştayı, (Ankara, January 3-4, 2009), 70.   
602 Ibid, 95. 
603 Ibid, 32, 163  
604 Ibid. 64, 66-8 & 150 
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related to Alevi faith. Detailed accounts of Alevism were a subject of the books from 7
th
 
to 12
th
 grade.  However, in the new text-books Alevism was defined as a ‘way of 
thought,’ rather than a religion or a sect. The chapters on Alevism were placed under the 
“Sufi interpretations within Islam” section of the books.  
Additionally, in the text-books an Alevi is defined as: “a person, who loves, 
respects and follows St. Ali.” The definition also emphasized the intertwined nature of 
Islam and Alevism and claimed “Alevis are Muslims who believe the unity of God; 
accept Muhammed as the last prophet; accept Quran as the holly book and love Prophed 
Muhammed and his Ahl al-Bayt.” The extension of the concept of Alevi and Alevism is 
so broad that it echoes the words of prime minster Erdoğan “If Alevism is the love of 
Ali, we all see ourselves as devoted Alevis.”605  
While the inclusion of other interpretations of Islam, i.e. Alevism, Caferism, 
Bektashim, into the textbooks could be taken as an indicator of increasing religious 
pluralism in religious education, the on-going emphasis on the Sunni interpretations of 
Islam made the revision initiatives of the AKP government nothing more that cosmetic 
changes. The content of the textbooks and curriculum in this period continued to be 
dominated by “education of a religion” rather “education about religions”.606  
On September 2011, the new initiatives on education were introduced with the 
legislative decree no. 625. The new education reform, popularly known as the “4+4+4 
system”, introduced new elective courses in the field of religious education. The 
absence of changes in the organization and content of the compulsory courses, the 
ambiguity in the criteria for selection of the new religious elective courses drew heavy 
criticisms in both TBMM and media. The Alevi interest groups feared the new electives 
would become de facto compulsory courses. In its criticism of the new education 
reform, ERG [Education Reform Initiative] highlighted the significance of making a 
differentiation between elective courses and courses given upon request.  ERG argued 
that since the former is more binding than the latter (i.e. has an effect on passing a grade 
                                               
605 Ruşen Çakır, and Fehmi Çalmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Bir Dönüşüm Öyküsü, (Istanbul: Metis 
Yayınları, 2001),  229–30. 
606 Education Reform Initiative’s report on the 2011 policies and practices on education also highlighted 
the limited scope of revisions in the textbooks of the 2011-2012 academic year and claimed that the 
changes involved limited number of additions and re-editing of few sub-chapters in the books. See ERG, 
Eğitim İzleme Raporu 2011, (Istanbul: Sabanci University, 2012), 108-10. 
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level), introduction of new religion courses cannot secure the religious freedoms and 
rights of both parents and the students.
607
  
The 2012 – 2013 academic year was marked with a number of interest group 
activism. In addition to the organization of rallies to protest the AKP policies, the Alevi 
interest groups by preparing reports on the new forms discrimination towards Alevis in 
the implementation of the 4+4+4 reform policies. Domestic interest groups collect 
testimonies of “forced election” of courses on Qur’an and the life of Prophet 
Muhammad. The reports prepared by the Alevi interest groups, by combining 
testimonial information with statistical information, tried to legitimize the concerns of 
the Alevi activists and raise consciousness of the media and the public. 
608
   
  
 6.6. Conclusion 
The preceding analysis indicates that there are no universal standards on religious 
education, and the European jurispuridance only deals with the right to religious 
education as part of the human rights. Despite the emphasis on the significance of the 
role of education on religionby the three European institutions, i.e. EU, CoE and OSCE, 
no regulations were introduced to standardize the right to religious education or 
religious freedoms in the states of the European Community. The link between religion 
and education is considered as a means to enchance the co-operation and dialogue 
between the religious communities. However, neither organization seeks to harmonize 
the content or the structure of the religious education. 
Among the three European intergovernmental organizations, the CoE through 
ECHR and ECtHR provides mechanisms to supervise and pressure the member states to 
compy with the requirements of the treaties they ratified. Despite the legal leverage the 
CoE has, the power of the organization to transform the institutions and the policies in 
member states is limited. Nonetheless, the limited leverage of the ECtHR can be 
                                               
607 Ibid. 
608 The latest report prepared by ABF member Hubyar Sultan Alevi Culture Association [HSAKD – 
Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği] indicates in the 2012-2013 education year Alevi children were 
forced to select courses on religion. Accordingly, in some region the parents were threatened and told 
their children would be unsubscribed from school records in case of non-selection. Sections of the 
document can be found in Evrensel newspaper dated 31 January 2013, where the chair of HSAKD is also 
a writer. See  Hubyar Sultan Alevi Kültür Derneği 2012 Hak İhlalleri İzleme Raporu, HSAKD press 
release, 30.01.2013 available at http://www.evrensel.net/news.php?id=47689    
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expanded through the EU accession process. The more the incentives to comply with 
the European norms on rights increase – i.e. the more the likelihood of membership to 
EU increases – the more the likelihood of the candidate states to amend and transform 
the institutional restrains expected to increase. However, the non-compliance of Turkey 
still reflects the limits of protection rights regimes in Europe. 
In Turkey, the struggle on Alevi religious education led to emergence of several 
boomerang patterns. The Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey case and increasing 
cooperation between ABF and AABF in transnational space were influential in 
attracting the attention of key European actors to the conditions of Alevis in Turkey. 
While the EU monitored the relationship between the Turkish state and the Alevi 
community through progress reports, the CoE put pressures on the Turkish government 
through the legally-binding rulings of the ECtHR. However, the absence of strict 
European standards to regulate states’ behavior on religious education, provided room 
for the Turkish political actors to introduce enough reforms to counter the increasing 
international criticisms without making significant alterations to the existing structures. 
Additionally, the fragmentation within the Alevi demands for rights further provided 
room for the government to legitimize its tactical concessions on the subject matter.  
The concessions introduced by the AKP government starting with 2007 
accompanied by introduction of new mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination. The 
most recent ‘4+4+4’ reform, while met the demands of Islamic revivalists by increasing 
the opportunities in instruction of religion, created new problems for the Alevi 
community. Both the groups seeking exemption from religious courses, and groups 
demanding transformation of religious education into education about religion have 
mobilized since 2012 to alert the media and the international actors.  
In contrast, the German case depicts a successful inclusion/integration story. The 
absence of structures and policies blocking the access of the Alevi interest groups to the 
decision-making processes enabled the Alevi community in Germany to better 
communicate and aggregate its interests. In Germany, the transnational networks only 
had an indirect affect in Alevi organizations struggle for rights. The increasing emphasis 
on the significance of integration, along with the increasing improvements in the 
conditions of the migrants, enabled the German Alevi interest groups to better 
communicate and aggregate the Alevi demands. Since the conditions of the right to 
control/organize religious education differed in each state’s legal framework, the speed 
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and manner of inclusion of Alevism varied in each German state. However, the most 
significant outcome of this process has been the gradual transformation of the AABF 
into a central and national level organization. 
 There are currently, 1,200 students enrolled in courses on Alevi religion, and the 
organization of the course is determined based on the legal framework of the German 
state [Länder]. The organization of the lectures, the preparation of the content of the text 
books, the enrollment procedures, and the education of the instructors are determined by 
the German states’ legal frameworks. In this process, the right to Alevi religious 
education not only seen as a parental right, but also is considered as an individual right. 
The consent of the parents is only a requirement for the students younger than 14. Any 
student who is older than 14 and wants to enroll in the classes can do so by filling out a 
consent form granting AABF the right to organize a class on Alevism in his/her school.  
The difference between the experiences of the German and Turkish Alevis shows 
that the emergence and the success of the ‘boomerang patterns’ depand primarily on the 
domestic institutional arrangements, and the leverage the intergovernmental 
organizations can exercise. Since neither the EU nor the CoE can force Turkey to adopt 
and implement policies to protect the rights of individuals and groups, the diffusion of 
the norms on rights remains shallow. Nonetheless, the Alevi TANs were successful in 
increasing the visibility of the community, and raising the consciousness of the public 
on Alevi issues. The networks established by the Alevi citizens and the Alevi interest 
groups (i) carry and re-frame the demands, and needs of the Alevi community on 
religious education, (ii) seek to insert the framed right-claims into the policy debates, 
and (iii) pressure for the transformation of the existing education policies from below.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation has sought to provide a deeper insight on the inclusion of 
religious minorities into the political processes, by focusing on the specific case of 
Alevis in Turkey. What makes the Alevis such a fascinating case is their idiosyncrasy. 
They are geographically dispersed within and across borders, and linguistically and 
ethnically heterogeneous. More importantly, they possess divergent resources, 
motivations and opportunities to articulate and aggregate their interests.  
To understand the dynamics of the political inclusion of the Alevis, the preceding 
chapters have provided discussions on (i) the dilemmas of the international and regional 
rights regimes in framing standards on rights of the individuals and groups, and the 
duties of the states, (ii) the role of opportunity structures in facilitating the emergence, 
organization and transformation of interest groups, (iii) the links between the identity 
and interests of Alevis, (iv) the relationship between the domestic and transnational the 
Alevi interest groups, (v) the limits of formal representative institutions in 
communication of the Alevi interests, and (vi) the impact of the transnational the Alevi 
advocacy networks on transforming domestic policies.  
To that end, Chapter 1 focused on the Alevi question in Turkey and questioned 
the status of Alevis as a minority. Since recognition as a minority provides special 
measures to protect and preserve cultural identity. Over the analysis of the international 
and regional norms, it has thus been explained that the individualist bias in the human 
rights regimes and the ambiguity in regional and international minority rights pose a 
challenge to guarantee recognition and protection of rights of marginalized groups. The 
absence of clear and universal definition of minority enabled states to have the final say 
in their dealings with ethnic, religious, racial and linguistic groups. This, in turn has 
caused the non-recognition of the Alevis particularly in the context of Turkey.   
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Based on these observations, the remaining chapters focused on the actors and 
strategies of Alevi struggle for recognition of their identity and the channels they use to 
communicate and aggregate their identity-based interests. Since the analysis is based on 
the assumption that the Alevi community cannot rely on the Turkish state to establish 
representative bodies (i.e. there are no quotas or other affirmative action policies), this 
dissertation: 
(i) clarified the link between identity and interests of Alevis, to 
understand how the heterogeneous and fragmented collective identity of 
Alevis shape formulation and aggregation of shared interests. 
(ii) questioned the legitimacy of those who represent Alevis in public 
life (i.e. political parties, civil society organizations or international 
organizations), as most Alevi representative actors are self-appointed; 
(iii) argued that the representation of Alevis can only be understood by 
examining both the domestic and transnational political contexts.  
(iv) concluded that the transnational actors have limited impact in 
enhancing and maintaining domestic change. 
The discussions on Germany and Turkey have shown that the opportunity 
structures have played a constitutive role in the emergence and transformation of right-
seeking Alevi interest groups. In Germany the institutional frameworks encouraged 
framing of Alevi identity as a heterogeneous religious identity; and provided channels 
for Alevi groups to communicate their interests at the local and regional (Länder) 
levels. Particularly, neo-corporatism of Germany and the reforms in citizenship and 
immigrant regimes in the late 1990s enabled Alevi interest groups to transform 
themselves into ‘religious corporations’ from cultural associations. Since their founding 
in the late 1970s, the content and the scope of the German Alevi interest groups adapt to 
the social and political conditions of their host country. The gradual unification of 
various local and regional Alevi networks and organizations under AABF, and the 
acknowledgement of the organization as the representative of the Alevi congregation in 
Hamburg in 2012 are directly related to the institutional design in Germany.   
In contrast, the Turkish institutional frameworks and opportunity structures 
discouraged the organization and unification of the Alevi organizations at the national 
or local levels. Additionally, the social, economic and political transformations in the 
country led to emergence of different Alevism interpretations, which in turn pave the 
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way for the development of a fragmented and heterogeneous Alevi associational life. 
The limited representation of the Alevi interests in TBMM and the absence of 
mechanisms facilitating direct access to the decision making processes, encouraged 
Alevi interest groups to seek allies either to coerce the Turkish state for policy and 
institutional change, or enhance dialogues so that they would receive incentives similar 
to those of their Sunni counterparts. However, the multiple and opposing demands of 
the Turkish Alevi interest groups reduce the likelihood of domestic policy change in 
favor of the Alevis. Unlike the German Alevi interest groups, the groups in Turkey have 
to compete with each other for support and resources.     
The discussion on the strategies of the Alevi interest groups on the issue of Alevi 
religious education also provides insights on how the non-discrimination and equality 
principles could be used by a state to enhance the exclusion and assimilation of a 
marginalized group. Even though regional and international rights regimes recognize 
the right to religious education, it does not consider it as a collective right. Additionally, 
non-discrimination and equality tenets determine the content and scope of these 
standards. As a result, when incorporated into policies the notion of non-discrimination 
does not guarantee non-assimilation. Instead it implies ‘equal treatment/opportunity’, 
which can maintain, or strengthen de facto inequalities and discrimination in a country. 
In the Turkish case, the emphasis on undifferentiated citizenship and a general policy of 
equality leads all education reforms to be exclusionary. Both the compulsory courses on 
religious culture and ethics and the new elective courses introduced with the 4+4+4 
reform are compatible with an overall strategy of equality, but not of non-assimilation.        
The equality principle that dominates the regional and international provisions, 
can impede, rather than promote, adoption of institutions and policies compatible with 
rights regimes. While both the ruling of the ECtHR, and the EU progress reports 
monitoring the adoption and implementation of the European standards put pressures on 
the Turkish government for change, they do not guarantee (positive) rule adoption and 
implementation. Even though the ECtHR acknowledged the religious education in 
Turkey did not meet the criteria of objectivity and pluralism, the ruling of the Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin v.Turkey case only recognized the violations in parental rights. As 
result, while reform in religious education was expected and desired, the content and 
manner of change was left to Turkey’s political actors. Similarly, while EU progress 
reports drew attention to the non-compliance of the Turkish state with the Court’s 
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ruling, they did not call for specific policies. In other words, both organizations 
recognize the organization and instruction of religious courses as a domestic issue.  
 The ongoing stalemate in the state-Alevi relations in Turkey, the increasing 
success of Alevi interest groups to aggregate Alevi interests in Germany, and growing 
successful initiatives to integrate Alevis to social and political institutions in the 
European societies, call for further research on both on the representation of Alevi 
interests, and the implementation and internalization of norms on individual and 
collective rights.  
This dissertation only dealt with the issues of the urban Alevis who are more 
visible, but also heterogenous in their policy demands, and focused on the nationwide 
activities. Whether or not the actors and strategies of the representation of the Alevis at 
the local level change needs further attention. To what extent the branches of the 
umbrella organizations in small towns and cities reflect the demands and preferences of 
their headquarters require clarification. Additionally, during the fieldwork period some 
Alevi activists implied that the relationship between the Alevis and the political parties 
at the local level did not always mirror their relationship at the national level. Instead, 
on occasion some dialogue and co-operation between the Alevi interest groups and the 
municipalities of AKP (or MHP) can be detected.      
The heterogeneity of Alevi identity across Europe demands further research to 
understand the role and significance of networks in transforming domestic policies. The 
representation and participation dynamics of each state determines the legitimate actors 
and strategies in the Alevi struggle for rights. Therefore, the following questions need to 
be considered to have a deeper understanding of the transnational impact: To what 
extend the increasing rights granted to the Alevi communities in Europe can be 
attributed to the success of transnational networks, rather than domestic and legal 
frameworks? Can cooperation between different Alevi organizations be continued if 
each group in its host country frames the Alevi issues from a different perspective? Can 
the alliance between the AABF and ABF – who emphasized the cultural dimensions of 
Alevism more than religious – be maintained if AABF transforms itself into a Church-
like entity by acquiring KÖR status at the national level?  
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APPENDIX 1 
THE “PROTECTION OF MINORITIES” IN THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE  
(JUNE 24, 1923) 
Article 37 
   Turkey undertakes that the stipulation's contained in Article 38 to 44 shall 
be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor 
official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulation's, nor shall 
any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them. 
 
Article 38 
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete 
protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction 
of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. 
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise whether in 
public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which 
shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. 
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of 
emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the 
territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish 
Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order. 
 
Article 39 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same 
civil and political rights as Moslems. 
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be 
equal before the law. 
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any 
Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political 
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rights, as, for instance, admission to public employment's, functions and 
honours, or the exarchate of professions and industries. 
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of 
any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or 
in publications of any kind or at public meetings. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities 
shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of 
their own language before the Courts. 
 
Article 40 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the 
same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In 
particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at 
their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any 
schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the 
right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely 
therein. 
 
Article 41 
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those 
towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem 
nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary 
schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish 
nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not 
prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish 
language obligatory in the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish 
nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be 
assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums 
which may provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other 
budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. 
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the 
establishments and institutions concerned. 
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Article 42 
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem 
minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, 
measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the 
customs of those minorities. 
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of 
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of 
the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the 
Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint 
in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the 
churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the 
above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted 
to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of 
the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish 
Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and 
charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to 
other private institutions of that nature. 
 
Article 43 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be 
compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or 
religions observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason 
of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on 
their weekly day of rest. 
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from 
such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the 
preservation of public order. 
 
 
 
Article 44 
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect 
non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of 
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international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League 
of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of 
the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and 
Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these 
Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the 
League of Nations. 
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations 
shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or 
danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may 
thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper 
and effective in the circumstances. 
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law 
or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and 
any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the 
Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an 
international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute 
shall, if the other party thereto demands, he referred to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final 
and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the 
Covenant. 
 
Article 45 
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-
Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the 
Moslem minority in her territory 
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APPENDIX 2 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Name
609
 Place / Date Position/Significance 
Necdet Subaşı Ankara, DİB / 18.1.2013 
Organizer of Alevi Workshops & the 
current head of Strategy Development 
Unit in DİB 
H. B. Ankara / n.d. 11. 2012 
CHP Alevi activist / TBMM 
undersecretary from  
Z. E. Istanbul / 10.12.2012 CHP and Alevi activist 
H.A. Istanbul / 10.12.2012 
CHP and Alevi activist / Kurdish 
origin 
Ş. K. Ankara / 8.11.2012  
CHP and Alevi activist / member of 
Tokat business and cultural 
associations  
D. Ş. Ankara / 8.11.2012 
CHP and Alevi activist/ member of 
Kars Democratic Associations 
Federation [Kars Demokrat Dernekler 
Federasyonu] 
Z. G. Ankara / n.d. 11. 2012 CHP and Alevi Activist  
K.K. Ankara / 8.11.2012 CHP, non-Alevi 
V.O.Ç Ankara / 8.11.2012 CHP, non-Alevi 
E. Ç. Ankara /n.d. 11.2012 CHP activist 
Hıdır Akbayır Istanbul / 10.10.2012 Alevi activist/CEM 
A. Y. Istanbul / 10.10.2012 Alevi activist/AİDHB 
 
 
 
 
                                               
609 The list includes only those signed a consent form during my fieldwork. For ethical reasons the names 
of the interviewees from my earlier fieldwork in 2005-2007, and from the off-the-record interviews are 
excluded from the list.   
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